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Abstract  
The field of language motivation is almost 60 years old. Throughout these decades, one idea 
has been persistent: Motivation is assumed to be a conscious process on which the learner can 
exert direct control. That this conscious conceptualization might not give the full picture has 
not been seriously entertained. An important consequence ensuing from this approach is the 
overreliance on self-report measures, such as questionnaires and interviews. Thus, in effect, 
the individual’s conscious reflection on their own attitudes and motivation has been the 
primary source of empirical data for our field.  
This thesis challenges this hegemony of conscious motivation. It provides an 
extensive review of the various paradigms of unconscious attitudes and motivation. It traces 
back their origins, highlights some of their major findings, and reviews the instruments used 
within each paradigm to circumvent direct self-report (as well as the controversies 
surrounding these instruments). The review also demonstrates that the adoption of an 
unconscious perspective is not inconsistent with major theoretical frameworks in the field. It 
then selects one of these paradigms, namely implicit attitudes, to apply in the context of 
language learning.  
Two studies were conducted on two independent samples (with almost 700 
participants in total), in two different contexts (the UK and Saudi Arabia), and with different 
instruments of implicit attitudes (the Implicit Association Test and the Single-Target Implicit 
Association Test). Study 1 found that openness to language speakers at the implicit level is 
associated with more openness at the explicit level. Study 2 successfully replicated this 
finding, and extended it to language achievement—showing that learners with more favorable 
attitudes toward language speakers at the implicit level achieved higher grades in their 
English class. This finding could not be explained away by either social desirability or 
cognitive confounds. The results from these two studies were also meta-analyzed using Bayes 
factors in order to give an overall picture of the findings.  
The Discussion chapter wraps up this thesis by highlighting the relevance of this 
unconscious approach to the field more broadly. This chapter reviews a number of recent 
studies that have yielded similar findings to those from the current thesis. Some of these 
findings are then critically reanalyzed and reinterpreted in the context of unconscious 
motivation, thus demonstrating how adopting an unconscious approach helps view existing 
findings in a new light. In some cases, the analysis casts doubt on established ideas that have 
been taken for granted for decades.  
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The overall message of this thesis is not that conscious motivation should be 
disregarded. Instead, conscious motivation should be complemented with a consideration of 
the role of unconscious motivation. A conscious-only approach would offer a limited window 
into human attitudes and motivation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
All our science, measured against reality, is primitive and childlike –  
and yet it is the most precious thing we have 
—Albert Einstein  
 
 
In 2013, Ema Ushioda noted that “the unquestioned importance ascribed to English in global, 
national and educational policy terms does not simply translate into unquestioned positive 
motivation for learners of English” (Ushioda, 2013, p. 233). The recognition of the 
importance of Global English reflects the conscious level. The overarching goal of this thesis 
is to examine whether adopting an unconscious/implicit motivation perspective helps solve 
one piece of the puzzle described by Ushioda. More specifically, it is possible to hypothesize 
that some learners might harbor an unfavorable implicit attitude (despite a favorable explicit 
attitude) toward the language or its speakers, and that this implicit attitude might be a 
predictive factor of their motivation (or lack thereof) to learn the language and their eventual 
success in it. Because this question has not been addressed in the field, this thesis aims to fill 
this gap.  
1.1 Overview of this thesis  
Chapter 1 poses a very important question: Do we have free will? This is a fundamental 
question that every motivation researcher has to consider. Depending on whether it turns out 
that motivation is under or outside the individual’s control, a radical shift in theoretical and 
operational considerations must be made to accommodate this outlook. In an attempt to 
address this admittedly thorny question, Chapter 1 reviews evidence from a wide range of the 
human sciences, and concludes that the control individuals have over their motivation and 
behavior is much more limited than one might intuitively presume at first. Instead, the 
emerging picture points to a more indirect level of control. That is, a great deal of human 
behavior is caused by unconscious impulses, and the role of conscious thought is rather to 
restrain or redirect these impulses. This has led some researchers to dub this process as ‘free 
won’t’.  
Chapter 2 narrows down the scope of the review from the human sciences in general 
to the language motivation field in particular. It reviews the three phases that the language 
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motivation has passed through, and then focuses on various emerging themes. This chapter 
demonstrates that adopting an unconscious perspective is not inconsistent with major 
theoretical frameworks in the field. It is also shown that although theorizing in our field has 
not addressed unconscious motivation explicitly, major theoretical frameworks actually have 
an indispensable unconscious component. If anything, current language motivation theories 
are not doing justice to the potential of their own theoretical frameworks.  
Chapter 3 narrows the scope even further to focus specifically on unconscious 
attitudes and motivation. This chapter offers an extensive review of major paradigms that 
have investigated unconscious attitudes and motivation. Each paradigm is reviewed in detail, 
highlighting its history, major findings, and controversies surrounding it. Chapter 4 then 
zooms in on implicit instruments. It reviews various traditional and modern instruments that 
have been devised to avoid the reliance on direct self-report. This chapter details operational, 
practical, and statistical considerations for each of these instruments.  
Chapter 5 presents the empirical studies of this thesis. Two studies, with almost 700 
participants in total, were conducted in the UK and in Saudi Arabia. The two studies also 
utilized two established measures of implicit attitudes: the Implicit Association Test and the 
Single-Target Implicit Association Test. Overall, the results show that learners with favorable 
implicit attitudes toward language speakers show more openness toward language speakers 
and achieve higher grades in the English class. The results of the two studies were also meta-
analyzed in order to offer a more integrative picture of the findings. Chapter 6 finally links 
the approach adopted in this thesis and its findings to the field more broadly. This chapter 
demonstrates that adopting an unconscious motivation perspective can have important 
implications to the field as a whole. This, in turn, underscores the critical need to broaden the 
scope of our field to encompass unconscious attitudes and motivation.  
The above brief overview reveals the logic behind the structure of this thesis. The first 
chapters become successively narrower in scope until the two empirical studies. In the last 
chapter, the discussion becomes broader again in order to consider the implications of this 
research to the field as a whole. Figure 1.1 offers a visual illustration of this funnel-like 
structure.  
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Figure 1.1: Overview of the chapters of this thesis.  
 
This brief overview also points to what is unique about this thesis. It adopts an 
interdisciplinary approach, drawing from various disciplines that have informed our 
understanding of human behavior and motivation. In fact, the thesis has drawn from almost 
700 references, a substantial proportion of which come from outside our field. Transcending 
the narrow disciplinary boundaries has led this thesis to also discuss rather unconventional 
topics, including weighing in on some pressing contemporary affairs including intergroup 
intolerance and global terrorism.  
The design of the two empirical studies has incorporated a number of features to 
protect against some methodological limitations. As detailed in this thesis, these features 
include focusing on explicit–implicit congruence rather than just implicit attitudes, validation 
with cluster analysis, replication with a different sample in a different context with a different 
implicit instrument, extending the results to achievement rather than relying on intended 
effort as an outcome variable, using social desirability as an explicit control, and using an 
additional measure as an implicit control. All these steps were taken to bolster confidence in 
the conclusions derived from this thesis.  
The analysis of the data also drew from a myriad of statistical procedures, including 
Cronbach’s alpha, rho, Mokken scaling analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, chi-squared, t-
tests, correlations, Fisher’s r-to-z transformation, hierarchical linear regression, structural 
equation modeling, cluster analysis, MANCOVA, Bayes factors, and sensitivity analysis. A 
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number of software packages were also used, including SPSS, Amos, MSP5, R, and Excel. 
This thesis has also generated numerous journal articles, book chapters, and presentations in 
international conferences held in various parts of the world.  
The above brief overview also hints to the philosophy of research adopted in this 
thesis. The next section spells out this philosophy more explicitly.  
1.2 Philosophy of this thesis  
Generally speaking, the philosophy of academic research is discussed in terms of four levels: 
ontology, epistemology, methodology, and method. Each of these concepts is explained 
briefly next in order to place the present research in context. This discussion draws mainly 
from Ladyman (2007, see also O’Gorman & MacIntosh, 2015; Okasha, 2002, for more 
accessible summaries). 
First, ontology refers to the question whether there is a reality out there to be 
discovered independently of our perception and comprehension of it. Objectivist philosophers 
maintain that there is a reality out there, and so the researcher’s job is to uncover 
generalizable facts and principles about this reality, and to demonstrate that these are robust 
and replicable. This is the ontological position adopted in this chapter. Social constructivist 
philosophers, on the other hand, contend that truth is not mind-independent, and that 
‘epistemic authorities’ are the ones who subjectively determine what constitutes true and 
false beliefs. Some qualitative researchers already acknowledge this subjective feature in 
their research tradition. According to Lincoln and Guba,  
 
The “realities” taken to exist depend on a transaction between the knower and the “to-
be-known” in the particular context in which the encounter between them takes place. 
That transaction is necessarily highly subjective, mediated by the knower’s prior 
experience and knowledge, by political and social status, by gender, by race, class, 
sexual orientation, nationality, by personal and cultural values, and by the knower’s 
interpretation (construction) of the contextual surround. Knowledge is not 
“discovered” but rather created; it exists only in the time/space framework in which it 
is generated. (Lincoln & Guba, 2013, p. 40, original emphasis)  
 
This perspective might lead one to the view that “the Special Theory of Relativity is true 
because those in the scientific establishment who advocated it overcame the opposition from 
those who denied it” (Ladyman, 2007, p. 307). Although it is hardly questionable that 
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subjective perception can shape reality (e.g., self-fulfilling prophesies, see Chapter 5), it 
seems rather extreme to posit that there is no reality out there at all.  
Second, epistemology has to do with how to obtain knowledge of the world. Those 
who adopt an objectivist ontology tend to favor positivism, the belief that valid knowledge 
can be verified by subjecting observable (rather than metaphysical) entities to empirical 
investigation. Those who adopt social constructivist ontology tend to favor interpretivism, the 
belief that researchers should analyze how individuals make sense of their world through 
socialization processes. A more moderate position was advanced by Karl Popper (e.g., 1983, 
2002/1934), who argued that theories cannot be verified but only falsified. Positive results do 
not prove the theory, but only make it ‘empirically adequate’ (van Fraassen, 1980). This 
position came to be known as post-positivism (for an application in educational research, see 
Phillips & Burbules, 2000). Another moderate position is critical realism (Bhaskar, 1989), 
which admits both that there is a reality out there and that our access to that knowledge might 
be limited by our ability to perceive it. Groff (2004) argues that critical realism goes beyond 
post-positivism. Critical realism is also the position held by many complexity theorists who 
maintain that the purpose of social research is to uncover causal mechanisms in order to 
arrive at generalizable claims. In the words of David D. Byrne (2009), “the central project of 
any science is the elucidation of causes that extend beyond the unique specific instance” (p. 
1). Critical realism is the epistemological position adopted in the chapter; the main finding 
related to explicit–implicit congruence was examined in a difference sample in a different 
context in order to find out whether the results are unique to one sample or generalizable to 
others as well.   
Third, methodology has to do with the systematic approach to collecting data. 
Objectivists generally follow the hypothetico-deductive model, in which researchers test 
specific hypotheses typically quantitatively. This is the approach adopted here; specific 
research questions were derived from the literature in order to test specific predictions in the 
context of language learning. Many social constructivists on the other hand prefer to follow 
an opposite model, using an inductive approach to develop theories and understanding of the 
world. Finally, method has to do with the specific techniques used to collect data. The two 
studies of this thesis used questionnaires involving several Likert and semantic differential 
scales, as well as two reaction-time measures of implicit attitudes.  
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Chapter 2: Motivation across the Social Sciences1 
 
The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing 
—Socrates  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The fundamental difference between the hard sciences and the social sciences may not lie in 
the complexity of the latter, since it is possible to conceive of immensely complex situations 
in the hard sciences as well. Instead, the uniqueness of the social sciences might lie in 
people’s ability to choose how to behave. Particles and molecules do not make choices; their 
behavior is predetermined and predictable by physical and chemical laws. That such precise 
predictability is absent in human behavior constitutes a strong argument for our ability to 
exercise free will through rational thought. In fact, it is the human ability to think and make 
rational choices that underlies ethical and moral judgments, for example deeming humans 
worthy of praise and reward for good behavior, and answerable for wrongdoing.  
As intuitive as it might be, the above reasoning has not gone unchallenged over the 
years. On the one hand, advances in quantum mechanics show that precise prediction is not 
possible even in principle. The position and the momentum of a particle, for example, cannot 
be precisely determined simultaneously; the more precisely one is known, the less precisely 
the other can be determined. On the other hand, several studies have questioned the extent to 
which humans are in control of their actions and thoughts. As a preliminary illustration, one 
of the most striking findings in this respect comes from neuroscience, where research shows 
that the outcome of a decision could be detected in brain activity up to ten seconds before it 
entered awareness, suggesting that it might be possible to predict people’s behavior prior to 
their conscious decision to behave (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). Findings in a 
number of different paradigms have pointed to similar conclusions, leading some scholars to 
view our free will as a mere illusion (e.g., Wegner, 2002) and our behavior as largely 
determined by unconscious, automatic processes not by our conscious deliberation (e.g., 
Bargh & Williams, 2006). Other researchers have attempted to combine quantum 
indeterminacy with social sciences to account for human free will (Glimcher, 2005; Kane, 
 
                                                 
1 A version of this chapter has appeared in Al-Hoorie (2015).  
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1996). The applicability of insights from quantum mechanics to our behavior is however 
disputed (Juarrero, 1999; Lau, 2009; Nahmias, 2010). 
Any motivation researcher has to ask the question whether individuals have free will 
or not. If the person does not have much control over his/her behavior, how much confidence 
can we place on data obtained from self-reports? Considering that questionnaires and 
interviews are predominant in the field (Ushioda, 2013), this question becomes even more 
urgent. Complexity theory (e.g., Larsen-Freeman & Cameron, 2008) raises interesting 
questions regarding agency and whether the individual is capable of exercising free will by 
choosing how to behave. This is because one of the most common metaphors in complexity 
nomenclature is ‘the beach ball’, which suggests that the behavior of the individual tends to 
be a function of the terrain and its attractors, thus controlled by external factors. The beach 
ball does not have free will. Because multiple, combined and integrated forces constantly 
affect behavior, making it almost never in equilibrium, it is easy to overlook the ‘agent’ and 
whether one can be in charge of his/her own behavior. This reinforces the beach-ball view of 
the individual. Although few researchers in the field would explicitly embrace such a 
deterministic view, clearly this question has not received due attention. Every motivation 
researcher should ask this important question.  
Looking at the literature in general, scholars tend to agree on general principles on the 
relationship between the individual and the environment; beyond that, the issue is “oddly 
divisive” (Dörnyei, 2009a, p. 236). As an illustration, Larsen-Freeman and Cameron (2008, 
p. 76) conclude that “it remains to some extent an open question as to how far complexity 
theory can accommodate deliberate decision-making.” Indeed, complexity theory has made 
substantial strides in analyzing the terrain of the system and its attractors, with much more 
work to be done to consider extent to which behavior is governed by the various system 
parameters and attractors. After all, the ultimate goal is not merely to describe the terrain 
features but to understand their effect on behavior. In Albert Bandura’s (1997, p. 7) words, 
“Agency causation involves the ability to behave differently from what environmental forces 
dictate rather than inevitably yield to them.”  
The question of human agency and free will has been the subject of bitter debates and 
sharp disputes, stimulating the thought of intellectuals belonging to diverse disciplines 
including Albert Einstein, Samuel Johnson, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Jean-Paul 
Sartre and Percy Bysshe Shelley. The purpose of this chapter is to build on Larsen-Freeman 
and Cameron’s (2008) discussion of this subject by presenting an overview of a number of 
theoretical paradigms that have challenged the independence of human agency, followed by a 
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summary of the main arguments used by agency proponents in response to these challenges. 
The overall aim of this chapter is to establish a position on how much conscious control the 
individual has on his/her motivation, in order to set the scene for the following chapters.  
2.2 Agency under attack  
2.2.1 Early challenges  
In modern science, probably the first attempt to strip from humans the agency of their rational 
thought is represented in the psychodynamic paradigm. Sigmund Freud is credited to be the 
first scientist to offer a systematic analysis of unconscious motives (see Ellenberger, 1970, 
for a historical overview) and to conclude that the conflict between conscious and 
unconscious is not exclusive to those suffering from mental illness but a general structure of 
the human mind, and that only a minority of our actions are based on rational thought (cf. 
Rennison, 2001). Many critics disapproved of Freud’s theory because it was considered an 
‘insult’ to deeply held beliefs about the self and reason, a standpoint that Freud himself 
acknowledged but interpreted as ‘resistance’ and another defense mechanism not to accept 
this embarrassing truth (P. A. Robinson, 1993). According to the psychodynamic view, our 
conscious mind is only the tip of the iceberg, and our behavior is primarily motivated by 
early childhood experiences that lead to an unconscious battle between the id, ego and super-
ego, a battle fueled by the pleasure, the reality and later the death principles (Heller, 2005; 
Thurschwell, 2000). It is worth noting, though, that at the heart of the psychodynamic 
paradigm is the fundamental assumption that we can exercise control over our behavior, 
albeit indirectly, through the tools of psychoanalysis, such as studying dreams, free 
associations, and Freudian slips (N. Sherman, 2000).  
Psychoanalysis was replaced by the positivist empiricism of the behavioristic 
paradigm. Following David Hume’s (1921/1748) emphasis on the external nature of constant 
conjunction, John B. Watson’s methodological behaviorism rejected inner life because it is 
not directly observable and requires the unreliable method of introspection (Watson, 1913). 
B. F. Skinner’s radical behaviorism went one step further by contending that the mind was no 
more than an imaginary invention, like all cognitive constructs such as thinking, intention, 
and knowledge (Skinner, 1961). Our phenomenological feelings were interpreted as 
“collateral effects of the causes” (Skinner, 1989, p. 18), mere by-products of three kinds of 
selection by consequences: natural selection (genes), operant conditioning (reinforcement) 
and the social environment (Skinner, 1981). In his reply to Chomsky’s (1959) review of 
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Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957), Skinner (1972) claimed that creativity, whether in 
generative grammar or in poetry, is no more remarkable or less inevitable than a hen laying 
an egg!2 The belief that humans control their behavior was compared to the belief that the 
wind controls its movement or that the farmer controls which type of fruit the plant will 
produce (Skinner, 1978). Skinner opposed the agentic mind so forcefully that, in a speech just 
one day before his death, he equated the effect of cognitive science on psychology with that 
of creationism on science (Skinner, 1990). Skinner also accepted all corollaries of his 
position, rejecting free will, punishment for transgressions, and even human dignity (Skinner, 
1973).  
2.2.2. Modern challenges  
Today, the assumptions of Freud and Skinner that challenge our agency still persist in various 
guises. One is the behavior genetic paradigm, first systematically utilized in 1875 by Sir 
Francis Galton (Burbridge, 2001). The most powerful design to extract genetic influences is 
‘twins-reared-apart’ comparisons, limitations of which are compensated for by ‘adoptees-
reared-together’ comparisons to examine environmental effects in the absence of genetic 
similarity and by non-human selective breeding to allow for randomization (Plomin, 1990; 
Plomin, deFries, McClearn, & McGuffin, 2001). In 1979, the Minnesota Study of Identical 
Twins Reared Apart was initiated (see Segal, 2012) and found that “genetic variation is an 
important feature of virtually every human psychological trait” (Bouchard, 2008, p. 69). 
According to Bouchard (2004), heredity accounts for a substantial proportion of the variation 
in key human attributes such as mental ability (around 80%), personality (40–50%), 
psychological interests (36%) and social attitudes (65% for males and 45% for females), 
religiosity (30–45%), and psychiatric illnesses including Schizophrenia (80%), depression 
(40%), alcoholism (50–60%), and antisocial behavior (41–46%). Environmental influences 
play a far smaller role, sometimes even decreasing with age. Although genetic influences do 
not usually account for more than 50% of the variance (Plomin, 1990), this magnitude is still 
remarkable considering that it constitutes a single source (Bouchard & McGue, 2003), thus 
leaving all other influences to share the remaining variance. These results support Skinner’s 
argument that a substantial proportion of our behavior is shaped by natural selection. 
 
                                                 
2 In explaining his late reply, Skinner (1972, pp. 345–346) stated, “Let me tell you about Chomsky. I published 
Verbal Behavior in 1957. In 1958 I received a 55-page typewritten review by someone I had never heard of 
named Noam Chomsky. I read half a dozen pages, saw that it missed the point of my book, and went no further. 
In 1959, I received a reprint from the journal Language. It was the review I had seen, now reduced to 32 pages 
in type, and again I put it aside. But then, of course, Chomsky’s star began to rise….” 
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Further support to Skinner’s theory comes from the sociological paradigm, 
specifically from the structure vs. agency debate in sociology. In one extreme, Emile 
Durkheim (Durkheim & Lukes, 1982/1895) challenged Karl Marx’s philosophy and 
advocated the structuralist position that views human behavior as passively and 
unidirectionally determined by social structure. The other extreme, the voluntarist position, 
shifts the focus to the individual, construing social structure as a result of human’s purposeful 
autonomy, a position held by Max Weber (Weber, Roth, & Wittich, 1978/1922) and recently 
by Baert and da Silva (2010). A compromise between these two extremes was later reached 
in Anthony Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory and Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977/1972) theory of 
practice. This position sees structure and agency as having a dialectical relationship in an 
iterative process where the system is “recursively organized” (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). In this 
duality of structure, agents act reflexively to three sources of constraint (and enablement) 
represented in ability limitations, sanctions by powerful others, and structural contexts that 
limit the agent’s options. To draw an analogy, football players are constrained by rules but 
these rules also give players the freedom to compete in a fair game that does not descend into 
complete anarchy.  
Some sociocultural theorists in the second language (L2) field have expressed similar 
views (e.g., Duff, 2012; Lantolf & Thorne, 2006; van Lier, 2013) while others adopted a 
realist position (Gao, 2010; Sealey & Carter, 2004) arguing that agency and structure are 
independent and that their interaction produces emergent properties. Social psychologists 
working within Henri Tajfel and his student John Turner’s social identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986) have similarly demonstrated that group affiliation has a significant impact on a 
wide range of issues including stereotyping and prejudice (R. Brown, 2010), crowd behavior 
(Reicher, 2001), attitude and attitude change (Crano & Prislin, 2008), judgment and 
conformity (Jetten & Hornsey, 2012), and group motivation (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Hogg, 
Abrams, Otten, & Hinkle, 2004). In addition to structure and agency, psychologist Albert 
Bandura (1986) adds a third component in his triadic reciprocal causation model, namely 
behavior. In addition to influencing the environment, behavior, once it has occurred can, in 
turn, have an influence back on the individual. Even the story influences the storyteller 
(McAdams & Pals, 2006).  
In other words, “there is no chance that... [our decisions] can be disconnected from 
the social-political-historical-moral-cultural influences of our time” (Larsen-Freeman & 
Cameron, 2008, p. 76). That one has to constantly navigate through all these influences 
indicates that human agency cannot be understood by looking into the individual but, 
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paradoxically, by looking into the social context (Dreier, 2008) as individuals cannot be 
completely autonomous (Ahearn, 2001). In fact, ‘conditioning’ is still accepted as an 
explanation of environmental effects by some sociologists (see Archer, 2000) and social 
psychologists (Bohner & Dickel, 2011), while frequency of stimulus is seen as a key 
determinant of L2 acquisition at all levels of analysis including phonology, morphology, 
syntax, discourse, and orthography (Ellis, 2002). This magnitude of environmental effects 
lends support to Skinner’s argument that a large extent of our behavior is shaped by the 
environment.  
In the 1950s, the cognitive revolution supplanted behaviorism (Miller, 2003). The 
cognitive paradigm was largely inspired by Edward Chace Tolman’s (1951/1932) purposive 
behaviorism and was a major step in reinstating the role of mental life in human behavior. 
Cognitive psychology has subsequently split into two routes: the microanalysis of brain 
functions and the macro-analysis of the socially-situated individual’s goals, expectations and 
aspirations (Bandura, 2001). Proponents of both these research avenues agree that, contrary 
to behaviorism, external stimuli do not influence the individual directly but through how they 
are consciously perceived, thus restoring the individual’s role in the causal chain. However, 
new strands within cognitive psychology have started to challenge this view. Originally, 
Thomas Henry Huxley (2011/1894) proposed the ‘steam whistle hypothesis’, wherein 
behavior is caused by molecular changes in the brain while consciousness3 is a by-product f 
this process without causal effect. Replacing ‘conditioning’ with ‘automaticity’, but accepting 
internal processes, advocates of this view explicitly state that they have “reopened the 
behaviorists’ hypothesis that the higher order responses of the human being can be directly 
put in motion by environmental stimuli” (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000, p. 928, emphasis added). 
Empirical studies, utilizing conscious and unconscious priming techniques (for 
methodological reviews, see Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Neely, 1991), have confirmed that 
situational contexts have significant unintended effects: 
 
 cognitively, information-processing goals can be primed (e.g., memorize vs. evaluate; 
Chartrand & Bargh, 1996); 
 affectively, primes influence enjoyment and self-determination (i.e., intrinsic vs. 
extrinsic; Séguin Lévesque, 1999), attitudes toward goals (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004), 
 
                                                 
3 Although they are not strictly the same, consciousness and rational thinking are treated in the same way in this 
context. 
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goal-facilitating objects (Ferguson, 2008) and goal-facilitating people (Fitzsimons & 
Shah, 2009), as well as affect following success and failure (Moore, Ferguson, & 
Chartrand, 2011) and emotion regulation during anger provocation (Mauss, Cook, & 
Gross, 2007); 
 behaviorally, priming increases the probability of goal pursuit and effort exertion 
(Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 2008; Holland, Wennekers, Bijlstra, Jongenelen, & van 
Knippenberg, 2009) and of resumption after interruption and persistence after 
setbacks (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001); 
 socially, automaticity extends to behavioral contagion (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) and 
even moral judgment (Agerström & Björklund, 2009). 
 
Such unconscious effects can be activated by things as simple as chair softness (Ackerman, 
Nocera, & Bargh, 2010) or coffee temperature (L. E. Williams & Bargh, 2008). They also 
occur through the same brain regions (Pessiglione et al., 2007) and working memory 
involvement (Hassin, 2008) as conscious effects.  
In sum, automaticity is seen as “a staple and indispensable construct for the 
explanation and prediction of almost all psychological phenomena” (Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & 
Cleeremans, 2012, p. 593), estimated to be accounting for 99.44% of behavior (Bargh, 1997: 
243), while consciousness has “no role” (Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, & Aarts, 2007, p. 52) and 
“has been vastly overrated; instead, it is often a post-hoc explanation of responses that 
emanated from the adaptive unconscious” (Wilson, 2002, p. 107). What about our 
phenomenological feeling of agency? These scholars consider self-knowledge a poor, 
unreliable measure, citing studies on confabulation, choice blindness, and misattribution of 
agency (e.g., Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Hassin, 2010; Hall, Johansson, Tärning, Sikström, & 
Deutgen, 2010; Johansson, Hall, Sikström, & Olsson, 2005; Wegner, 2002). The magnitude 
of empirical evidence supporting the effect of unconscious processes on behavior left some 
wondering whether Freud is really dead (Westen, 1999) and whether the cognitive revolution 
would be just a detour to behaviourism (Mischel, 1997).  
Our exercise of agency has further been challenged by other paradigms as well. For 
example, random events are said to ‘rule our lives’ (Mlodinow, 2008), where accidental 
occurrences can become life-changing occasions. Our free will is also constrained by 
hormones and other biological factors, such as the effect of testosterone level on generosity 
(Zak et al., 2009) and social dominance (Terburg, Aarts, & van Honk, 2012), or the impact of 
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diet on depression (Akbaraly et al., 2009; Sánchez-Villegas et al., 2009) and on cognitive 
ability in childhood (von Stumm, 2012) and adulthood (Kesse-Guyot et al., 2012). The 
effects in all of these cases operate below the threshold of consciousness, and therefore we 
are unable to control them directly. However, as discussed below, some scholars argue that 
we can still exert indirect, second-order control (Bandura, 2008) by learning about these 
effects and behaving adaptively. Researching these issues is therefore an instance of 
exercising agency.  
2.2.3 Neuroscientific support  
A recent, powerful support to the arguments against direct agency comes from the 
neuroscientific paradigm. Initially, German researchers Hans H. Kornhuber and Lüder 
Deecke (1965) discovered that voluntary action is preceded by bio-electrical activation in the 
brain, which they termed Bereitschaftspotential, or readiness potential (RP). This finding did 
not seem particularly remarkable until 20 years later when Benjamin Libet and colleagues 
(1983) found “somewhat puzzlingly” (Larsen-Freeman & Cameron, 2008, p. 76) that RP 
precedes even the conscious intention to act. They concluded that ‘voluntary’ action is 
actually initiated unconsciously. Threatening as it is to free will, this conclusion attracted 
severe criticism on methodological (Klemm, 2010) and philosophical (Dennett, 2004; Mele, 
2009) grounds. Experiments also questioned whether RP represents a decision to act 
(Trevena & Miller, 2010) and whether introspection is a reliable measure of decision time 
(Banks & Isham, 2009). Nonetheless, more refined replications confirmed the original 
findings (Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Matsuhashi & Hallett, 2008). Other studies predicted 
which hand the participant would move with 60% accuracy (Soon et al., 2008) and used 
direct recordings from single neurons with more than 80% predictive accuracy (Fried, 
Mukamel, & Kreiman, 2011), the latter being the most accurate approach in contemporary 
neuroscience (Haggard, 2011). In all of these cases, the participants’ decisions were predicted 
before the participants themselves were aware they would make those decisions, leading 
some to conclude that we confuse correlation with causation in the relationship between our 
sense of agency and our intention to act (Wegner, 2002), and that full awareness of agency 
may even be ‘postdicted’ by the individual after action has been unconsciously initiated 
(Guggisberg, Dalal, Findlay, & Nagarajan, 2008). Neuroscientist John-Dylan Haynes 
wonders, “How can I call a will ‘mine’ if I don’t even know when it occurred and what it has 
decided to do?” (cited by K. Smith, 2011, p. 24). Further, magnetic brain stimulation can 
induce participants, unbeknownst to them, to choose which hand to move (Ammon & 
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Gandevia, 1990) and, recently, this non-invasive stimulation was found to improve numerical 
competence (Cohen Kadosh, Soskic, Iuculano, Kanai, & Walsh, 2010) and other arithmetic 
skills (Snowball et al., 2013) with effects observed as long as six months later!  
On the negative side, disruption to brain functions can have unwanted behavioral 
consequences. In addition to the famous Phineas Gage, whose personality reportedly changed 
after a freak work accident that destroyed part of his brain (see Fleischman, 2002; Macmillan, 
2000), brain tumors have been blamed for criminal behavior such as indecent conduct 
(Goldberg, 2001) and pedophilia (Burns & Swerdlow, 2003; see also Mobbs, Lau, Jones, & 
Frith, 2009) as well as more extreme disorders such as the alien hand syndrome (e.g., Assal, 
Schwartz, & Vuilleumier, 2007). These findings raise the question of whether our behavior is 
controlled unconsciously by our neurons. Yet, it is argued, we can exercise agency through 
consciously ‘vetoing’ the execution of impulses initiated unconsciously (though see Lau, 
2009; Libet, 2003, 2004) by implementing a ‘neural brake’ mechanism (Filevich, Kühn, & 
Haggard, 2012). Furthermore, this process, dubbed ‘free won’t’, is not the only function of 
consciousness because consciousness is an emergent property that also exerts top-down 
influence, complementing the unconscious bottom-up influence (Bandura, 2008; Gazzaniga, 
2012). Finally, this counterargument assumes that the unconscious initiation of action 
discovered by Libet is generalizable from the simple finger movement examined in these 
laboratory studies to all human behavior and cannot be explained away by skill automation 
(Bandura, 2008).  
2.3 Agency fights back 
The previous sections have presented in some detail a range of powerful arguments and 
positions that go against the grain of traditional motivation research by claiming that the 
antecedent of human behavior is not ‘motivation’ conceived as an attribute of which people 
are always aware. We have seen some potential counter-arguments, and in the following such 
arguments will be further explored in an attempt to suggest some possible interim position. 
Generally, those who adopt pro-agency views argue that the agent, given the same present 
situation and the same past events, ‘could have done otherwise’. They are usually open to 
accept that certain factors may play a role in our behavioral choices, but maintain that these 
factors merely influence them, as opposed to entirely produce them (Nichols, 2008). “Your 
genes, your upbringing, and your circumstances may predispose certain behavior tendencies. 
But ultimately it is you who decides and who bears responsibility” (Myers, 2008, pp. 32–33).  
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In an attempt to address the issue of agency head on, Baumeister, Masicampo, and 
Vohs (2011) embarked on the task of answering what at first seems an obvious question: Do 
conscious thoughts cause behavior? In order to establish causality, these scholars reviewed 
various carefully-selected lines of research that involve random assignment to experimental 
manipulations, such as imagining, mental practice, implementation intentions, and 
anticipation. In support of the agency view, their results showed that conscious causation of 
behavior is “profound, extensive, adaptive, multifaceted, and empirically strong” (Baumeister 
et al., 2011, p. 351). Agency proponents will certainly be delighted by this conclusion, but the 
disparity between this pro-agency conclusion and the wide range of anti-agency findings 
outlined above raises several questions.   
First of all, these two viewpoints need to be reconciled. In their article, Baumeister et 
al. (2011) realized that the role of conscious thought is not as direct as might be intuitively 
assumed, but offline and indirect: “Nothing indicated motivations originating in 
consciousness—instead, conscious thoughts interacted with existing motivations” (p. 351, 
emphasis added). Put differently, in many situations, our agency seems to be represented not 
in our direct control of behavior, but in our ability to resist an unconscious impulse or to 
select from multiple competing impulses. These resistant and selective roles of conscious 
behavior still affirm our agency, and by extension our moral responsibility, albeit in an 
indirect fashion (cf. Juarrero, 1999; Larsen-Freeman & Cameron, 2008). This indirect view of 
agency supports a duality within human nature; while on the one hand the terrain with its 
multiple influences disposes behavior toward one direction, on the other hand agentic 
behavior requires conscious evaluation of these tendencies and vetoing what is deemed 
maladaptive.  
The second question raised by the disparity of the agency-related findings is how 
consciousness can exercise its agentic role. That is, even if we accept the mediating influence 
of consciousness, we still need to explain the mechanism by which this agentic capacity is 
achieved. As Bargh and Ferguson (2000) argue, construing consciousness as an ‘uncaused 
cause’ reverts to a Cartesian dualism, which maintains that the mind is a non-physical entity 
(e.g., a soul) that is excluded from the causal order governing the body; in order to study 
consciousness scientifically, we must presuppose that it follows the physical laws of our 
universe. Complexity theory offers one solution that explains conscious free will without 
violating physical laws. Philosopher Alicia Juarrero (1999) maintains that modern philosophy 
is based on Aristotle’s (mistaken) contention that cause must be external to its effect. Instead, 
Juarrero asserts that an alternative to external cause is ‘self-cause’. That is, complex systems 
16 
 
allow emergent properties, and these properties can have qualitatively different functions. 
From this perspective, consciousness is seen as an emergent property that exerts top-down 
control on behavior.  
The third question concerns who can have this agentic ability. Is everybody capable of 
it? There seem to be at least two essential prerequisites. The first prerequisite is that one 
needs to believe in free will (Csikszentmihalyi, 2006). For example, research suggests that 
belief in determinism can lead to unethical behavior through yielding to enticement (Vohs & 
Schooler, 2008). Contrary to the philosophers who are interested in the abstract concept of 
free will and its existence, Dweck and Molden (2008) also argue that what people believe 
constitutes a psychological question, whose answer constructs differential psychological 
realties. This is because the laws of our universe referred to above also include human nature 
and how people view themselves, and this is at least partly self-constructed. To support their 
view, Dweck and Molden (2008) review diverse lines of research showing that self-
theories—as fixed or malleable—have a direct and unequivocal effect on behavior, attitudes, 
and motivation. They conclude that “personality is, in many ways, a highly dynamic system 
in which (changeable) beliefs can create a network of motivation and action” (Dweck & 
Molden, 2008, p. 58) and that “people’s self-theories have a cascade of effects on their 
personal motivation, as well as on the ways they judge and treat others” (p. 47).  
The second prerequisite is that agentic capacity requires becoming cognizant of the 
factors that influence one’s behavior. Awareness of the effects of unconscious primes may 
override and disrupt unconscious impulses (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Wegner & Bargh, 
1998). Group affiliation, for example, may lead to prejudice automatically, but the realization 
of this susceptibility would help one monitor one’s behavior and hopefully avoid the 
prejudice trap. People may shape their own destiny by learning about the factors that 
influence them. Agentic exercise of conscious thought can thus have a causal impact on 
behavior (for a review, see Baumeister et al., 2011) and therefore it is a false dichotomy to 
ask whether conscious or unconscious thought causes behavior; it is the interplay between the 
two (Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010; Nordgren, Bos, & Dijksterhuis, 2011). For this reason, 
psychological experiments typically involve blinding the hypotheses to be tested for fear of 
nullifying the independent variables under examination; allowing the participants to be 
conscious of the actual hypothesis prior to the study is considered “a scientific prohibition” 
(Bandura, 2007, p. 655). Even covert, nonverbal communication from the experimenter can 
bias the participants’ performance (Rosenthal, 2003).  
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In other words, the emergent nature of consciousness seems to allow one to exercise 
agency by recycling and reprocessing knowledge in order to reshape the boundaries of the 
system and change its trajectory. This illustrates the nonlinearity of the system; the same 
situational input (the terrain) can have divergent outputs depending on one’s expertise and 
attentiveness to input particulars. This conceptualization is compatible with the First Law of 
Thermodynamics (cf. Juarrero, 1999), which states that energy is always conserved, cannot 
be created or destroyed, and can only be converted from one form into another. That is, 
consciousness does not have to be an uncaused cause (or caused by a non-physical entity), 
but a reorganization of existing knowledge. Fate, we may argue, is not dictated by the terrain, 
but by whether one yields to, or resists it. In fact, it is probably this capacity to resist 
attractive attractors that makes humans unique. If our behavior were solely a product of the 
terrain, looking back and feeling proud about one’s achievements would become 
meaningless.  
An example of this agentic achievement should make the point clearer. A vivid 
illustration comes from research on psychological resilience. Resilience is defined as “the 
maintenance of positive adaptation by individuals despite experiences of significant 
adversity” (Luthar, Cicchetti, & Becker, 2000, p. 543). That is, some individuals are able to 
sustain normal functioning in situations of extreme stress, significant threat, severe adversity, 
and trauma (Cicchetti, 2010), and can actually thrive after these aversive events (Bonanno, 
2004). Such cases might be more interesting than cases where an individual follows the 
expected trajectory by succumbing to a negative attractor basin and consequently developing, 
say, mental disorders or other psychopathologies. Initially, theorists assumed that such 
resilient cases are exceptional, but empirical studies have shown that resilience is actually the 
most common response to potential trauma (Bonanno, 2005). Although it might be tempting 
to think of resilience as an individual difference trait, resilience researchers have forcefully 
challenged such a view. These researchers argue that resilience is not “in” the person 
(Masten, 2012, p. 208) or something that an individual “has” (Cicchetti, 2010, p. 146). 
Instead, they stress that resilience emerges from the dynamic interaction of multiple factors, 
internal and external to the individual, that have differential effects depending on time and 
context.  
Furthermore, like in so many other areas, researchers have been able to discover 
specific genes that appear associated with resilience. Kendler (2006) argues, however, that 
the expression ‘X is a gene for Y’ is misleading because it implies a causal relationship that is 
strong, clear, and direct, while in fact genes play a contributory role working in concert with 
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a host of other factors. Indeed, recent findings dispute the direct causal role of genes 
suggesting that:  
 
there is much more scope for a single gene to have multiple diverse actions. But, even 
more basically, this dynamic process forces one to reconceptualize just what is meant 
by a gene. These new findings in no way undermine the evidence of the crucial 
pervasive importance of genes but they do undermine any notion that genes are 
determinative in a simplistic fashion favored by the genetic evangelists. (Rutter, 2006, 
p. 151) 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Going back to the original question of whether the beach ball has free will, the above 
overview is consistent with Larsen-Freeman and Cameron’s (2008, p. 76) assertion that “we 
can marshal some substantial support for a positive answer to this question” and with 
Juarrero’s conclusion that “We are not passive products of either the environment or external 
forces. In a very real sense we contribute to the circumstances that will constrain us later on” 
(Juarrero, 1999, p. 253, emphasis added). This position is moderately optimistic as it rejects 
both the extreme view that we have absolute control over our behavior, and the other extreme 
that our behavior is entirely ruled by unconscious processes and external factors. Although 
past research has supported several behaviorist claims, investigations also point to our ability 
to exercise agency indirectly through top-down control (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2011; 
Windmann, 2005). This means that unconscious motivation plays a prominent role in human 
motivation. This thesis investigates the role of unconscious motivation.  
On a more theoretical note, this conclusion compels us to make an important 
distinction between the beach ball and the individual in relation to attractor states. While the 
ball gravitates toward various attractors, individuals can agentically repel themselves from 
certain others. As demonstrated in resilience research, this ironic process—repelling from 
attractors—is not uncommon and requires ordinary rather than extraordinary abilities, hence 
its nickname ‘ordinary magic’ (Masten, 2001). Motivational theorizing within a complexity 
framework has paid little attention to this repellent process to date and has instead focused on 
the expected trajectory of individuals gravitating toward attractor states. However, being at 
the heart of human agency, conscious repellent processes certainly deserve more attention in 
future research.   
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Chapter 3: Motivation across Language Learning Field4 
 
we witnessed an astonishing amount of recent activity that has left the field in a state  
barely recognizable from a decade ago 
—Dörnyei and Ryan (2015, p. 194) 
 
3.1 Introduction  
One day, a Canadian graduate student met with his advisor to discuss possible thesis topics. 
During that meeting, the student remarked that he could not see how one could learn the 
language of another group if s/he does not like that group. At this point the advisor said, “Hey 
man. There’s your thesis!” The student was Robert Gardner with his supervisor Wallace 
Lambert at McGill University in 1956 (Gardner, 2001b). That meeting gave birth to the field 
of second language (L2) motivation and was the primary instigator of decades of research.  
Building on the previous chapter, the purpose of this chapter is to offer a historical 
background of research into language motivation, and then highlight a number of emerging 
themes that seem to hold potential for future research. This chapter shows that our field is not 
immune to the ‘wind of change’, in that a number of exciting developments are taking place. 
One of these themes is unconscious motivation. This theme is introduced briefly in this 
context in order to position it side by side with other themes in the field. The following 
chapter will be fully devoted to unconscious motivation.  
The analysis in this chapter builds on and expands previous efforts to understand the 
historical trajectory of the field (e.g., Dörnyei, 2005; Dörnyei & Ryan, 2015; Dörnyei & 
Ushioda, 2011). These historical analyses have identified three phases that the field has gone 
through. The first is the social psychological period, in which a common theme was the focus 
on the macro-perspective language learning. That research was largely concerned with 
affective factors in intergroup relations. The field then progressed into a second phase, in 
which the scope of research was expanded to address the individual learner in the micro-
context of the classroom and on the cognitive processes underlying language learning. 
Finally, the current, third phase is witnessing the emergence of several innovative directions 
that are surveyed in this chapter.  
 
                                                 
4 A version of this chapter has appeared in Al-Hoorie (2017).  
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Previous surveys of the field may be characterized as back-pointing, in that they have 
primarily focused on trends found in the past two phases without elaborating on the emerging 
trends in the current period. The present analysis therefore offers a more forward-pointing 
survey of these emerging trends. As reviewed below, some of these themes have been 
discussed separately in the literature, but they have not been synthesized and presented in one 
place to date.  
It goes without saying that there will always be some overlap between historical 
phases, and that there are some researchers who have made important contributions to more 
than one phase. Therefore, I do appreciate that “we need to take care not to portray 
researchers… as part of a coordinated, focused movement, when it was more the case of 
various diverse concerns emerging at a similar time” (Dörnyei & Ryan, 2015, p. 80). Still, 
understanding the historical trajectory of the field would allow us to make projections and 
future recommendations.  
3.2 The social psychological period  
The social psychological period was spearheaded by Gardner and associates in Canada (e.g., 
see Gardner, 1979, 1985, 2010). The fundamental basis of this research is the assumption that 
learning an L2 is different from other school subjects because L2 learning additionally 
requires openness to the L2 group and willingness to adopt features from it. This concept 
came to be known as integrative motivation. A number of researchers in the first part of the 
20th century—including Arsenian, Marckwardt, Nida, Whyte, and Holmberg—who 
challenged the then-dominant view that intelligence and aptitude are the primary factors in 
successful L2 learning. Building on work by these researchers, Gardner undertook a more 
focused investigation into the role of affective factors.  
Gardner (2010) classifies the history of his own research program into three phases. 
He calls the first phase ancient history. This phase dates from 1945 to 1972, and covers the 
above early researchers as well as Gardner’s MA and PhD work and later research included 
in Gardner and Lambert (1972). The second phase, or early history, spans the 1970s and the 
early 1980s. During this period, Gardner and P. C. Smythe obtained funding to establish the 
Language Research Group at the University of West Ontario, and conducted studies across 
Canada. Gardner calls the last phase of his research modern history, which describes work 
conducted in the 1980s. This is when Gardner and his graduate students continued research 
after the Language Research Group was disbanded. (As explained in more detail below, the 
1990s marked the beginning of the cognitive–situated period.)  
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During these three phases, Gardner and associates engaged in a very productive 
research program, which led to the development of the socio-educational model (for a review, 
see Gardner, 2010). This model postulates four different aspects of the learning process: 
social milieu (cultural and educational backgrounds), individual differences (intelligence, 
aptitude, motivation, and anxiety), acquisition contexts (formal versus informal), and 
outcomes (linguistic versus non-linguistic). Most empirical research focused on the 
integrative motive, according to which language achievement is influenced positively by 
motivation and aptitude, and negatively by language anxiety. Motivation, in turn, is a 
function of integrativeness, attitudes toward the learning situation, and instrumentality. 
Gardner (2007) also identifies four stages of L2 development: elemental, consolidation, 
conscious expression, and automaticity and thought. From this perspective, “acquisition 
involves making the language part of the self” (Gardner, 2010, p. 7).  
This research generated the Attitude/Motivation Test Battery (AMTB), which has 
undergone extensive validation research examining its psychometric properties. This 
instrument has also permitted Gardner and associates to test a large set of formal hypotheses 
derived from the socio-educational model. Gardner (1985, 2010) summaries the major 
findings from this research:  
 
 Higher achievement: Integratively motivated learners consistently achieve higher 
grades than those who are not so motivated.  
 Classroom behavior: Integratively motivated learners volunteer more frequently in 
the L2 class, give correct answers more often, and seem more satisfied at the end of 
the class. This pattern could not be explained away by other factors, such as teachers’ 
differential treatment.  
 Persistence in L2 studies: Integrative motivation is a better predictor of re-enrolment 
in the L2 class than is aptitude.  
 More autonomy: Learners who opt for self-instructional courses are more 
integratively motivated than are learners who prefer regular courses.  
 Rate of learning: Integratively motivated students learn significantly faster than do 
students with low integrative motivation.  
 Length of learning: Integratively motivated learners spend more time studying than 
do instrumentally motivated ones, who quit once the reward is no longer available.  
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 Lower Anxiety: Integratively motivated learners report less state anxiety during 
learning.  
 Participation in excursion programs: Integrative motivation has an influence on 
learner’s decision to take part in excursion programs into areas where the L2 is 
spoken, and on behavior while there.  
 Attrition after learning: Integrative motivation has a negative effect on attrition, and 
this effect is mediated by initial achievement and subsequent use.  
 Mediating the effect of personality: Both integrative motivation and aptitude mediate 
the effect of personality on L2 achievement.  
 Language-specificity: Integrative motivation is language-specific, in that the learning 
benefits described above are specific to the language that the learner is integratively 
motivated to learn, and do not generalize to other languages.  
 Application to L1: Learners who show more integrative motivation in relation to their 
own L1 are also more successful in advanced L1 studies.  
 Application to foreign language contexts: Because some of this research was 
conducted in Canadian provinces that are predominantly monolingual, Gardner 
argued that the results are therefore generalizable to foreign language contexts. More 
recently, Gardner (2010, Chap. 7) reviewed research that was conducted in different 
countries around the world, and that also supported his model. These countries 
include Brazil, Croatia, Japan, Poland, Romania, and Spain.  
 
A meta-analysis of research by Gardner and associates shows that the mean 
correlation between the motivation construct in Gardner’s model and school grades is .37 
(Masgoret & Gardner, 2003). This coherent line of research consolidated the socio-
educational model, making it the most established theory of L2 motivation for several 
decades in a row.  
Although Gardner’s framework was arguably the dominant paradigm in the social 
psychological period, there were also other frameworks active at the time. These include 
Clément’s (1980) social context model, Giles and Byrne’s (1982) intergroup model, and 
Schumann’s (1978) acculturation model. However, as Dörnyei and Ryan (2015) observe, the 
common theme shared by all of these approaches is their macro-level analysis of the 
interrelationship between social groups and contextual variables. Serious interest in the 
individual learner in the classroom micro-context had to wait until the second period.  
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3.3 The cognitive–situated period 
For decades, Gardner and associates have repeatedly insisted that the socio-educational 
model is dynamic rather than static (e.g., Gardner, 2010, p. 46; Gardner & Tremblay, 1994, p. 
366; MacIntyre, 2002, p. 49) and that it “does not just link variables together but describes a 
process” (Gardner, 2010, p. 59). Nevertheless, Gardner has also acknowledged that, 
 
It is not intended to provide explanations to individual teachers as to why or why not 
some of their students are more or less successful than others, or to give teachers 
advice on how to motivate their students, or to provide reasons to students to help 
them understand their own success or lack thereof. It is a model to account for general 
relationships in a parsimonious and testable structure that is subject to verification and 
replication. (Gardner, 2010, p. 26)  
 
In addition to not being classroom-friendly, Gardner’s model was criticized from other 
perspectives. For example, Dörnyei (1994b, 2005) explains that mixing motivational intensity 
(i.e., effort) with the abstract mental phenomenon of motivation will increase the construct’s 
predictability of the behavioral ‘outcome’ simply because behavior is already part of it (see 
also MacIntyre, 2002, p. 49). Additionally, with the spread of World English as a 
decentralized global language, the idea of integrating with native speakers from Anglophone 
countries started to became less and less meaningful (e.g., Coetzee-Van Rooy, 2006). Some 
integrative and instrumental orientations have also become hardly distinguishable (Lamb, 
2004).  
Starting from the 1990s, these accumulating issues led language motivation research 
to shift into a new phase, which was described as the cognitive–situated period (Dörnyei & 
Ryan, 2015; Dörnyei & Ushioda, 2011). Because Gardner’s integrativeness was conceived of 
as an affective factor, Dörnyei (e.g., 2010) tried to uncover its cognitive underpinnings 
through reinterpreting it into the ideal L2 self. The attempt to reinterpret integrativeness in 
cognitive light gave birth to the L2 Motivational Self System (L2 MSS, Dörnyei, 2005, 
2009b). The L2 MSS consists of the ideal L2 self, the ought-to L2 self, and the L2 learning 
experience, thus preserving the original tripartite conceptualization of the integrative motive. 
The L2 MSS is based on two ‘parent’ theories, self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) and 
possible selves theory (Markus & Nurius, 1986). On the one hand, learners experience 
uneasiness if their perceived level of proficiency is discrepant from the level they aspire to 
achieve (i.e., actual–ideal discrepancy) or from the level they think they are expected to meet 
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(i.e., actual–ought discrepancy). This psychological uneasiness may serve as a motivator to 
reduce this discrepancy by improving L2 proficiency. On the other hand, possessing an 
elaborate vision of a desired possible self may intensify one’s motivation because the 
imagined self becomes an experiential reality that the individual can see and hear. The closest 
parallel to this ideal self-image is the L2 native speaker. Learners, therefore, could draw from 
their past knowledge of L2 speakers to envision for themselves a desired future that would 
have a motivational effect in the present. According to a survey of language motivation 
research spanning about a decade, Boo, Dörnyei, and Ryan (2015) observed that the L2 MSS 
is currently the dominant framework in the field.  
In another survey spanning about two decades, Sugita McEown, Noels, and Chaffee 
(2014) also observed that an increasing number of researchers have used Self-Determination 
Theory (SDT, Deci & Ryan, 1985) as their primary theoretical framework, or have drawn 
from some aspects of it. According to SDT, individuals have an inherent proclivity to seek 
out novel and stimulating experiences in order to expand their capacities and learn. This is 
what SDT calls intrinsic motivation. Additionally, SDT proposes that individuals might also 
be motivated to engage in an activity when it is perceived as consistent with one’s sense of 
self and its values (integrated regulation), when it facilitates attainment of other self-defining 
values (identified regulation), when it is not perceived as valuable but—because significant 
others perceive it so—it acquires self-esteem implications (introjected regulation), or when it 
is simply associated with certain rewards or punishments (e.g., passing a test or gaining a job 
promotion, external regulation).  
In addition to these two theoretical frameworks, some researchers have continued 
trying to realign language motivation with educational psychology and to make use of other 
non-L2-specific theories, such as social cognitive theory (e.g., Mills, Pajares, & Herron, 
2007) and attribution theory (e.g., M. Williams, Burden, Poulet, & Maun, 2004). The scope 
of research was also expanded to involve some innovative constructs, including vision 
(Dörnyei & Kubanyiova, 2014) and imagination (Norton, 2013). This type of innovation 
necessitated also expanding the methodological repertoire, which has led to an increasing 
number of qualitative investigations as well as practical applications of language motivation 
research into classrooms (Boo et al., 2015). In fact, because this research has been so 
concerned with classroom processes and with making motivation research more teacher-
friendly—as opposed to the focus on larger picture in the social psychological period—it 
might be appropriate to describe this phase as the educational period.  
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Another interesting development is the recognition of the role of identity (e.g., 
Dörnyei & Ushioda, 2009). This follows an early trend in motivational psychology (e.g., 
Foote, 1951), and a more recent trend in other SLA disciplines, with some researchers 
portraying language learning as a struggle to develop a new identity (van Lier, 2007) and a 
liberation from the monolingual one (Kramsch, 2009). In fact, Block (2007) describes this 
trend as ‘the rise of identity in SLA research’. Indeed, identity is considered a central, 
organizing construct that constitutes the gate to understanding motivation and learning 
engagement or lack thereof (e.g., Oyserman, 2015; Turner & Nolen, 2015), while 
identification is seen as the basic motivational mechanism (Brophy, 2009), without which 
discussions of motivation and competence are incomplete (Wigfield & Wagner, 2005). Due 
to its centrality, identity will most likely remain a vital theme in future research.  
3.4 The current period 
According to Dörnyei and Ryan’s (2015) historical analysis, the language motivation field is 
currently in its third phase. Dörnyei and Ryan characterize this period by the shift to socio-
dynamic perspectives. Indeed, perhaps the most salient characteristic of this phase is the 
growing emphasis on the dynamic nature of motivation and its temporal variation. However, 
a number of other themes are also emerging, and this makes it hard to give this period a 
single monolithic title. Such titles usually emerge in retrospect, especially when the field is 
ready to move to a new phase. 
Looking at developments in the field from a broader perspective, some commentators 
(e.g., Boo et al., 2015; Sugita McEown et al., 2014) have also pointed out some limitations in 
previous research. For example, both of these periods coincide in characterizing motivation 
as a conscious process in which learning English—rather than other languages—is examined 
within a relatively short duration and using rather “simplistic” research designs (Boo et al., p. 
156). The samples investigated also tend to be tertiary students, while different theoretical 
frameworks have tested participants from different age groups and from different cultural 
backgrounds, thus making cross-theoretical comparisons problematic (Sugita McEown et al., 
2014). Additionally, most of this research has overlooked the increasing technologization of 
everyday life and its impact on language learning nowadays. Some of these themes are 
discussed in more detail in this section.  
26 
 
3.4.1 Stable vs. dynamic  
The observation that, unlike L1 learners, L2 learners vary substantially how successful they 
are in their language proficiency prompted research into individual differences (IDs). 
Researchers identified several ID factors that could potentially account for this variability, 
such as aptitude, motivation, learning styles, learning strategies, and anxiety (e.g., Dörnyei, 
2005; Skehan, 1989). This approach can be intuitively summarized as finding out “why, how 
long, how hard, how well, how proactively, and in what way the learner engaged in the 
learning process” (Dörnyei & Ryan, 2015, p. 6, original italics). Despite the intuitive appeal 
of this approach, recent theoretical analysis suggests that it is no longer tenable. In fact, 
because this approach rests on a number of problematic assumptions, Dörnyei (2009c) has 
described it as the ‘individual differences myth’.  
One of these problematic assumptions is that these IDs are clearly identifiable 
(Dörnyei, 2009c). However, close examination of some of the traditional IDs shows that the 
borders between them are fuzzier than first assumed. For example, while motivation is 
traditionally viewed as an affective factor and has been contrasted with the cognitive nature 
of aptitude, in reality most influential motivational theories draw heavily from cognitive 
research and have cognitive components. Another example is anxiety, which is sometimes 
treated as a motivational component, sometimes as a personality trait, and sometimes as an 
emotion (MacIntyre, 2002). Similarly, aptitude involves not only cognitive aspects, but also 
affective and conative dimensions (P. Robinson, 2007). The fuzzy distinction between the 
different IDs calls into question their modular, monolithic view.  
Another problematic assumption is that IDs are relatively stable (Dörnyei, 2009c). 
However, it is now increasingly recognized that, far from being stable, IDs are highly 
sensitive to contextual and temporal variation. From context to context and from time to time, 
the different IDs fluctuate and consequently their effect on language learning correspondingly 
fluctuates. A ‘motivated’ learner may be less motivated on the next day, or at the next task. 
Even fluid intelligence and language aptitude are not fixed. Fluid intelligence, which used to 
be assumed fixed and genetically predetermined, interacts with the environment, and 
therefore it is “dynamic rather than static and modifiable rather than fixed,” which makes it 
“trainable to a significant and meaningful degree” (Sternberg, 2008, p. 6791). Neither is 
language aptitude independent of context, and instead it is sensitive to task and situation 
specificity (P. Robinson, 2007). Therefore, the observed association between a cause and its 
effect may be substantial at one occasion but negligible at another (Ellis & Larsen-Freeman, 
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2006). “People do what their immediate situations tell them to do rather than what their long-
standing internal traits might prompt them to do” (McAdams, 2006, p. 12).  
Another curious situation is that ID research has actually been concerned more with 
group aggregates rather than individuals, making the term ‘individual differences’ research 
somewhat of a misnomer (Dörnyei, 2009c). Originally, the idea that variability is unwanted 
noise that should be eliminated through aggregation was firmly established by the work of 
Ronald A. Fisher, whose statistical revolution originated primarily from his extensive study 
of crop variation. As Barlow, Nock, and Hersen (2009) explain, in this agronomical approach 
“the fate of the individual plant is irrelevant in the context of the yield from the group of 
plants… if the yield is better on the average than a similar plot treated differently” (p. 7, 
original emphasis). However, this wholesale approach does not always work in the social 
sciences. Especially when it comes to language learning, many questions require more fine-
tuned understanding of the phenomenon of interest, and therefore this generic group-based 
approach is usually useful only as a starting point for more detailed analyses.  
An alternative to the modular view of IDs is that learner characteristics are 
dynamically changing both in response to context and time, and as a result of their interaction 
with each other. Dörnyei (2009c, p. 231) suggests that dynamic systems theory may be a 
viable approach that can do justice to this complex conceptualization. The adoption of a 
complexity theory perspective in language motivation may be seen as officially inaugurated 
by the publication of a recent anthology edited by Dörnyei, MacIntyre, and Henry (2015). 
The contributors to this volume drew from a variety of data-analytic techniques to examine 
the dynamics of motivation such as idiodynamics, latent growth modeling, and trajectory 
equifinality analysis. Dörnyei and Ryan (2015, p. 102) anticipate that this new perspective 
has the potential to keep language motivation researchers busy for the next decade. Dörnyei’s 
conclusion aptly summarizes the gist of this novel direction:  
 
I have come to believe that the key area where the traditional ID view must be 
reformed is the need to accept that individual variation is not so much a function of 
the strength of any individual determinant (e.g. aptitude or motivation) as the way by 
which the complex system of all the relevant factors works together. (Dörnyei, 2009c, 
p. 195)  
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3.4.2 Cognitive vs. affective  
Dörnyei’s attempt to reinterpret integrativeness in cognitive terms was part of a more general 
trend in the language motivation field. Starting in the early 1990s, researchers tried to adopt 
cognitive constructs following the then-trendy approach in educational psychological 
research (e.g., Dörnyei, 1994a). This general shift from affective-based models to cognitive-
based models seems to implicitly reflect the view that affect is a ‘post-cognition’ 
phenomenon, in that affect is a mere result of cognition (e.g., Muncy, 1986): Once we 
understand the cognitive processes involved, we can then deduce the affective outcomes. 
While this view was dominant after the cognitive revolution, more recent research has cast 
doubt on it. For example, Pessoa (2008) argues that, at the neural level, the view that 
cognition and emotion are separate entities does not hold; in many cases, the two contribute 
jointly to behavior (see also Okon-Singer, Hendler, Pessoa, & Shackman, 2015). The 
situation is no different when it comes to language learning. As Schumann (1997) explains, 
“from a neural perspective, not only are various affective processes interrelated, but affect 
and cognition are also intimately intertwined” (p. 238). If this is the case, then affect should 
also be integrated in our models. (See also Ford, 1992, who details the need for clear 
accounts of cognitive and effective processes, calling it an identity crisis in the motivation 
field.) 
A number of SLA researchers have started to recognize the need for such an 
integrative approach. For example, MacIntyre, Noels, and Moore (2010) maintain that 
researchers with a certain theoretical stance can obtain certain perspectives, but each 
theoretical stance also inherently conceals certain other perspectives. Similarly, Pavlenko 
(2013) advocates an integrative approach, in which researchers should “merge [these] lines of 
inquiry, placing embodied subjects in their linguistic and social contexts” (p. 6). In a similar 
fashion, Dörnyei and Ushioda (2011) propose a systemic approach that involves motivation 
conglomerates. In this view, rather than isolated and distinct individual difference variables, 
conglomerates include both cognitive and affective factors as wholes, such as interest, flow, 
and self-guides (see also Dörnyei, 2009c; Dörnyei & Ryan, 2015). Indeed, due to the 
complexity of human motivation and its intimate connection with identity, the cognitive 
approach alone may be insufficient without considering the affective dimension as well. The 
growing awareness of the need for an affective dimension has been dubbed as the affective 
turn is SLA (Pavlenko, 2013).  
An important class of this affective dimension is emotions, due to their close 
connection to identity and adjustment in language learning (e.g., Noels, Pon, & Clément, 
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1996). In fact, it might be argued that emotions are ‘true’ affects, while the affective-based 
models in the first period may actually be cognitive to some extent. Despite this, emotions 
have not received adequate attention in the SLA field in general and in language motivation 
in particular. Dörnyei and Ryan (2015) blame this on the cognitivist roots of SLA, as well as 
the irregular, fluctuating nature of emotions. This is why Dörnyei and Ryan (2015) describe 
emotions as “the greatest omission” (p. 9) among individual difference variables, leading the 
field to suffering from an “emotional deficit” (p. 10). Emotions were also described as 
“fundamentally important motivators” (MacIntyre, Mackinnon, & Clément, 2009, p. 47) and 
as “the fundamental basis of motivation” (MacIntyre, 2002, p. 45), since motivation without 
emotion remains cold cognition that lacks potency. Swain (2013) also considers emotions the 
elephant in the room, maintaining that cognition and emotion are at least interdependent and 
at most integrated and inseparable. In line with this perspective, Dörnyei (2009c) has 
rethought the role of emotions in SLA, treating the emotional system as equal to the cognitive 
and motivational systems.  
Despite the fact that emotions have long been kept “in the shadows” of language 
learning discussions in favor of other variables (Garrett & Young, 2009, p. 209), actual 
classroom experience indicates that ability and attitudes alone are not sufficient to support 
motivation (MacIntyre, 2002). Classrooms in general are a cause of emotional turmoil for 
many people, and the language classroom in particular can be an especially emotionally 
loaded experience (Dörnyei & Murphy, 2010). As an illustration, MacIntyre (2002) gives the 
example of embarrassment. It is hard to imagine a language learner who has not been in an 
embarrassing situation in the language classroom and, depending on the intensity of 
embarrassment, the learner might resort to withdrawal or reticence as a form of emotional 
defense (King, 2011). It does not help that curriculum designers find it easier to focus on 
rigid activities that involve little emotional investment, which puts further burden on the 
teacher (Dewaele, 2005, 2011, 2015). To deal with this situation, Kramsch (2009) 
recommends that teachers try to detect aspects in the syllabus that can be subject to emotional 
arousal, such as love or hate, in order to encourage more learner investment in the lesson.  
Research into emotions in language learning has traditionally tended to focus on the 
detrimental effects of negative emotions, most notably anxiety (e.g., Horwitz, Horwitz, & 
Cope, 1986). More recently, however, Gregersen and MacIntyre (2014) have argued that 
neither are negative emotions always bad, nor should researchers overlook positive emotions. 
This position has materialized most clearly in the publication of three anthologies in the same 
year (Gabryś-Barker & Gałajda, 2016; Gkonou, Tatzl, & Mercer, 2016; MacIntyre, 
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Gregersen, & Mercer, 2016) marking the inception of the positive psychology movement in 
SLA. The contributors to these anthologies discuss non-traditional topics relating emotions to 
language learning. Examples include empathy, hope and hardiness, enjoyment, flow, 
eudemonic happiness, and love. Considering the controversial status of positive psychology 
(e.g., Coyne & Tennen, 2010), the next few years would reveal the extent to which this 
movement is accepted in mainstream L2 motivation. 
3.4.3 Short- vs. long-term 
If motivation is tightly connected to identity, then understanding how identity develops in the 
first place should be a central concern. Identity does not emerge in a vacuum, but develops 
through interaction with various events in one’s life history. The life history of each learner 
plays a major role in whether s/he decides to take up learning the language and whether s/he 
sees a reason to persist in it. This requires researchers to look at the bigger picture of the 
ecology motivation. As an illustration, educational psychologist Avi Kaplan describes how 
this notion emerged in his research:  
 
Exploring various methodologies, [Kaplan] conducted a narrative interview study 
with 10 undergraduate students, aiming to understand the processes that led them to 
adopt different achievement goal orientations toward their studies in college. To his 
surprise, when asked about their experiences, choices, and engagement in college, the 
students spoke relatively little about the characteristics of the learning environment, 
their self-efficacy, or their attributions for success and failure. Instead, they elaborated 
on growing up in their hometown, their high school experiences, their dilemmas 
concerning careers and relationships, their family, ethnicity, friends, and the peer 
groups they belonged to or wanted to belong to. These students mentioned 
schoolwork specifically when the material seemed to be relevant to who they thought 
they were and who they considered or wanted to be. [Kaplan] had the insight that, to a 
large extent, these students’ achievement goals in college were based in their identity 
and identity formation processes. (Kaplan & Flum, 2009, p. 73) 
 
Building on Erik Erikson’s (1968) theory of identity development, James Marcia (1966, 
1967) proposed an influential theory of identity development. Marcia identified four identity 
statuses, or types, that individuals develop through socialization processes. From lowest to 
highest, these identity statuses are  
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 diffusion identity, those who have not made life commitments and are not interested 
in doing so;  
 foreclosure identity, those who have committed without exploration, such as 
following parental standards;  
 moratorium identity, those who are still in the process of searching for commitments 
to establish their identities; and  
 identity achievement, those who have made life commitments after meaningful 
exploration (for a more recent analysis, see Kroger & Marcia, 2011).  
 
Meta-analyses of 40 years of research into these identity statuses show that individuals with 
the higher types tend to exhibit superior cognitive, emotional, self-determined, and 
interpersonal skills (Martinussen & Kroger, 2013). The socialization processes giving raise to 
these identity statuses are further complicated by neuroscientific evidence showing that 
different areas in the adolescent brain mature unevenly leading to problems in the self-
regulation of emotions and behavior (Van Leijenhorst & Crone, 2009, p. 212). Consequently, 
due to these various socialization and maturation factors, about half of late adolescents fail to 
progress to higher identity statuses by the time they leave tertiary education (Kroger, 2003, p. 
215), and therefore the scope of identity development spans well into adulthood (Hoshman, 
2003).  
Investigation of this developmental change and fluctuation may be achieved through 
micro- and macro-process models (cf. Dörnyei & Ottó, 1998), and this requires longitudinal 
designs. Unfortunately, longitudinal designs are a minority in the language motivation 
literature, while the majority of research is cross-sectional (Sugita McEown et al., 2014). This 
status quo creates gaps in our knowledge. For example, despite their popularity in the 
literature lately, L2 self-guides have been typically examined cross-sectionally, and so little is 
known about how they initially develop or their evolutionary trajectories over time. For 
example, Dörnyei (2009b) suggests that L2 self-guides might not be appropriate for pre-
secondary learners (see also Lamb, 2012), but there is “virtual absence” (Boo et al., 2015, p. 
156) of systematic research into the motivation of younger learners.  
An interesting exception to the lack of research on long-term motivation is the recent 
development of the notion of Directed Motivational Currents (DMCs, Dörnyei, Henry, & 
Muir, 2016; Dörnyei, Ibrahim, & Muir, 2015; Dörnyei, Muir, & Ibrahim, 2014; Muir & 
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Dörnyei, 2013). DMCs may be described as flow-like experiences (cf. Csikszentmihalyi, 
1975) that extend over diverse tasks unified by an overall goal. In other words, DMCs are 
unique motivational surges that span over longer time-scales and that are not necessarily 
enjoyable in themselves—since pleasure is derived from the end goal that is external to the 
activity. DMCs therefore occur when there is a clear vision of that goal as well as an 
identifiable factor triggering the launch of motivation. After their launch, DMCs are then 
maintained by ongoing behavioral routines and progress checks. Eventually, DMCs decline 
and motivation goes back to its normal levels. In explaining the rationale behind the term 
Directed Motivational Currents, Dörnyei et al. (2016) explain that “Both motivational and 
ocean currents represent a formidable flow of energy, carrying the life-forms caught up 
within them unimaginable distances” (p. xi).  
In a first empirical study of the concept of DMCs, Henry, Davydenko, and Dörnyei 
(2015) conducted interviews with language learners who had experienced DMCs. The results 
showed that DMCs are characterized by a salient facilitative structure, involvement of 
identity investment goals, and positive emotionality. Further investigation into this positive 
emotionality revealed that participants attribute it to the feeling that their entire identity was 
being transformed in the process (Ibrahim, 2016a). Other empirical research showed that 
DMCs can also be experienced by a group of individuals working on a project (Ibrahim, 
2016b) and can be intentionally induced by teachers (Muir, 2016). These findings came from 
learners with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds learning typologically different 
languages (second, foreign, and global), suggesting that DMCs are not limited to particular 
contexts. These results also suggest that the dynamics of such motivational surges may be 
different from regular, and even high, motivation. It is clear that this line of research has a lot 
of potential, especially since the DMC concept is still not mainstream even motivational 
psychology.  
3.4.4. English vs. other languages 
The SLA field is concerned with “the processes by which school-aged children, adolescents, 
and adults learn and use, at any point in life, an additional language, including second, 
foreign, indigenous, minority, or heritage languages” (The Douglas Fir Group, 2016, p. 19) as 
well as sign languages (Woll & Adam, 2012). This is one factor why there has been a 
growing interest in multilingualism in other SLA disciplines, which has amounted to a 
multilingual turn (e.g., Conteh & Meier, 2014; May, 2014b). This interest in multilingualism 
follows the recognition of “the dynamic, hybrid, and transnational linguistic repertoires of 
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multilingual (often migrant) speakers in rapidly diversifying urban conurbations worldwide” 
(May, 2014a, p. 1). In fact, in recent discussions, there have been calls to go beyond 
multilingualism. For example, some authors have drawn from Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of 
heteroglossia to refer to the simultaneous use of multiple language forms and signs and the 
ensuing conflicts among them (e.g., Bailey, 2012), while critical applied linguists Makoni 
and Pennycook (2012) question the traditional view of languages as discrete entities rather 
than fluid and dynamic acts of identity. Makoni and Pennycook use the term lingua franca 
multilingualism to describe this view.  
The L2 motivation field has not actively engaged with these developments. Just as its 
name suggests, L2 motivation research has mostly looked at learning an L2, typically 
English. For example, Boo et al.’s (2015) survey shows that research into the motivation to 
learn English was by far more predominant than research into all other languages combined. 
Similarly, in the context of heritage language learning, Comanaru and Noels (2009) point out 
that little work has been done to examine the motivational and affective profiles of these 
learners. In the context of indigenous languages, Ball (2009) also reports that she conducted a 
literature search on the difficulties experienced by indigenous language learners, but she 
could not find a single study that satisfied her search criteria. To quote Leeman and King 
(2015), research on minority languages “remains marginalized, underfunded, and often an 
after-thought” (p. 211).  
There is reason to argue that the motivation to learn English is qualitatively different 
from that of learning languages other than English (LOTEs, Dörnyei & Al-Hoorie, in press). 
Because of the status of English, the motivation to learning it might interfere with the 
motivation to learn other languages. As an illustration, Dörnyei, Csizér, and Németh (2006) 
conducted a large-scale longitudinal investigation of language learning motivation—
involving over 13,000 learners over a period of 12 years focusing on five target languages 
(English, German, French, Italian, and Russian) in Hungary. The results revealed a 
fundamental restructuring of the different L2 learning dispositions. English maintained its 
high profile, but the other languages dropped steadily. Even the former lingua franca of the 
region, German, gradually became limited to only a selected few. Furthermore, Global 
English itself also displayed a marked shift over the decade: Although its popularity remained 
as strong as ever, the correlational link between motivation and the choice of English for 
language learning decreased, suggesting that the study of English is increasingly becoming a 
self-evident part of education rather than an L2-specific motivated decision.  
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Subsequent analysis also suggests that language learners develop distinct ideal L2 
self-guides (see Dörnyei & Chan, 2013). It is therefore likely that the self-guides of the 
influential language would develop more strongly at the expense of self-guides related to 
other languages. Indeed, in a cluster analysis study, Csizér and Dörnyei (2005) identified 
different learner profiles and confirmed that a positive disposition toward one language can 
clash with that of another. Similarly, findings by Henry (2010, 2011) also suggest that 
learners of different languages possess separate self-concepts and that the motivation to learn 
English can deplete the working self-concept, thus disadvantaging LOTEs.  
All of this leads to the conclusion that the motivational basis of learning English may 
be quite distinct from that of learning LOTEs. Since most available research is English-
biased, then the available theories most likely reflect learning English rather than LOTEs. 
Paying more attention to LOTEs has the potential to deepen our understanding of the 
complexities involved in language learning motivation. One interesting outcome of 
researching LOTEs is that the role in integrative motivation seems to resurface. Integrative 
motivation might be a relevant concept in the context of LOTEs since there is usually a 
specific community out there that speaks the language and that is considered the ‘owner’ of 
that language. Additionally, many individuals who decide to take up learning a certain LOTE 
do so because they are already in the geographical area where the language is spoken, or 
because they plan to move there. A person trying to learn Danish, for example, would most 
likely be thinking about a localized community rather than imagining themselves as a global 
citizen. The motivation to learn LOTEs is the subject of an upcoming special issue (Ushioda 
& Dörnyei, in press), which is likely going to stimulate further theoretical and empirical 
research in the future.   
3.4.5 Traditional vs. technological  
In 2003, Carol Chapelle declared that “the bond between technology and language use in the 
modern world should prompt all language professionals to reflect on the ways in which 
technology is changing the profession of English language teaching in particular, and applied 
linguistics as a whole” (Chapelle, 2003, p. 1, emphasis added). Subsequently, CALL 
(Computer Assisted Language Learning) became mainstream in applied linguistics with 
various applications, especially in language testing (e.g., Chapelle & Douglas, 2006). 
Language motivation researchers also recognized the potential technology has. In an early 
study, Warschauer (1996) found that students—regardless of gender, experience with 
computers, or learning context (second versus foreign)—have positive attitudes toward using 
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computers for writing and communication, and so the author recommended that teachers 
exploit this to enhance student motivation. Appel and Mullen (2002) also examined the effect 
of engaging in email exchanges on language learning. The authors devoted a section of their 
paper to discuss the motivational implications of this strategy. Admittedly, however, although 
research into CALL has flourished over the years, there has been little overlap between the 
CALL and language motivation literatures, and these two disciplines have progressed largely 
independently.  
To further complicate the scene, there has been an explosive growth in the use of 
technology in everyday life recently. In fact, due to the ease of access to online technology 
and its interactive nature, the popularity of TV and DVDs is starting to wane among young 
people (Henry, 2013). Nowadays, young people have access to a variety of social networking 
websites that facilitate exposure to the L2 such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and 
Snapchat (e.g., Alias, Manan, Yusof, & Pandian, 2012) as well as interactive 3D gaming such 
as Counter-Strike, Call of Duty, World of Witchcraft, The Sims, Second Life, and Unity (e.g., 
Collentine, 2011; Deutschmann, Panichi, & Molka-Danielsen, 2009; Gee & Hayes, 2010b; 
Henry, 2013; Peterson, 2010). Internet users can also easily read and contribute to discussion 
forums, blogs, wikis, and other online communities, all available in English (Kessler, 2009; 
Pinkman, 2005) and utilize video-conferencing facilities such as Skype and Adobe-Connect 
(Jauregi, de Graaff, van den Bergh, & Kriz, 2012). Last, but certainly not least, there is the 
pervasive prevalence of smart phones, tablet computers, wireless laptops, personal digital 
assistants, and portable MP3 players (Stockwell, 2013). These gadgets also come with a 
bewildering amount of educational apps (Hirsh-Pasek et al., 2015). In Apple Store alone, 
there are currently over 75,000 educational apps ready to download (Apple, 2017). This 
comes amid skepticism about the utility of these apps, and even concerns that they might, 
ironically, lead to screen addiction, increased aggression, depression, and anxiety (Kardaras, 
2016). The inevitable conclusion from the changing face of today’s language learning (cf. J. 
C. Richards, 2015) is that “a new type of student” is emerging (Henry, 2013, p. 138).  
It is clear that language motivation research is still lagging behind these 
developments. At the same time, this rapidly evolving popular culture now constitutes a 
competition for classroom learning (Gee & Hayes, 2010a). As an illustration, Henry (2013) 
reports an authenticity gap that an increasing number of language learners are experiencing. 
That is, many learners are exposed to the L2 both inside and outside the classroom, but their 
experiences outside the classroom are much more stimulating. Contemporary digital gaming, 
for example, requires intense interaction, communication, and cooperation with real people 
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(usually in English) in order to proceed in the game. These interactions may include devising 
sophisticated strategies and plans to carry out military operations to defeat opponents or 
monsters, which stimulates a lot of creativity and imagination and which can easily induce 
long flow experiences. These interactions also take place with players from all over the 
world, including native speakers of English, thus increasingly blurring the line between 
second and foreign language contexts. Native speakers are now virtually present, and so they 
no longer need to be present physically in the neighborhood in order for learners to have 
regular and meaningful interactions with them. These experiences dwarf the routine activities 
that learners do in the classroom, which now appear banal and trivial in comparison. A 
number of researchers have therefore called for building bridges between the classroom and 
these leisure activities in order to make classroom learning more motivating to today’s 
learners (cf. Henry, 2013).  
Today’s technology has expanded what used to be imaginable for learners and 
teachers, opening the gate for imagined identities that are characteristic of the new world 
order (Darvin & Norton, 2015). Drawing from earlier work (K. Richards, 2006; Zimmerman, 
1998), Ushioda (2011) argues that technology can be used to harness the learners’ 
transportable identities. The notion of transportable identities refers to latent dimensions of 
one’s identity that can be invoked in interaction, such as the teacher being a cat lover or the 
student being a fan of Manchester United. Ushioda explains that drawing from the identities 
learners develop through technology would encourage them to engage more genuinely in 
target-language communications in the classroom. Teachers are no longer limited to the 
handout they bring to the classroom everyday, but can now draw from topics they find 
interesting in discussion forums, live chats, blogs, wikis, podcasts, social networking sites, 
and video-sharing sites. This makes lesson planning take a new meaning. Since this approach 
treats them as ‘people’ rather than as abstract ‘language learners’, students would develop a 
greater sense of autonomy and ownership of the activity, thus leading to more investment 
(Ushioda, 2011). This is certainly a promising area for future research. 
3.4.6 Conscious vs. unconscious  
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, all these emerging themes demonstrate the 
wind of change in our field. An attempt to expand the scope to cover unconscious motivation 
would not therefore be something out of the ordinary. Indeed, a comprehensive picture of 
motivation and identity cannot be attained without considering the unconscious side. In fact, 
despite the abundance of perspectives on identity, one idea has stood the test of time: William 
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James’s (1890) distinction between the I-self and the Me-self. While the I-self constitutes the 
willful and volitional aspects of motivation, the Me-self reflects automatic and unconscious 
motivators. As Roeser and Peck (2009) review, these two systems are separate but 
functionally interdependent, and both systems have to be accounted for in explanations of 
motivation and identity. To date, most research on language motivation has, at least 
implicitly, assumed that the learner is a rational individual who is able to recognize and 
articulate what motivates him/her. Recently, however, there has been a resurgence in the 
interest in unconscious motivation in mainstream motivational psychology, as an increasing 
number of psychologists are starting to realize the importance of unconscious motivators (see 
Al-Hoorie, 2015). For example, in their review of the emerging themes in mainstream 
motivational psychology, R. M. Ryan and Legate (2012) document their surprise under the 
title ‘Motivation’s Future: What’s the Buzz?’:  
 
Perhaps the most widely cited future direction that emerged was, at least for us, a 
somewhat surprising one. Mentioned more than any other area for future research was 
investigations of dual-process model or more study of the distinctions and relations 
between automatic, or implicit, and deliberative, or explicit, goals. The fact that this 
interest emerged in so many papers reflects motivation researchers’ renewed interest 
in nonconscious processes and the motivated behavior they can organize. We would 
add to this the strong interest in the dynamic nature of motivation, as implicit and 
explicit processes can operate congruently or be in conflict. So despite our surprise it 
should have been of little wonder that this was the most saliently expressed future 
direction in the field, since it has both basic research and broad applied implications. 
(R. M. Ryan & Legate, 2012, p. 563, original italics) 
 
The language motivation field has also reached a level of maturity that allows it to start 
exploring issues related to unconscious motivation, and to catch up with other SLA sub-
disciplines where unconscious processes have become a stable topic of investigation. To be 
more specific, “our field is ready to expand into exploring these areas because it seems 
evident that language globalisation has created a linguistic landscape that is characterised by 
both powerful positive trends and strong negative undercurrents” (Boo et al., 2015, p. 156). 
In fact, even some aspects of self-regulation can occur through unconscious processes (e.g., 
Critcher & Ferguson, 2016).  
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Adopting an unconscious angle of human motivation does not have to be at odds with 
the current frameworks in the field. For example, neither possible selves theory nor self-
discrepancy theory, the two parent theories of the L2 MSS, disapprove of unconscious 
processes. In terms of possible selves theory, Markus and Nurius (1986) discuss the 
possibility of the unconscious activation of both positive and negative possible selves (see p. 
961). In describing the effects of unconscious activation of possible selves, Oyserman (2013) 
similarly asserts that “these effects are automatic and do not require that people make a 
conscious choice as to how to think about themselves” (p. 185; see also Oyserman, 2015, p. 
44). In a special issue marking the centennial of the publication of James’s (1890) The 
Principles of Psychology, Markus (1990) contributed with a paper titled ‘On splitting the 
universe’, in which she endorsed James’s distinction between the I-self and the Me-self and 
stressed its relevance today.  
Self-discrepancy theory also accommodates unconscious processes: “self-discrepancy 
theory does not assume that people are aware of either the availability or the accessibility of 
their self-discrepancies. It is clear that the availability and accessibility of stored social 
constructs can influence social information processing automatically and without awareness” 
(Higgins, 1987, p. 324). Neither do the behavioral consequences have to be conscious 
(Higgins, 1989, p. 98). In fact, self-discrepancy theory does not assume that a future self-
guide is a stable individual difference variable (Higgins, 1998, p. 19), but that situational 
variability can unconsciously induce the motivational effect independently from the nature of 
the learner’s self-guides. In one study, for example, Higgins, Roney, Crowe, and Hymes 
(1994) used an ostensibly unrelated task to activate either the ideal or ought selves of their 
participants. Although the participants were not aware that their ideal or ought selves were 
activated, this activation was still successful in unconsciously shaping their performance on a 
subsequent free recall task. In other study (Higgins, 1998), either the promotion function of 
the ideal self or the prevention function of the ought self was activated by simply asking the 
participants to put in their mouths either a sweet or bitter cotton ball. The results showed that 
this procedure also activated the relevant self-guide and successfully shaped their 
performance in the subsequent task unconsciously. If something as simple as the taste of 
cotton can activate self-guides, then it is likely that real-life classroom situations offer a more 
diverse stimulus repertoire that can activate self-guides similarly unconsciously.  
Gardner’s integrative motivation also allows some room for such unconscious 
conceptualizations. In Gardner’s (2010) words, integrativeness “is not a conscious decision 
on the part of the individual and… individuals may not be aware of it…. The rationale 
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underlying integrative motivation is that emotional factors can influence behavior, sometimes 
in ways that are not even perceived by the individual concerned” (pp. 223–224). If these 
factors are not always perceived by the learner, then limiting our empirical analyses to what 
the learner perceives (e.g., via questionnaires and interviews) can be counterproductive since 
individuals readily misattribute the unconscious sources of their behavior, of which they are 
obviously unaware, simply to salient and plausible factors in the environment (e.g., Bargh, 
1994; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  
Although current theoretical frameworks are not, in principle, at odds with 
investigations into unconscious phenomena, researchers in reality have relied predominantly 
on self-report questionnaires and interviews (Ushioda, 2013). Expanding language motivation 
research to include implicit processes would enrich the field and open up numerous potential 
pathways. As an illustration, motivational psychologists have examined the implicit 
dimension of many well-known constructs. Examples include implicit attitudes (Petty, Fazio, 
& Briñol, 2009), implicit prejudice and stereotypes (Levinson & Smith, 2012), implicit 
motives (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2010b), implicit self-concept (Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 
2006), implicit self-determination (Keatley, Clarke, Ferguson, & Hagger, 2014), and implicit 
self-regulation (Koole, McCullough, Kuhl, & Roelofsma, 2010). It is clear that language 
motivation researchers would benefit from exploring ‘the other side’ of their constructs as 
well. As explained later, this thesis examines the implicit side of attitudes toward L2 speakers 
and toward the L2 course.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the three major phases that the language motivation field has 
passed through: The social psychological period, the cognitive–situated period, and the 
current period. The most recent phase is characterized by a number of diverse themes, 
including the dynamic, affective, unconscious, and long-term aspects of motivation to learn 
English as well as other languages.  
Dörnyei and Ryan (2015) warn that the expanding scope of language motivation 
research may lead to fragmentation in that researchers in our field “will no longer speak the 
same language” (p. 102). This seems to be the natural evolution of academic fields as they 
mature (for an example in psychology, see Sternberg, 2005). The real danger is when 
different research strands use different jargons to describe very similar phenomena but with 
little overlap in their reference lists. The situation might be aggravated when specialized 
conferences become more popular at the expense of conferences with a broader cover. The 
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socialization process at conferences seems to offer more benefits than might be thought at 
first.  
The next chapter expands on one of the themes addressed in this chapter, namely 
unconscious motivation. The next chapter reviews various paradigms that have investigated 
unconscious motivational processes in order to select one promising paradigm for L2 
motivation.  
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Chapter 4: Unconscious Attitudes and Motivation  
 
Freud’s view of the unconscious was far too limited. When he said… that consciousness is 
the tip of the mental iceberg, he was short of the mark by quite a bit— 
it may be more the size of a snowball on top of that iceberg  
—Wilson (2002, p. 6) 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In 2001, Zoltán Dörnyei predicted that “Although such unconscious motives do not feature 
strongly in current motivational thinking, it seems clear that they play a significant role in our 
lives and therefore they are likely to be ‘rediscovered’ before long” (Dörnyei, 2001, p. 7). 
Indeed, as shown in the previous chapters, contemporary motivational psychology has started 
to reconsider some of the fundamentals of the cognitive revolution (for reviews, see Al-
Hoorie, 2015; Bargh, 2006). More specifically, there has been a resurgence in the interest in 
cognitive processes that operate at an unconscious level. This point has been surveyed briefly 
in the previous chapter, and this chapter elaborates more on it.  
Originally, in anticipation of the cognitive revolution, Gordon Allport (1937) asserted 
that there are two sources for human motivation: primitive drives for infants, but for adults 
motivation is guided by more sophisticated motives such as interests and attitudes. After the 
cognitive revolution, many motivation researchers took for granted the idea that human 
motivation is a function of conscious rational processes. They assumed “an agentic, 
conscious self at the controls, making decisions about courses of action to take and then 
guiding behavior along those lines” (Bargh, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2010, p. 288). 
Therefore, in order to explain motivation—which concerns why, how long, and how hard 
people pursue a course of action (Dörnyei & Ushioda, 2011)—these theories have tended to 
revolve around two basic aspects, the desirability of the outcome and its feasibility, along 
with additional features that are idiosyncratic to each particular theory (see Austin & 
Vancouver, 1996).  
For example, expectancy–value theory (Atkinson, 1957, 1964) with its contemporary 
versions (e.g., Wigfield & Eccles, 2000) views the individual as engaging a balancing act 
comparing the perceived likelihood of success in a given endeavor with its perceived value. 
These two aspects are similarly emphasized in the theory of planned behavior (called 
attitudes and perceived behavioral control; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Many other motivation 
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theories have elaborated on feasibility and/or desirability. In terms of feasibility, some 
theories have emphasized backward evaluations (attributions; Weiner, 1986, 1992), forward 
evaluations (self-efficacy; Bandura, 1997, 2007), ability conceptualizations (incremental vs. 
entity; Dweck, 2000; Dweck & Molden, 2005), and feasibility enhancement techniques (goal 
characteristics; Locke & Latham, 1990, 2002). In terms of desirability, some theories have 
emphasized whether the activity is valued for its own sake (intrinsic motivation; Deci & 
Ryan, 1985, 2002), whether the outcome would be instrumental to the attainment of further 
positive consequences (valence; Vroom, 1964), or whether the future would be bright in 
general (dispositional optimism; Scheier & Carver, 1987).  
In the L2 field, desirability has also been a central concept. This includes the 
motivation to learn a language for the purpose of affiliating with another linguistic 
community (integrative motivation; Gardner, 1985, 2010) as well as its cognitive 
reinterpretation focusing on visualization (the ideal L2 self; Dörnyei, 2005, 2009b). Despite 
the broad range of these theories and their divergent perspectives, they still share at least one 
common feature: The role of unconscious motivation has not been studied systematically, and 
so people are assumed to “weight the incentive value of the desired outcome with the 
expectancy that it would actually occur” (Bargh et al., 2010, p. 268). Some other motivation 
theories did attempt to incorporate an unconscious component. For example, some scholars 
have stressed the importance of self-worth and the consequences of perceived lack of 
competence on it (Covington, 1984, 1992) and on the use of defensive strategies (Rhodewalt 
& Vohs, 2005). However, there is still controversy over the extent to which these defenses 
are conscious (Erdelyi, 2001; Paulhus, Fridhandler, & Hayes, 1997), and whether and how 
self-deception is possible (see von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). Thus, many 20th-century 
motivation theories seem to be in line with Allport’s (1953) contention that, except in a 
minority of psychiatric conditions, “simple, conscious report is the whole truth. It can be 
taken at its face value” (p. 114).  
This chapter surveys different paradigms that have studied unconscious attitudes and 
motivation. These include the implicit motives tradition, the implicit attitudes tradition, and 
the contextual priming tradition. Relevance to learning is also discussed in a separate section 
after each paradigm. Before that, the discussion starts with an overview of the dual-process 
approach, which attempts to offer an explanation of human cognition that combines both 
explicit and implicit processes. The chapter ends with a discussion of social desirability bias.   
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4.2 Duality of the mind 
4.2.1 A bit of history  
The question whether primacy should be accorded to conscious or unconscious thought has 
sparked bitter debates throughout modern history. At one extreme, some scholars have 
posited that conscious thought is the ‘whole truth’, and so self-reports can be taken at their 
face value (Allport, 1953). At another extreme, some scholars have gone even beyond 
Freud’s original view that the unconscious is the tip of an iceberg. For example, Wilson 
(2002) claims that Freud “was short of the mark by quite a bit—it may be more the size of a 
snowball on top of that iceberg” (p. 6).  
According to historical reviews (Gawronski, Sherman, & Trope, 2014; Payne & 
Gawronski, 2010), research into dual-process frameworks (see below) started to emerge in 
the 1980s (e.g., Trope, 1986). This research has offered a compromise between the two 
extreme views. In 1990s, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) reviewed the results this research had 
generated, and coined the term implicit social cognition to refer to notion that constructs such 
as self-esteem, attitudes, and prejudice can also operate unconsciously. Greenwald and Banaji 
(1995) introduced implicit social cognition in an attempt to integrate and reinterpret previous 
research findings and to guide future investigations. Indeed, within just two decades, 
“virtually every intellectual question in social psychology, and many outside of it, has been 
shaped by the theories and methods of implicit social cognition” (Payne & Gawronski, 2010, 
p. 1, original italics). In the recent Oxford Handbook of Human Motivation, Ryan and Legate 
(2012) emphasize that the notion that the human mind contains two distinct processes that 
can have a differential effect on motivation is currently by far the single most widely cited 
area to hold great potential for future motivation research. In fact, the authors argue that this 
is where the present-day ‘buzz’ is. The conclusion from this handbook is that this area of 
inquiry will remain vital in future motivation research. In a more vivid account of the dual-
process approach and its impact, Sherman and colleagues explain that,  
 
The emergence of dual-process theories has been one of the most significant 
developments in the history of scientific psychology. The overarching assumption of 
these theories is that psychological processes can be divided into two distinct 
categories depending on whether they operate in an automatic or controlled fashion. 
In recent years, this distinction between ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ modes of thought has even 
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permeated the popular press and the lay public’s understanding of psychology. (J. W. 
Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014a, p. xi, emphasis added) 
 
Notice that the authors consider conscious and unconscious processes as ‘distinct’, and so it 
is not the case that one is ‘in the shadow’ of the other. This also suggests that examining one 
of them does not necessarily tell us much about the other. Therefore, “the way forward for 
psychological theory is to stop pitting conscious against unconscious and instead figure out 
how the two work together” (Baumeister, Vohs, & Masicampo, 2014, p. 20; see also 
Nordgren et al., 2011). The claim that conscious processes play no role would require “a 
drastic leap of faith” (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997, p. 75) that is not justified by available 
empirical research (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2011). Currently, only a minority of researchers 
still explicitly espouse a single-process model (see de Houwer, 2014; Evans, 2008; Helion & 
Pizarro, 2015, for critiques; see also Hulstijn, 2015, for a language-specific perspective).   
4.2.2 Dual-process approach 
According to the dual-process approach of cognitive functioning, there are two 
simultaneous—but qualitatively different—kinds of mental processes (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 
1999; Evans & Frankish, 2009; J. W. Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014b). More 
specifically, mental processes can be divided into rule-based and associative (e.g., Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004). Rule-based processes are controlled and conscious, and they are based on 
knowledge of facts and values. On the other hand, associative processes are automatic and 
impulsive, and they occur through repeated exposure. Put differently, associative processes 
develop through affective reactions that are automatically and efficiently activated once a 
relevant stimulus is encountered; propositional processes derive from rational judgments 
based on conscious, logical reasoning (see Evans, 2008; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2014, 
for more detailed comparisons). This distinction is commonly referred to as Type 1 
(automatic) and Type 2 (deliberate).  
In a detailed analysis of automatic versus controlled processes, Bargh (1994) has 
decomposed automaticity into four component features, or ‘horsemen’: awareness, 
intentionality, controllability, and efficiency. As for awareness, automatic thought can take 
place without the individual’s awareness of some aspects of the process, such as the stimulus 
(e.g., subliminal priming) or its effect (e.g., stereotyping). Intentionality has to do with the 
one’s inability to exercise control over the instigation of automatic processes, while 
controllability has to do with the inability to stop or override it. Finally, efficiency refers to 
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the fact that automatic processes require a very low cognitive load and are not resource-
intensive. These are considered characteristics of automatic processes, though they do not 
have to be all present at the same time in order for a phenomenon to qualify as automatic. 
More recently, Shea and Frith (2016) have challenged the monolithic view of Type 1 
cognition, and divided it into Type 0 (automatic processing and unconscious representation) 
and Type 1 (automatic processing but conscious representation). Shea and Frith use this 
distinction to explain why confidence judgments elicited through neural signals are reliable 
predictors of subsequent performance accuracy, while verbal confidence judgements—
affected by other factors such as similarity and fluency—are less reliable.  
That automatic processes are efficient constitutes an important advantage. We live in 
a complex world, in which survival requires efficient navigation. Humans have therefore 
developed the ability to simplify the overwhelming amount of information they encounter 
everyday. This simplification process is so efficient that it allows us to make evaluative 
judgments “without having to think about it much, sometimes without really thinking at all” 
(Nosek & Banaji, 2009, p. 84). Conscious, deliberative processing is more resource-intensive 
of our cognitive capacity, and therefore it is typically reserved for unfamiliar situations. In 
familiar situations, it is more efficient to leave things on autopilot (for more on this functional 
analysis, see Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994). 
4.2.3 Interaction between conscious and unconscious processes  
Another question that researchers have pursued is whether automatic processes are associated 
with behavior. Evidence suggests that, indeed, automatic processes predict behavior, and add 
to the prediction over and above controlled processes (Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014). 
Generally speaking, the effect of automatic processes tend to be observed in spontaneous 
behaviors, while the effect of controlled processes in deliberate behavior that requires 
intentional decision-making (Fazio, 2001; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Additionally, automatic 
processes better predict behavior when cognitive resources are constrained, while controlled 
processes better predict behavior when cognitive resources are left unconstrained (Hofmann, 
Rauch, & Gawronski, 2007). Research also shows that individual differences play a role. 
Automatic processes are better predictors of behavior for individuals with intuitive thinking 
styles, whereas controlled processes are better predictors for individuals with rational 
thinking styles (Richetin, Perugini, Adjali, & Hurling, 2007).  
In a more comprehensive analysis of the potential patterns of how controlled and 
automatic processes are related to behavior, Perugini, Richetin, and Zogmaister (2010) 
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describe seven possible patterns that are reported in empirical research (see Figure 4.1). The 
first pattern, single association, is the most common pattern. Here, researchers examine the 
association between a measure of automatic processing and behavior. The second pattern, the 
moderation pattern, is where researchers look for conditions of the relationship between 
automatic processing and behavior. These could be the personal moderators, situational 
moderators, or the type of behavior in question (see Perugini et al., 2010, for a review). 
According to the additive pattern, each process type predicts unique variance of the behavior. 
This pattern is usually more meaningful and more convincing of the validity of automatic 
processing than the previous ones. The next pattern, the interactive or multiplicative pattern, 
reflects a statistically significant interaction term of the two process types over and above 
their individual contributions. For example, Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, and 
Correll (2003) found that high explicit self-esteem, especially when combined with low 
implicit self-esteem, predicts narcissism. The authors argue that high self-esteem individuals 
therefore become particularly defensive when they harbor negative self-feelings 
unconsciously.  
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Figure 4.1: Seven patterns of the relationship of the two process types (automatic and 
controlled) with the two behavior types (spontaneous and intentional). Adapted from Perugini 
et al. (2010) with permission. 
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The double-dissociation pattern concerns the situation where automatic processing 
predicts spontaneous behavior, whereas controlled processing predicts more intentional 
behavior, but not vice versa. For example, Asendorpf, Banse, and Mücke (2002) found that 
implicit shyness predicts spontaneous (but not controlled) shy behavior, while self-reported 
shyness predicted controlled (but not spontaneous) shy behavior. The same pattern was 
obtained by Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner (2002), who found that self-reported prejudice 
predicted verbal behavior with a Black partner, whereas spontaneous nonverbal behavior 
(e.g., eye contact and blinking) was predicted by implicit prejudice. The next pattern, the 
partial dissociation, is concerned with the situation where one type of processing predicts 
only one type of behavior, but the other type of processing predicts both. Therefore, only one 
of the two crossing lines in the figure is significant. For example, Richetin et al. (2007) found 
that implicit attitudes toward soft drinks predict spontaneous behavior (amount of 
consumption in a taste-and-rate test), while self-reported attitudes predicted both deliberate 
and spontaneous behaviors. Finally, the double additive pattern is where both processing 
types predict both types of behaviors. Perugini et al. (2010) report that this patterns is rarely 
obtained in empirical research. Perugini et al. (2010) maintain that outcome patterns that 
reflect additivity or dissociation constitute strong evidence that the two processes are valid 
and are qualitatively different because they lend support to the notion that there are two 
processes operating in the human mind. At a more exotic level, this dissociation may be akin 
to “a split in consciousness, such as mutually unaware person systems occupying the same 
brain” (Greenwald & Nosek, 2009, p. 65).  
Gawronski and De Houwer (2014) explain that scholars have not been able to reach a 
level of understanding of these different patterns to allow them to expect a prior which 
pattern should be obtained. The authors therefore encourage future researchers to understand 
these patterns better. One account to explain the patterns of discrepancy between controlled 
and automatic processes is offered by Nosek (2005). According to Nosek, four factors 
moderate controlled–automatic relationships:  
 
a) self-presentation concern: the stronger the need to present oneself favorably, 
the weaker the controlled–automatic convergence,  
b) endorsement strength: the stronger the endorsement of the issue in question, 
the greater the convergence,  
c) perceived distinctiveness: the more distinctive one sees one’s views from the 
norm, the stronger the convergence, and  
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d) dimensionality of the issue: the more multifaceted the issue, the weaker the 
convergence. 
 
An alternative conceptualization of explicit–implicit moderators is offered by Friese, 
Hofmann, and Schmitt (2009), who classify moderators in terms of two dimensions. The first 
dimension is related to control (such as opportunity and motivation to control behavior), and 
the second is related to the disposition (i.e., of the person, the situation, or the behavior itself). 
Payne, Burkley, and Stokes (2008) also present empirical evidence showing that increasing 
the similarity in task demands, which they call ‘structural fit’, leads to higher explicit–
implicit correspondence.  
The inevitable conclusion from all of these empirical results and their theoretical 
implications is that, without taking unconscious motivation into account, a substantial 
proportion of the picture would be missing. Investigation of unconscious processes therefore 
seems a fruitful future direction.  
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4.3 Implicit motives 
4.3.1 A bit of history  
In his book Fact and Fiction in Psychology, Hans Eysenck (1965) presented a scathing 
critique of research into unconscious phenomena, which was then dominated by Freud’s 
psychoanalytic paradigm. Eysenck maintained that, 
 
… as has often been pointed out, the complexities of psychoanalytic reasoning 
effectively prelude any scientific testing of these theories. Furthermore, when we look 
at the evidence upon which Freud’s theories are based, we find that it is not the kind 
which would recommend it to the scientist. Instead of experimentally tested 
deductions from clearly stated hypotheses, all that we find is anecdotal evidence 
collected in a relatively haphazard manner from individual case histories. This lack of 
true evidence is often disguised from the reader by the superb quality of Freud’s 
writing, which deservedly won him the Goethe Prize in Germany, which is awarded 
for literary endeavor; however, in science persuasion should not take the place of 
proof… (Eysenck, 1965, p. 106) 
 
In another book documenting the Decline and Fall of the Freudian Empire, Eysenck (1985) 
offered another round of critique of the psychoanalytic literature that developed out of 
Freud’s work:  
 
There is another reason which may lead us to wonder why psychoanalysis does so 
poorly, and which may help to explain this. As already explained, psychoanalysts tend 
to screen out their patients in such a way that only those most likely to benefit, and 
least seriously ill, are accepted for treatment. It would also seem, however, that many 
of those who go to the psychoanalyst are not in fact neurotically ill at all. For the 
majority of them, psychoanalysis constitutes what one critic once termed the 
‘prostitution of friendship’. In other words, unable because of defects of personality 
and character to make and keep friends in whom they can confide, they pay the 
psychoanalyst to serve this function, just as men buy sex from prostitutes because 
they are unable or unwilling to pay the necessary price of affection, love and 
tenderness which is needed to achieve a sexual relation on a non-commercial basis…. 
All these people, not being ill, cannot of course be cured; the habit of relying on the 
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psychoanalyst (like the habit of relying on priests, or astrologers, or witch-doctors) 
becomes self-perpetuating, and while the money lasts can be quite amusing. But all 
this has nothing to do with serious mental disorders of the kind we are considering. 
The psychoanalyst as prostitute or entertainer may not fit the self-important concept 
of the ‘healer’ developed by Freud and his successors, but it applies only too often. 
(Eysenck, 1985, pp. 71–72)  
 
These critiques were circulating around psychologists, which led to attempts to reform 
research into unconscious motivation. Early on, Henry A. Murray (e.g., 1938) of Harvard 
University was trying to make the investigation into unconscious motives more systematic. 
He developed the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT, later called the Picture Story Exercise; 
see also Section 5.2.2 in the next chapter), which is a more systematic approach to study the 
type of free associations that Freud was interested in. Instead of asking the participant to 
simply speak whatever comes to his/her mind—as Freud would do—the TAT contains a 
series of ambiguous pictures suggestive of emotional complexities of everyday life (e.g., 
father–son relationships), and the participant is asked to tell imaginative stories to describe 
what is happening in each picture. Just like Freud, the idea here is that the participant’s own 
unconscious motives would be projected on these pictures. This fantasy-based approach is 
more disciplined in that the narrative stories of different participants can now be compared 
more systematically. Murray’s work has had another major contribution, namely the 
generation of “a vocabulary of human motives that has shaped work in the field ever since” 
(McClelland, 1987, p. 44). In contrast to dominant approaches, Murray’s approach could 
generate motives that are neither too few (e.g., only self-actualization as in the work of Carl 
Jung, Carl Rogers, and Abraham Maslow), nor too numerous to be manageable.  
However, one drawback of Murray’s work was related to how to analyze the fantasy 
responses once they have been elicited via the TAT. Murray’s method was to assemble a 
group of experts to discuss and try to interpret the responses in order to arrive at the 
underlying motives. However, this intuitive approach was still not systematic enough as the 
biases of the individual judges might creep in. One solution offered by Cattell (1957, 1965) 
was the use of factor analysis, but still researchers first needed a way to decide which motive 
was represented by which statement, and this could not be done solely via statistical analyses.  
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4.3.2 Work by McClelland and colleagues  
Work by David C. McClelland (e.g., 1987) offered a solution by devising a systematic coding 
scheme that allows researchers to follow explicit and objective procedures in deciding on 
unconscious motives (see Schultheiss & Pang, 2007; C. P. Smith, 1992; Winter, 1991, for 
practical guides). Because this procedure finally allowed researchers to systematically and 
objectively investigate unconscious phenomena, Heinz Heckhausen (1967) described it as a 
“breakthrough” (p. 2). In an early study on comparing projective stories and self-reports, 
McClelland and Atkinson (1948) conducted an interesting experiment in which they 
manipulated hunger in their participants to investigate how hunger is projected in stories. 
They compared three groups of participants who had not had food for 1, 4, or 16 hours. The 
researchers wanted to make sure that the participants were unaware of the purpose of the 
experiment. They recruited submariners, some of whom were assigned to their quarters in the 
afternoon, and so they could sleep late and participate in the morning, which was about 16 
hours after their last meal. Two interesting results emerged from this study. First, self-
reported hunger failed to distinguish between participants in the 4- and 16-hour conditions, 
but the projective test did distinguish between them. Thus, self-reported hunger was not as 
sensitive as the fantasy-based instrument. Second, the content of stories narrated by the 
participants did not emphasize food and eating per se as the participants got hungrier. Instead, 
they emphasized instrumental activity that can facilitate obtaining food. Indeed, “it is more 
adaptive for hungry people to think about ways of getting food rather than just passively 
dream of eating” (McClelland, 1987, p. 187).  
Building on the concept of needs that was developed by Lewin (1935), Murray 
(1938), and then Maslow (1954), McClelland and associates initiated a research program 
following Freud’s assumption that childhood emotional experiences shape basic personality 
structure in adulthood unconsciously. This research led to the validation of three major 
implicit motives: need for Achievement (called n Ach), need for Affiliation (n Aff), and need 
for Power (n Power). McClelland (1987, pp. 213–214; Weinberger & McClelland, 1990) 
summarized research showing that these three motives orient, select, and energize behavior 
differentially—thus demonstrating that implicit motives measured with the TAT successfully 
discriminate among individuals. For example,   
 
 as for the orienting function, individuals high in n Ach, when presented with words 
rapidly, recognize positive achievement-related words (e.g., success) more quickly 
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than negative ones (e.g., failure), while individuals high in n Power recognize power-
related pictures more quickly than neutral ones; and  
 as for the selecting function, those high in n Ach engage in entrepreneurial acts more 
frequently, those high n Power are involved in more arguments, and those high in n 
Aff perform more affliative acts;  
 as for the energizing function, a high n Ach score is related to improved performance 
in moderately difficult tasks, a high n Power score with faster learning of associations 
between pictures and words if they are power-related, and a high n Aff score with 
faster learning of complex networks of social relationships.  
 
This predictive validity was interpreted as showing that different individuals are predisposed 
to different behaviors, or ‘preset’ to use McClelland’s term, in accordance with their implicit 
motives.  
Further evidence in support of implicit motives comes from diverse paradigms 
including biological and neuroscientific. When it comes to biology, individual differences in 
implicit attitudes are related to health and disease through specific physiological mechanisms 
(McClelland, 1989). For example, a combination of high n Aff with low n Power is 
associated with type I diabetes, while a combination of n Power and life stress is associated 
with high blood pressure and respiratory infections. In addition, different motive states are 
presumably linked to different neurohormones, specifically n Aff to dopamine and n Power to 
norepinephrine. These findings led McClelland (1989) to conclude that implicit motives 
“play a causal role in health outcomes because they predict illness over a 10-year period and 
because changes in them produced by therapy precede health improvements” (p. 682). When 
it comes to neuroscience, those with a high n Power score exhibit greater electrical activity—
as measured with electrodes attached to their scalps over the occipital area that receives 
visual sensations—to pictures representing power than did those with a low n Power score 
(McClelland, Davidson, Saron, & Floor, 1980). When presented with words that are neutral 
or power-related, individuals with high versus low n Power also exhibit different levels of 
electrical activity in response (Davidson, Saron, & McClelland, 1980). As McClelland (1987) 
put it, “The difference is in the receiving system, and not just in the verbal or motor response 
to motive-related cues” (pp. 213–214). Finally, in one longitudinal study that lasted for over a 
quarter of a century (McClelland & Pilon, 1983), mothers’ rearing practices when their 
children were five years old were compared with the TAT responses of these children after 
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the children became over 30 years old. The results show that n Ach scores correlate with 
scheduling of feeding and severity of toilet training at the age of five, while n Power 
correlates with permissiveness for sexual and aggressive behavior. These findings led 
McClelland to the bold conclusion that parents’ overuse of disposable diapers could have 
serious ramifications on the child’s achievement motive in later life. Such conclusions 
support Freud’s position that very early experiences can shape personality in adulthood 
unconsciously. In a review of this line of research, Heckhausen (1967) stated clearly that, 
“According to present knowledge a direct relationship between achievement motivation and 
TAT content may be considered an established fact” (p. 13).  
Just like the findings reviewed in the previous section, unconscious motives represent 
the affective dimension and predict spontaneous behavior over time, whereas conscious 
motives represent the cognitive dimension and predict immediate responses to specific 
situations. McClelland’s explanation was that unconscious motives are sustainable because 
they stem from the pleasure of the activity itself, while conscious motives stem from the 
social incentives present in the situation. For this reason, McClelland distinguishes between 
what he called self-attributed (i.e., explicit) motives and between implicit motives. Another 
interesting idea in McClelland’s approach is the distinction between motive and motivation. A 
motive, he argued, refers to the disposition or trait to behave in a certain way while 
motivation is the aroused state at a certain moment, and so the latter is the product of the 
former (McClelland, 1987). McClelland claimed that much confusion in the literature could 
be traced back to using ‘motivation’ in both senses, while in fact the aroused state could 
merely be a reflection of other non-motivational determinants—including values, skills, and 
opportunities—and not necessarily motive strength.  
4.3.3 Explicit–implicit correlation and conflict 
In an early study, deCharms, Morrison, Reitman, and McClelland (1955) tested the effects of 
explicit and implicit motives. The researchers tested their participants’ implicit achievement 
motive through a fantasy-based measure, while their explicit achievement motive was tested 
through standard questionnaire ratings. The researchers found that implicit scores predicted 
performance on an anagram task, which is a classic measure of creativity that requires effort 
and concentration. On the other hand, self-reported value of achievement was associated with 
explicit impressions the participants made of a person they evaluated as being successful or 
not. These results led the researchers to conclude that explicit and implicit achievement 
motives predict different things: Implicit motives predict behavioral performance, while self-
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attributed motives predict verbal attitudes and choices (see also Schultheiss & Brunstein, 
2010a). deCharms et al. (1955) went even further to suggest that self-attributed motives 
might have unconscious sources:  
 
This is clearly in line with the general notion that subjects who describe themselves as 
ambitious and achievant may do so for defensive reasons: they have perhaps been 
under some authoritarian pressure from their parents to be ambitious and the resultant 
motive which has originated in external sources shows itself primarily as a fear of 
being unsuccessful or at least as a disregard for those who are unsuccessful. 
(deCharms et al., 1955, p. 419) 
 
In any case, the results showed that explicit and implicit motives do not have to be correlated 
with each other. Implicit motives better predict long-term engagement in unstructured 
situations, but explicit motives predict short-term verbal reports and response to specific 
situational demands (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2010a). This offered a reply to early critics 
(e.g., Entwisle, 1972; Fineman, 1977; Klinger, 1971) who questioned the lack of correlation 
between explicit and implicit motives.  
Recent research has lent further support to the notion that explicit and implicit 
motives generally do not correlate with each other (e.g., Schultheiss, Yankova, Dirlikov, & 
Schad, 2009). However, it has further shown that, for some individuals, explicit and implicit 
motives do display a positive correlation. These individuals consequently experience 
‘personality coherence’, which takes place when one embraces his/her ‘true self’ and its 
“deeply rooted affective proclivities” (Thrash & Elliot, 2002, p. 746). This explicit–implicit 
congruence predicts positive outcomes related to flow, volitional strength, identity, and well-
being (e.g., Thrash, Maruskin, & Martin, 2012). In contrast, a lack of correlation between 
explicit and implicit motives is associated with fragmentation due to adopting social norms 
not compatible with one’s preexisting implicit values. This explicit–implicit incongruence is 
undesirable because success in long-term pursuits requires both (explicit) proactive 
organization of goals, as well as (implicit) spontaneous inclination to keep pursuing these 
goals (Thrash, Cassidy, & Maruskin, 2010).  
Especially since McClelland’s death in the late 1990s, the popularity of implicit 
motives has somewhat waned. Nonetheless, some researchers are still actively investigating 
this area, most notably German psychologists Oliver Schultheiss and Joachim Brunstein (e.g., 
Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2010b). Recent research themes in this tradition have examined the 
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role of implicit motives in implicit learning (Schultheiss et al., 2005) and in episodic memory 
(Woike, 2008), and the role of certain hormones such as gonadal steroids (testosterone and 
estradiol) and cortisol in n Power (Stanton & Schultheiss, 2007) and progesterone in n Aff 
(Schultheiss, Dargel, & Rohde, 2003), and the role of certain brain areas including the 
amygdala, the striatum, and the orbitofrontal cortex (Schultheiss & Wirth, 2008). More 
detailed reviews of these developments are found in Schultheiss (2008) and Schultheiss, 
Rösch, Rawolle, Kordik, and Graham (2010). Thus, because of the recognition of its 
significance, “the implicit motive construct enjoys continued as well as newfound popularity 
among personality psychologists and also in other disciplines” (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 
2010a, p. xvii).  
Another notable legacy of McClelland’s work is found in the work of psychologist 
Dan McAdams, who was a student of McClelland and who has continued this tradition in a 
different direction. McAdams adapted McClelland’s story-based approach to the study of 
narrative identity. This research has shown that individuals integrate their life experiences 
into a coherent and evolving story of the self, which in turn have important implications on 
psychological development, adaptation, and well-being (for a recent overview, see McAdams 
& McLean, 2013).  
4.3.4 Research on learning  
Research has shown that implicit need for achievement is actually not associated with better 
grades at school; instead, the power motive is (McClelland, 1987, p. 258). McClelland argued 
that there is no theoretical basis to expect the two to be correlated because school 
environments do not generally foster taking the initiative to pursue one’s own goals in one’s 
own way (see also Heckhausen & Krug, 1982, p. 288). The power motive, on the other hand, 
does not require the activities to be pleasurable as long as they help attain one’s goal.  
Nevertheless, some early researchers did try to deliberately induce achievement 
motivation in students in the hope that this would have a positive effect of their academic 
achievement. These training programs generally aim at helping students think, talk, and act 
like somebody with a high need for achievement (Alschuler, Tabor, & McIntyre, 1970; 
McClelland, 1972). McClelland (1972) reviewed the results from some interventions showing 
that achievement training did have a positive impact on both school grades and out of school 
activities (e.g., how they spent their time, worked, planned, and thought about their future), 
especially for boys. McClelland concluded that these results “leave little doubt that 
achievement motivation training can have fairly dramatic effects on school performance if it 
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is properly understood by teachers and integrated throughout the year with their regular 
classroom work” (McClelland, 1972, p. 132). In another study on university students, Elias 
and Rahman (1994) also found that achievement motivation training had positive effects both 
cognitively and affectively.  
Another early intervention was conducted by deCharms (1976). deCharms 
distinguished between individuals who were origins versus pawns. This distinction has to do 
with the locus of causality; origins feel in control of their fate while pawns feel pushed 
around by external forces. As deCharms put it, “The motivational effects of these two 
personal states are extremely important. The Origin is positively motivated, optimistic, 
confident, accepting of challenge. The Pawn is negatively motivated, defensive, irresolute, 
avoidant of challenge. The Origin feels potent; the Pawn feels powerless” (deCharms, 1976, 
p. 5). McClelland (1987, p. 570) suggested that deCharms’s origin training approach 
incorporates some aspects of power motivation. The results of this intervention showed that 
students who received origin training outperformed the control group in standardized tests. 
They also showed more school discipline in terms of attendance and punctuality (see also 
deCharms, 1977).  
More recently, researchers have raised questions whether the positive results from 
these early interventions reflect motive change per se, or just the acquisition of life 
management skills. An alternative approach that has recently been adopted by researchers in 
this tradition is to increase the congruence between explicit and implicit motives (Rheinberg 
& Engeser, 2010). Because motivation under explicit–implicit congruence does not require 
permanent volitional control and constant monitoring, it becomes easier to experience flow 
(cf. Csikszentmihalyi, 1975) and more general well-being. This approach therefore involves 
guided self-exploration of one’s own implicit motives (e.g., achievement, power, and/or 
affiliation), and then selection of explicit goals and activities that are congruent with these 
implicit motives. This approach constitutes a radical shift from modificatory to clarificatory 
training programs (see Rheinberg & Engeser, 2010, p. 540). In addition, this approach takes 
individual differences into account; motivational intervention has to be tailored to each 
individual’s implicit motives, rather than being ready-made and applicable to everybody. 
This is a rather new area of investigation and only future research will determine its 
effectiveness.  
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4.4 Contextual priming  
4.4.1 A bit of history  
In his book Subliminal Perception: The Nature of a Controversy, Dixon (1971) chronicles the 
debates and controversies that surrounded the question of whether it is possible to be 
influenced by a stimulus that is not consciously perceived. In his words,  
 
If the importance of a hypothesis can be gauged from the number of experiments in 
which it has been tested, then that of subliminal perception must rank as one of the 
most important in the history of the science; but if its importance were to be judged on 
the basis of the attention given it in textbooks on psychology, then it would surely 
feature at ‘the bottom of the charts’. If the antiquity of the concept of subliminal 
perception is anything to go by, then it deserves to hold a prominent place in the 
history of psychology; but if what has been said about the concept, by those who 
doubt its validity, is the real criterion, then it should have been dead and buried a 
hundred years ago. (Dixon, 1971, p. vii) 
 
Dixon goes on to survey thinkers who expressed their belief in subliminal perception as far 
back as 400 BC, including Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, and Leibniz. Dixon considers the 
mid-19th century to be the beginning of experimental research on this phenomenon. This 
early research appeared to lend support to the validity of subliminal priming. A century later, 
in the mid-1950s, the credibility of subliminal perception deteriorated sharply. Dixon 
attributes this to factors including concerns about the methodological robustness of previous 
studies (e.g., Eriksen, 1960) as well as the fear of the potential to exploit people 
commercially through this technique. J. V. McConnell, Cutler, and McNeil (1958) document 
the fear that this technique generated: “Seldom has anything in psychology caused such an 
immediate and widespread stir as the recent claim that the presentation of certain stimuli 
below the level of conscious awareness can influence people’s behavior in a significant way” 
(p. 229). The authors then explain that this controversy was primarily sparked when claims 
emerged that sales of Coca-Cola and popcorn increased among viewers of cinema motion 
pictures that used subliminal messages about these products. As the authors put it, these 
claims had “given rise to a series of charges and countercharges, the effects of which have 
reached the United States Congress and the Federal Communications Commission” (p. 229).  
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Subsequent methodological refinement gave further support to subliminal effects. As 
an illustration, one of the classic findings was initially reported by Otto Poetzl in 1910s (see 
Ionescu & Erdelyi, 1992). Poetzl observed that patients suffering from central vision loss first 
were able to report very little about a stimulus they were looking at, but after a while they 
started to gradually recall it better. Poetzl wondered whether this delayed perception would 
occur in healthy individuals as well. To examine this possibility, Poetzl presented his 
participants with a complex picture very briefly and asked them to draw it as exhaustively as 
they could. Although, as expected, the participants could recall few details about the picture, 
they were able to recall more details after they went home and ‘dreamt about it’. This effect 
was later on substantiated not only in dreams but also in free association images, and came to 
be know the Poetzl phenomenon. By the 1990s, subliminal effects were mainstream in 
psychology. As Bornstein (1992) summarized it,  
 
Twenty (or even ten) years ago a researcher arguing for the existence of subliminal 
effects was on the fringe of the discipline, on the outside looking in. Now a researcher 
arguing against the existence of subliminal effects is in that position, while the 
advocate sits squarely within the mainstream. (Bornstein, 1992, p. 12) 
 
However, in the same year, a special issue in the American Psychologist (Loftus & Klinger, 
1992) also examined another important question: How strong are the subliminal effects? The 
conclusion was that, although “the reality of unconscious processes is no longer 
questionable” (p. 761), the effect of the unconscious was limited to highly routinized 
activities that could do little without conscious processing. Therefore, the conclusion from 
that special issue was that the unconscious was ‘dumb’. (For more on the history of priming 
research, see Bargh, 2014; Trofimovich & McDonough, 2011.) 
4.4.2 Work by Bargh and colleagues  
John Bargh and associates have been actively investigating priming phenomena. Recently, 
equating ‘the unconscious’ with ‘subliminal priming’ has been criticized as unnecessary 
restriction. Expanding the scope of the unconscious, Bargh et al. (2010) define priming as 
“the passive, subtle, and unobtrusive activation of relevant mental representations by 
external, environmental stimuli such that people are not and usually do not become aware of 
the influence exerted by those stimuli” (p. 288). Notice that this definition covers both 
subliminal (unperceived) and supraliminal (perceived) stimuli. The focus has shifted from 
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lack of awareness of the stimulus itself to lack of awareness of the effects of the stimulus. 
What is unconscious becomes the unintentional consequences of the situation. Bargh et al. 
(2010) argue that this is not a new redefinition of the unconscious, but rather it is in line with 
original conceptualizations of prominent thinkers, such as Darwin and Freud, where the 
unconscious used to refer the unintended nature of the behavior or its consequences. Bargh et 
al. (2010) also argue that recognizing situational influences is in the spirit of some early 
motivation researchers, such as Kurt Lewin (e.g., 1935), where motivational dynamics were 
described in terms of ‘fields of forces’ impinging on the individual. Additionally, stimuli that 
appear subliminally but still have significant effects on humans are actually uncommon in 
nature, and so humans have instead evolved to deal with more salient primes. Therefore, 
“assessing the unconscious in terms of processing subliminal stimuli is analogous to 
evaluating the intelligence of a fish based on its behavior out of water” (Bargh & Morsella, 
2008, p. 74).  
That unconscious processes, just like conscious ones, can influence behavior but 
without awareness came to be known as the automaticity principle (Huang & Bargh, 2014). 
according to this principle, the “power of the situation in determining behavior is that the 
mere, passive perception of environmental events directly triggers higher mental processes in 
the absence of any involvement by conscious, intentional processes” (Bargh et al., 2010, p. 
288). The first demonstration of this effect was obtained in a study by Chartrand and Bargh 
(1996), who were able to activate cognitive goals (to evaluate or to memorize) merely 
through exposure to certain words in an ostensibly unrelated task. That task required the 
participants to perform a scrambled-sentences exercise in which words related to either 
evaluation (e.g., evaluate, opinion, impression) or memorization (e.g., remember, retain, 
memory) were embedded. This priming task successfully influenced the participants’ recall in 
a subsequent task. In a following study by Bargh et al. (2001), different goals were similarly 
activated through an unobtrusive and ostensibly unrelated task. In a series of experiments, 
Bargh et al. found that achievement priming led participants to perform better in an 
intellectual task, cooperation priming led them to behave more cooperatively in a resource-
management task, and high-performance priming led them to persist at the face of obstacles 
and to favor resumption of disrupted tasks even in the presence of more attractive 
alternatives. This demonstrates that self-regulation can be induced unconsciously. In all of 
these cases, each participant was quizzed during debriefing in order to make sure that s/he 
was not aware of the effect of the priming task. Participants in these experiments display no 
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awareness of the reasons behind their improved learning ability, or whether there is any 
improvement at all.  
These findings have led to a new area in motivation science called implicit motivation. 
According to Ferguson, Hassin, and Bargh (2008), because the conscious regulatory capacity 
is severely limited and resource-intensive, implicit motivation evolved to make up for this 
limitation by helping the individual negotiate the social world automatically, without having 
to consciously deliberate every decision. However, implicit motivation cannot do this if it 
cannot adapt to the requirements of different situations. Being flexible and adaptable to new 
circumstances is obviously essential to successful goal pursuit, and if implicit motivation is 
inflexible it should be vulnerable to failure. While it was initially thought that implicit 
processing is slow and inflexible, recent research has shown that its interaction with “the 
dynamic, unfolding situation” is actually more flexible and adaptive than was previously 
expected (Ferguson et al., 2008, p. 154). Hassin, Bargh, and Zimerman (2009) conducted two 
studies to examine the flexibility of implicit motivation. In the first study, the researchers 
utilized the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, which is a classic measure of adaptation to 
changing environments. This task consists of cards of varying colors (red, blue, yellow, or 
green), forms (stars, triangles, circles, or crosses) and numbers (one, two, three, or four). The 
participant has to sort each card according to color, form, or number. The participant is 
informed after each trial whether it was right or wrong, but s/he is never informed what the 
underlying rule actually is. After 10 consecutive correct sortings, the rule also changes 
without warning. The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test is therefore a test of flexibility in learning 
implicit patterns that change repeatedly. The results showed that participants in the high-
achievement priming condition (primed with words like win, succeed, strive, master) adapted 
better to the changing task requirements than did those in the no-priming condition. In the 
second study, the researchers utilized a variation of the Iowa Gambling Task. This task is also 
a card game in which the participant has to maximize gains and minimize losses without 
being given the rule explicitly. Also, half the way through the task, the implicit rule changes 
without any warning. Just like the first study, participants in the high-achievement priming 
condition outperformed those in the no-priming condition. These results suggest that primed 
participants are better at disengaging from the old environment and learning the structure of 
the new one.  
In another study, Eitam, Hassin, and Schul (2008) used a different approach to 
measure flexibility in implicit motivation. They used a simulation of a dynamic system 
represented by a sugar factory. The participants had to manage the factory by controlling the 
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number of workers to reach a production level of 9,000 tons. The sugar factory operated 
according to a dynamic probabilistic rule [2 × (number of employees on trial n) – (tons of 
sugar on trial n – 1) × noise], which the participants were not aware of. Again, the primed 
participants outperformed the control ones in adapting to the dynamic nature of the task. 
Crucially, the primed participants did not report any increase in explicit motivation, nor were 
they able to indicate explicit knowledge about the underlying rule.  
4.4.3 Misattribution  
In some priming studies, primed participants perform at a higher intensity, such as working 
harder or cooperating more. In these cases, they are neither aware that priming might have an 
effect on their behavior, nor that their behavior had been modified in any way. In some other 
priming studies, however, the participants are primed with a goal whose satisfaction requires 
choosing one of a number of alternatives. When primed participants do select the alternative 
that best helps them reach their unconsciously primed goal, they are not aware of the effect of 
the prime on their behavior, but they are aware of the choice they had made. Asking these 
participants to introspect about the cause of their behavior reveals interesting insights about 
the nature of cognitive biases and how individuals (mis)attribute the motivation behind their 
behavior.  
In one of the first systematic analyses, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) conducted an 
extensive review and concluded that individuals typically report faulty accounts to explain 
their behavior, and sometimes even make assertions about mental events that they do not 
have access to. The authors therefore concluded that self-reported motives are questionable. 
In their words,  
 
The evidence reviewed is then consistent with the most pessimistic view concerning 
people’s ability to report accurately about their cognitive processes…. the evidence 
indicates it may be quite misleading for social scientists to ask their subjects about the 
influences on their evaluations, choices, or behavior. The relevant research indicates 
that such reports, as well as predictions, may have little value except for whatever 
utility they may have in the study of verbal explanations per se. (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977, p. 247) 
 
Other researchers (Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1984) have argued that verbal reports do not 
automatically qualify as scientific data without first satisfying certain conditions, such as 
63 
 
asking the participant to describe their successive cognitive processes (the ‘what’ question) 
rather than their motives and reasons (the ‘why’ question). This should also take place during 
the activity rather than afterward (e.g., via think-aloud protocols). Retrospective reports about 
general reasons risk contamination by memory traces retrieved from long-term memory. 
Instead, researchers should seek information from the short-term memory of the activity in 
question. The same issue arises in prospective self-reports. In reviewing research that has 
compared self-reports with objective measures of actual behavior, Back and Vazire (2012) 
report low to moderate correlations and conclude that there are “substantial blind spots” (p. 
139) in personality self-views when individuals try to predict their own actual behavior.  
Priming research shows that individuals tend to misattribute their behavior to some 
internal state, such as permanent dispositions or temporary preferences. In a study that 
specifically investigated this post-priming misattribution process, Bar-Anan et al. (2010) 
conducted a series of experiments that showed a striking sequence of events. The researchers 
demonstrated that (a) a primed goal can influence people’s behavior, (b) people then fail to 
recognize the effect of the prime, (c) they therefore misattribute their behavior to their 
internal state, and (d) this ‘confabulated’ internal state would then be incorporated into their 
self-concept and would influence subsequent behavior! The last point illustrates the 
downstream effects of post-priming misattribution, showing that unconsciously primed states 
may have longer-lasting effects than was first thought. This research also suggests that 
individuals sometimes infer the motives behind their own behavior from salient 
environmental factors—especially when the situation is ambiguous enough for individuals to 
rationalize in a post hoc manner—just like an outside observer would. As Gawronski (2009) 
put is, “what is sometimes regarded as the ‘privilege of self-knowledge’ may be nothing else 
than naïve theories about ourselves that are based on the same kinds of behavioural 
observations that form the basis of our knowledge about other individuals” (p. 141).  
Research on choice blindness has shed some more light on this misattribution 
phenomenon. In a remarkable experiment, Johansson et al. (2005) asked their participants to 
decide which of two female faces they considered more attractive. After the participant had 
made their decision, the experimenter—with a sleight of hand—switched the pictures and, 
immediately, asked the participant to explain why they preferred the picture that they did not 
actually choose. Most participants did not detect the trick and, interestingly, went on to 
explain why the female face they ‘chose’ was more attractive. During debriefing, the 
researchers report that many participants expressed considerable surprise, and even disbelief, 
when they were told about the purpose of the study. In a subsequent study titled ‘Magic at the 
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Marketplace’, Hall et al. (2010) set up a tasting venue at a local supermarket and invited 
shoppers passing by to try two varieties of jam and tea. Just like the previous study, the 
experimenter sneakily switched the two choices after the participant made their decision and 
then asked them to explain why they preferred the one they did not originally choose. Most 
participants failed to detect the mismatch between their actual choice and the outcome, and 
readily (mis)explained their ‘choice’ (see also Wegner, 2002, for similarly amusing 
experiments). These results show that the human mind is efficient in making up (faulty) 
explanations for one’s behavior. Interestingly, when the reasons behind one’s actions cannot 
be misattributed plausibly, such as when primed to behave in a norm-violating way, 
participants experience an ‘explanatory vacuum’, which leads to experience negative affect 
(Oettingen, Grant, Smith, Skinner, & Gollwitzer), which they might again misattribute 
(Bargh et al., 2010).  
Conscious–unconscious dissociation has a neurological basis. According to Frith, 
Blakemore, and Wolpert (2000), while high-level control is housed in the prefrontal cortex, it 
is the parietal cortex that houses metal representations, thus making it structurally possible to 
have a high-order goal operating without a conscious representation of it (Bargh et al., 2010). 
Additionally, the brain contains ‘mirror neurons’ that allow one to copy another person’s 
behavior automatically and unconsciously in what neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese (2003) calls 
the ‘shared manifold of intersubjectivity’. These mirror neurons become active both when 
one engages in a type of action and when one perceives another person engaging in that 
action. These findings reopen “the behaviorists’ hypothesis that the higher order responses of 
the human being can be directly put in motion by environmental stimuli” (Bargh & Ferguson, 
2000, p. 928). In extreme clinical cases, such as the environmental dependency syndrome 
(Lhermitte, 1983, 1986), the patient loses all control of their behavior when a prime is 
present. This condition causes a disorder in personal autonomy, making the patient at the 
mercy of environmental cues. Seeing a bed means undressing and lying on it; seeing flowers 
and some water means watering them. Lhermitte recounts the startling level of submission to 
environmental cues in one of his patients:  
 
Patient 2 and I sat down in my office. I put some medical instruments on my desk. 
She immediately picked up the blood pressure gauge and very meticulously took my 
blood pressure... After this she took the tongue depressor and placed it in front of my 
mouth, which I opened, and she examined my throat... Last, she picked up the reflex 
tester and, to make sure she tested the ankle jerks, I knelt down on the chair. When I 
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asked her what she thought, she said she was satisfied with my state of health. 
(Lhermitte, 1986, p. 336) 
 
Research on contextual priming is arguably one of the most controversial areas of 
motivational and social psychology, just as Dixon describes the controversy over subliminal 
perception in the opening quote of this section. John Kihlstrom, a prominent critic of the 
automaticity movement, dubbed the reemrgence of the interest in the uncosncious as a 
regressive situation (Kihlstrom, 2008b), as the automaticity juggernaut (Kihlstrom, 2008a), 
and as the rise of a ‘People are Stupid’ school of thought that portrays the individual as 
mindlessly swayed by instinctual drives and situational stimuli (Kihlstrom, 2004b). Because 
Kihlstrom’s critique is so passionate, I quote some of it:  
 
Almost inevitably, the emphasis on how people are pushed around by situational 
factors led to a kind of ‘Candid Camera’ rhetorical stance in which social 
psychologists’ lectures and textbooks focused inordinately on just how ridiculous – 
how stupid – people can be, depending on the situation – a situation that, in many 
cases, has been expressly contrived to make people look ridiculous and stupid…. 
Behaviorism, with its emphasis on stimulus and response, did not survive the 
cognitive revolution, but the “positivistic reserve” (Flanagan 1992) that was part and 
parcel of behaviorism is still with us. As a result, we grudgingly accept intervening 
mental states and processes as necessary to the explanation of behavior – but we want 
them to be as mechanical as possible. We’ve replaced both the black box and the 
ghost in the machine with a clockwork mechanism that is as close to reflex activity as 
we can get and still pay lip service to cognitivism…. We had a cognitive revolution 
for this – only to be told that Skinner had it right after all? (Kihlstrom, 2004b, p. 348, 
original emphases) 
 
Other detractors direct their criticism toward methodological issues (e.g., Newell & Shanks, 
2014), failed replications (e.g., Doyen et al., 2012; Pashler, Coburn, & Harris, 2012), and 
potential publication bias (e.g., Vadillo, Hardwicke, & Shanks, 2016). Without doubt, this 
topic is going to remain an active and controversial area of research for a long time to come.  
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4.4.4 Research on learning  
This research tradition has demonstrated that the mere passive exposure to certain stimuli can 
influence subsequent perception, motivation, and behavior. Some of this research has been 
conducted in the context of learning. For example, Radel, Sarrazin, Jehu, and Pelletier (2013) 
exposed their participants to a ‘barely audible’ conversation (i.e., just above the auditory 
threshold) to which the participants could not have attended because they were engaged in a 
cognitively-demanding task. When this conversation was about an intrinsically motivating 
activity reflecting enjoyment and satisfaction, the participants’ motivation was automatically 
activated so that they consistently outperformed their control counterparts both in solvable 
tasks and in perseverance in unsolvable ones. The researchers argue that research 
successfully eliciting unconscious motivation through situational cues has yielded 
“indisputable evidence” (Radel et al., 2013, p. 763).  
Other research has shown that mere exposure to motivationally-charged words (e.g., 
aspire, excellence, ambitious) improves performance in subsequent, ostensibly unrelated, 
tasks. This priming process facilitates better learning of complex patterns of information as 
well as more efficient disengagement from the old environment in order to learn the structure 
of the new one (e.g., Eitam et al., 2008; Hassin et al., 2009). Other research has shown that 
priming students with the name of their parents increases self-rated goal commitment as well 
as actual effort exerted in a subsequent cognitive task (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Shah, 
2003). Parents’ names are usually associated with striving for achievement, and so this 
research has found that this effect is moderated by reported closeness to parents. On the other 
hand, Hassin (2008, p. 579) reports results showing that priming mothers with the name of 
their young child, which activates the goal of going home and nurturing, reduces the pursuit 
of achievement goals.  
Some investigators have tried to understand why passive priming can have an effect 
on learning. Early research on semantic activation suggests that priming leaves an 
unconscious residue in the brain (see Dörnyei, 2009c, p. 44). For example, an individual 
reading the word ‘window’ as part of a long list and then asked to complete the word ‘win…’ 
would most likely say ‘window’ even if s/he does not remember whether this word was 
originally on the list. Similarly, asking somebody to repeat the word ‘silk’ and then asking 
them ‘What does a cow drink?’ would most likely make them answer ‘milk’. However, it 
turned out that this activity is not restricted to just semantic activation, but also conceptual 
activation. For example, an individual instructed to read a list of insect names very carefully 
(and explicitly informed that this is a memory test) and then asked whether the word ‘insect’ 
67 
 
was on the list, s/he would likely answer in the positive even if that word was not on the list 
(see Banaji & Greenwald, 2013). This happens because insect names activate the concept of 
insect. In a seminal study on this question, Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) asked their 
participants to describe the ambiguous behavior of a person they read about. The participants 
that had been primed with positive versus negative words formed impressions about the 
target person that were congruent with their primes. Importantly, over half (55%) of the terms 
the participants used were not from the list of words they had been exposed to in the priming 
task. For example, some participants used ‘self-centered’ instead of ‘conceited’ and ‘daring’ 
instead of ‘adventurous’.  
Going even beyond semantic and conceptual activation, more recent research shows 
that priming has perceptual, evaluative, emotional, motivational, and behavioral effects. 
Ferguson (2008) argues that priming leads to an evaluative readiness to pursue the goal as 
well as implicit positivity toward goal-facilitating objects. Primed learners would therefore 
become better predisposed to the learning goal and to what facilitates successful learning. In 
a way, this could make priming the unconscious counterpart of advance organizers (Ausubel, 
1960). Bargh (2006) also argues that priming does not actually activate a single concept, but 
conceptual structures, since concepts “are not defined solely in terms of inherent properties; 
instead, they are defined primarily in terms of interactional properties” (Lakoff & Johnson, 
2003/1980, p. 125). Priming therefore activates a network of related concepts that may help 
channel the learner’s attention and effort toward the learning goal, and away from distractors.  
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4.5 Implicit attitudes 
4.5.1 A bit of history  
About 150 years ago, Donders (1868/1969) made the proposal that, although mental 
processes could not be observed directly, psychologists could still investigate them through 
the speed of performance in response to different stimuli. Donders reported a number of 
experiments showing, for example, that using the right or left hand produced different lapse 
times depending on whether the stimulus was to the right or the left of the participant.  
More recently, Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji tried to adapt this technique 
in a grant proposal submitted in early 1994 (see Dasgupta, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2003). Later 
that year, Greenwald wrote the first computer program measuring the speed in associating 
Flowers with Pleasant and Insects with Unpleasant (see Banaji & Greenwald, 2013). 
Greenwald tried this test on himself, thus becoming the first ever person to take this test, and 
felt that this configuration was very easy to perform. However, when Greenwald switched the 
categories—i.e., associating Flowers with Unpleasant and Insects with Pleasant—the task 
suddenly became difficult! And no matter how many times he repeated this test, it remained 
difficult. He then shared it with other colleagues, and they also had the same experience.  
Afterward, Greenwald used the same procedure but this time using the categories 
Black and White. He was disturbed to find that associating Blacks with Pleasant felt just as 
difficult as associating Insects with Pleasant. Some of his colleagues who took the test also 
reported the same experience. Reflecting on this experience, Dasgupta et al. (2003) explain 
that “Because of our deeply held beliefs about equal treatment, our own automatic responses 
were difficult to explain away. Now we could no longer talk about ‘those others’ who held 
negative attitudes toward disadvantaged groups” (p. 239). Therefore, a unique aspect of this 
test is that the experimenter can become a participant his/her own experiment.  
A few years later, the first article using what came to be known as the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT) appeared (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In this article, 
the researchers conducted three experiments assessing individual differences in implicit 
social cognition. The participants in these experiments consciously disavowed the racial 
implications of finding it hard to associate Blacks with Pleasant. As Banaji and Greenwald 
(2013) put it, “The Race IAT holds up a mirror in which many see a reflection that they do 
not recognize.”  
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4.5.2 Work by Greenwald and colleagues  
Implicit (i.e., unconscious) attitudes are defined as “introspectively unidentified (or 
inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable 
feeling, thought, or action toward social objects” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, p. 8). 
Psychologist Icek Ajzen describes this emerging field under the subheading The promise of 
implicit measures: 
 
People tend to express socially desirable attitudes and to report possessing relatively 
favorable personality characteristics. These self-reports may, at a conscious level at 
least, indeed reflect what the [respondent] truly believes. With respect to some 
attitudinal issues and personality traits, however, explicit measures may be misleading 
or tell only part of the story. When it comes to socially sensitive issues or personality 
characteristics, implicit measures may reveal attitudes or traits that people are 
reluctant to admit even to themselves. (Ajzen, 2005, p. 18) 
 
The first demonstration that implicit attitudes derived from the IAT are indeed a reflection of 
prejudice that individuals are reluctant to admit comes from a study of discriminatory 
behavior by A. R. McConnell and Leibold (2001). Unbeknownst to the participants, the 
researchers videotaped them interacting with two female confederates, one Black and one 
White, separately. The confederates asked each participant a number of questions and told a 
scripted joke. The behavior of each participant was then analyzed by judges who were blind 
to his/her IAT scores. The results showed that, indeed, the IAT scores correlated significantly 
with the judges’ ratings of various discriminatory behaviors in interacting with the Black (vs. 
White) confederate, such as amount of speaking time, smiling, unprepared social comments, 
and speech errors and hesitations. In contrast, explicit measures of racial prejudice offered 
conflicting results.  
Further research has shown that implicit attitudes could predict meaningful outcomes 
in a variety of domains, such as predicting the number of cigarettes smoked per day 
(Swanson, Swanson, & Greenwald, 2001), voting behavior for those who are still undecided 
(Arcuri, Castelli, Galdi, Zogmaister, & Amadori, 2008), and even suicidal risk (Harrison, 
Stritzke, Fay, Ellison, & Hudaib, 2014). A decade after the first IAT paper was published, 
Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of IAT 184 
studies involving 14,900 participants. The researchers analyzed a range of criterion 
variables—including behavioral, judgmental, and physiological measures—and found that 
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the IAT scores exhibited a moderate correlation (r = .274). Explicit measures, on the other 
hand, showed an inferior effect size (e.g., r = .12 in interracial behavior). Because of these 
encouraging results, research on implicit attitudes “is exploding at a phenomenal rate” (Petty, 
Fazio, & Briñol, 2009, p. 3).  
Some of this research has socially significant implications. Hugenberg and 
Bodenhausen (2003) have found that European Americans showed greater readiness to detect 
anger in Black faces when their implicit prejudice was high. In ‘real-life hiring situations’ 
that require subjective judgement while weighing the applicant’s various credentials, Rooth 
(2010) has also demonstrated that the probability of inviting male Arab-Muslim applicants to 
a job interview decreases when the recruiter has stronger negative implicit attitudes toward 
Arab-Muslim men. Other research has revealed an even darker side of everyday life. Reports 
indicate that police officers frequently misidentify unarmed Black people as hostile, tragically 
leading to fatal shootings. These reports have been supported by research using computer 
simulation games, in which Black people tend to be erroneously misidentified criminals (e.g., 
Greenwald, Oakes, & Hoffman, 2003). In this type of research, the participant is instructed to 
press a button to ‘shoot’ at criminals, who are holding guns, but not at citizens, who are 
holding benign objects such as a flashlight or a camera. Glaser and Knowles (2008) showed 
that this pattern is related to IAT scores. Equally disturbing is the finding that medical doctors 
also exhibit a similar pattern. Green et al. (2007) compared the explicit and implicit racial 
attitudes of medical doctors with their medical recommendations. At the explicit level, all 
doctors expressed equal preference for Black and White patients, as expected. At the implicit 
level, however, the more they favored White patients, the more they also offered them better 
medical recommendations (in this case, thrombolysis diagnosis for myocardial infarction). 
Thus, their behavior was in line with their implicit—not explicit—attitudes. Researchers 
examining this issue from the other side of the fence, so to speak, found parallel results. 
Penner et al. (2010) examined the experiences real-life patients. Their results showed that, 
after interacting with medical doctors with high implicit (despite low explicit) racial 
prejudice, “Black patients responded particularly negatively to medical encounters with 
[these] physicians” (p. 438). It is clear, therefore, that implicit attitudes can have serious 
consequences on everyday life. In a most disturbing study, Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-
Vaughns, and Johnson (2006) found that jurors are more likely to sentence to death a Black 
defendant in cases involving a White victim if the defendant exhibit more stereotypically 
African features (e.g., broader nose, thicker lips, darker skin). The researchers describe this 
phenomenon as ‘looking deathworthy’.  
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Neuroscientific research indicates that implicit and explicit attitudes are two distinct 
constructs. According to Cunningham et al. (2004), implicit attitudes correlate with activation 
in the amygdala, the brain region concerned with emotions, while explicit processing is 
associated with activation in the frontal cortex, the area responsible for control and regulation 
(see also Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 2003; Phelps et al., 2000). 
Dasgupta et al. (2003) have drawn from such findings to make the argument that implicit 
attitudes are not ‘cold cognition’. Activation of the amygdala indicates that “the IAT was 
capturing something warm and affect-laden” (p. 241).  
Despite the fact that implicit and explicit attitudes are related to activation in distinct 
areas in the brain, they seem to have some aspects in common. As for explicit attitudes, they 
have been known to develop in children early on through socializing with others, such as 
parents, and so the level of identification with parents moderates the intergenerational 
transmission of attitudes (Allport, 1954). Recent empirical research supports this process, 
which is akin to vicarious learning (Bandura, 1977), showing an association between 
children’s and parents’ explicit attitudes (for a meta-analysis, see Tenenbaum & Leaper, 
2002). As for implicit attitudes, a very similar process has been observed. For example, 
Sinclair, Dunn, and Lowery (2005) found a correspondence between the implicit prejudice of 
children and that of their parents, and that this correspondence was influenced by the extent 
to which children identified with their parents. Still, the available research on the 
development of implicit attitudes is still in its infancy. While we already know that attitudes 
start forming very early, even before birth, through genetic factors (Bouchard et al., 2003), 
and through sounds heard while still in the womb (DeCasper & Spence, 1986), as well as a 
multitude of factors after birth (for a review, see Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010), little is known 
about which of these factors are also relevant to the development of implicit attitudes.  
4.5.3 The validity of the Implicit Association Test 
The IAT is arguably the most popular indirect measure of attitudes in contemporary 
psychological research. Because its popularity, the IAT has generated a sizable amount of 
literature utilizing it in various domains, thus permitting scrutiny of its reliability and validity. 
The reliability of the IAT is considered the highest among all other implicit measures of 
attitudes, with internal consistency and split-half reliabilities amounting to r = .79 across 50 
studies in one meta-analysis (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; see 
also Krause, Back, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011).  
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As for the validity of the IAT, there is still continuing debate concerning what exactly 
the IAT is actually measuring. Some proponents of the IAT have also argued that its validity 
amounts to a ‘scientific certainty’ (Rudman, 2008), drawing from findings in various domains 
including consumer preferences, political preferences, personality traits, sexual orientations, 
and close relationships (see Greenwald et al., 2009). Proponents also cite the IAT’s known-
groups validity. That is, research shows that the IAT is capable of correctly distinguishing 
among members of different groups in accordance with our a priori knowledge of them, such 
as reliably determining the participant’s gender, nationality, and even affiliation to a group 
artificially created in the laboratory (for a review, see Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 
2007).  
The IAT also has its own critics. There is continuing debate concerning what exactly 
the IAT is measuring. Some critics have questioned the implicit attitudes construct. In the 
context of racial prejudice, for example, they argue that the IAT may represent shared 
cultural stereotypes rather than personal animus (e.g., Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Gehring, 
Karpinski, & Hilton, 2003; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). In addition, Oswald, Mitchell, 
Blanton, Jaccard, and Tetlock (2013) conducted a meta-analysis and criticized the IAT on the 
basis of overall poor prediction of relevant criterion measures and of being contaminated by 
irrelevant factors such as working memory capacity, task-switching skills, and other sources 
method-based variance (see also Ajzen, 2005; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Oswald, Mitchell, 
Blanton, Jaccard, and Tetlock (2015) also argue that “IAT studies often rely on small-sample 
studies that predict criteria far removed from meaningful forms of discrimination (e.g., 
performance on a Stroop test or amygdala activation) in artificial situations involving 
strangers” (p. 565). 
However, in Oswald et al.’s meta-analysis both explicit and implicit measures 
performed almost as poorly, in turn leading Greenwald, Banaji, and Nosek (2015) to criticize 
this meta-analysis for including correlations that have no theoretical basis. They also argue 
that these results actually lend support to the IAT’s discriminant validity. In addition, 
Greenwald et al. explain that even small effects can have substantial societal significance if 
they apply to a large section of the society or if they apply to the same person repeatedly, and 
thus “conventionally small (and even subsmall) effect sizes can have substantial societal 
significance” (p. 557). This is related to what Messick (1995) called consequential validity 
and to what Merton (1968) referred to as the Matthew effect, according to which the rich get 
richer while the poor get poorer. This debate is still ongoing (e.g., Carlsson & Agerström, 
2016; Oswald et al., 2015).  
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Nonetheless, one limitation of the IAT is that it is a relative measure, and this 
sometimes makes its scores ambiguous. For example, if a participant obtains a score favoring 
the L1 group over the L2 group, this may mean that the individual possesses positive attitudes 
toward the L1 and negative attitudes toward the L2. However, other scenarios are equally 
possible, such as being indifferent about one group, or even possessing positive attitudes 
toward it but even stronger positive attitudes toward the other group. Similarly, a neutral 
score could mean that the individual is indifferent to the two groups, but this could also be 
due to possessing equally positive or equally negative attitudes toward each group. The 
relative nature of the IAT has led some psychologists to devise variations of it, such as the 
Single-Target Implicit Association Test. This discussion is presented in more detail in the 
following chapter (Section 5.3.2).  
Finally, the active research on implicit attitudes and its consequences is becoming 
increasingly relevant to contemporary world affairs, including globalization and immigration. 
Dasgupta et al. express this idea as follows: 
 
We believe that research explicating the relationship between intergroup familiarity 
and implicit and explicit prejudice is likely to be an important topic in the 21st 
century as globalization and immigration continue to change the demographics of the 
United States, and indeed many other countries around the world. (Dasgupta et al., 
2003, p. 242)  
 
4.5.4 Research on learning 
A number of investigations have uncovered links between these processes and educational 
outcomes. For example, using a multilevel modeling approach, van den Bergh, Denessen, 
Hornstra, Voeten, and Holland (2010) examined the relationship between teacher’s implicit 
prejudice (measured with the Implicit Association Test) and the achievement of minority 
students. Their results showed that the higher the implicit prejudice of the teacher, the lower 
the achievement of his/her minority students (and sometimes the higher the achievement of 
majority students!). This pattern was observed in both mathematics and text comprehension 
tests. Further analyses led van den Bergh et al. (2010) to conclude that this effect may be 
mediated by the teacher’s different expectations for minority versus majority students. More 
specifically, teachers with high implicit prejudice tended to view minority students as less 
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intelligent and less promising. Unsurprisingly, explicit measures of prejudice failed to exhibit 
any of these associations.  
van den Bergh et al. (2010) argue that, because teachers interact with their students 
for extended periods of time, implicit biases are bound to surface in everyday spontaneous 
behavior. Teaching is a demanding job, and so these biases could creep in even if the teacher 
does not intend it. The teacher might for example devote more time and attention to students 
s/he considers more promising, and might give them more challenging activities that would in 
turn help them learn the material better (the Pygmalion effect, Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). 
At the same time, the teacher might communicate subtle messages to minority students about 
their low ability, and this could have a substantial and long-term impact on them (the Golem 
effect, Babad, Inbar, & Rosenthal, 1982). According to these self-fulfilling prophesies, the 
teacher’s false beliefs about the potential of different students (e.g., bright or dull) can 
materialize in actual achievement through the teacher’s expectations and differential 
treatment. When these beliefs are based on real differences, they can also lead to the 
perpetuation of these differences (van den Bergh et al., 2010, p. 500). These effects has been 
validated in controlled laboratory settings (Reynolds, 2007).  
Another line of research has examined the effect of stereotype activation on student 
performance. Since women are stereotyped to have inferior quantitative ability while 
Asians—especially in the United Stated—are stereotyped to have superior quantitative 
ability, Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady (1999) combined these two stereotypes in a single study. 
The researchers recruited female Asians to complete a quantitative test. Before the test, the 
participants first competed a questionnaire that activated different aspects of their social 
identities. The participants whose female identity was activated performed worse, while those 
whose Asian identity was activated performed better, than a control group. The researchers 
also hypothesized that this effect has to do with the stereotypes that are associated with 
different identities, not identities per se, and so when they repeated this experiment in the 
Canadian context—where Asians are not stereotyped to have superior quantitative skills—the 
results replicated the gender activation effect but not the ethnic identity effect.  
In a subsequent study, Ambady, Shih, Kim, and Pittinsky (2001) showed that this 
effect can also be observed in children as young as five years old. Among girls, activation of 
female identity impeded performance while activation of Asian identity facilitated it. Among 
boys, as expected, activation of either male or Asian identities led to better performance in 
comparison to a control group. In addition, susceptibility to stereotypes generally increased 
with age. This research shows that the subtle, unobtrusive activation of different social 
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identities can have an effect on cognitive abilities in subsequent learning tasks. In these 
studies, the researchers activated the different identities by merely asking the participants to 
answer a questionnaire about innocuous matters such as whether they preferred to live in a 
single-sex accommodation (female identity) or whether they had opportunities to speak 
languages other than English in their resident halls (Asian identity). With young participants, 
the researchers simply asked them to color a picture of a girl holding a doll or two Asians 
eating with chopsticks to activate the female and Asian identities, respectively. Explicitly, 
most participants denied that gender or ethnicity should have an effect on performance, 
suggesting that these influences are unconscious. This effect has been replicated in a recent, 
larger-scale study (Gibson, Losee, & Vitiello, 2014; for more on the stereotype threat effect, 
see also Gilovich, Keltner, & Nisbett, 2011, pp. 477–478). 
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4.6 Social desirability 
4.6.1 A bit of history  
In the early 1930s, Richard LaPiere of Stanford University went on a road trip with a Chinese 
couple. Considering the generally negative attitudes toward Orientals that surveys at the time 
showed, LaPiere was expecting that the Chinese couple would have a hard time finding a 
hotel to stay. However, the clerk of the first hotel they tried accommodated them without 
hesitation. Two months later, LaPiere called that same hotel to ask whether they would be 
willing to accommodate ‘an important Chinese gentleman’. The answer was unequivocally 
‘No’.  
A few years later, LaPiere documented his experience traveling across the United 
States with this Chinese couple (LaPiere, 1934). He reported visiting 66 hotels and other 
residential establishments and 184 restaurant and cafés. They were refused service only once. 
Six months later, LaPiere sent a questionnaire to the same establishments he had visited (as 
well as similar ones in their local area) asking: “Will you accept members of the Chinese race 
as guests in your establishment?” Over 90% replied ‘No’ and most of the remainder were 
‘Undecided’. LaPiere concluded that on the basis of these questionnaire results Chinese 
people should not consider visiting the United States, but on the basis on actual experience 
Chinese people are actually very welcome in the country! This disparity led LaPiere to launch 
a harsh attack on the validity of questionnaire methodology and its ability to elicit valid data 
about the respondents’ attitudes. He argued that questionnaires generally ask rather 
hypothetical, abstract questions that have little to do with actual behavior. Here is how he 
explained his point:  
 
Because it is easy, cheap, and mechanical, the attitudinal questionnaire is rapidly 
becoming a major method of sociological and socio-psychological investigation. The 
technique is simple. Thus from a hundred or a thousand responses to the question 
“Would you get up to give an Armenian woman your seat in a street car?” the 
investigator derives the “attitude” of non-Armenian males towards Armenian females. 
Now the question may be constructed with elaborate skill and hidden with 
consummate cunning in a maze of supplementary or even irrelevant questions yet all 
that has been obtained is a symbolic response to a symbolic situation. The words 
“Armenian woman” do not constitute an Armenian woman of flesh and blood, who 
might be tall or squat, fat or thin, old or young, well or poorly dressed—who might, in 
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fact, be a goddess or just another old and dirty hag. And the questionnaire response, 
whether it be “yes” or “no,” is but a verbal reaction and this does not involve rising 
from the seat or stolidly avoiding the hurt eyes of the hypothetical woman and the 
derogatory states of other street-car occupants. Yet, ignoring these limitations, the 
diligent investigator will jump briskly from his factual evidence to the unwarranted 
conclusion that he has measured the “anticipatory behavior patterns” of non-
Armenian males towards Armenian females encountered on street cars. Usually he 
does not stop here, but proceeds to deduce certain general conclusions regarding the 
social relationships between Armenians and non-Armenians. (LaPiere, 1934, p. 230) 
 
In another lucid account of his position, LaPiere stated that,  
 
There would seem little to be gained from asking a man if his religious faith prevents 
him from committing sin. Of course it does—on paper. But “moral attitudes” must 
have a significance in the adjustment to actual situations or they are not worth the 
studying. Sitting at my desk in California I can predict with a high degree of certainty 
what an “average” business man in an average Mid-Western city will reply to the 
question “Would you engage in sexual intercourse with a prostitute in a Paris 
brothel?” Yet no one, least of all the man himself, can predict what he would actually 
do should he by some misfortune find himself face to face with the situation in 
question. His moral “attitudes” are no doubt already stamped into his personality. But 
just what those habits are which will be invoked to provide him with some sort of 
adjustment to this situation is quite indeterminate. (LaPiere, 1934, pp. 235–236) 
 
This study provoked different reactions of scholars. For example, Ajzen and colleagues 
blamed the abstract nature of LaPiere’ question. They argued that in order for LaPiere to 
obtain more accurate results, he should have asked “Would you accept a young, well-dressed, 
well-spoken, pleasant, self-confident, well-to-do Chinese couple accompanied by a mature, 
well dressed, well-spoken… educated European gentleman as guests in your establishment?” 
(Ajzen, Darroch, Fishbein, & Hornik, 1970, p. 270). This logic subsequently led to the 
formulation of the principle of compatibility (see Ajzen, 2005; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). 
According to this principle, the relationship between attitude and behavior is governed by the 
level of specificity in relation to target, action, context, and time.  
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However, the attitude–behavior may be more complex than this (see Liska, 1975). For 
example, response biases have to be accounted for. As an illustration, Connelly and Ones 
(2010) conducted a meta-analysis comparing the accuracy and predictive validity of self-
reports versus other-reports. Surprisingly, the results show that ratings by others yield 
“substantially greater” (p. 1092) predictive validity, especially when it comes to academic 
achievement and job performance. These results suggest that others can provide a more 
realistic perspective, while the individual’s self-reports are sometimes inflated by social 
desirability biases. This is what investigators found when they examined self-reports that 
could be verified independently, such as one’s weight and height. For example, obese and 
overweight adolescents tend to misreport their weight, and this misreporting is consistently in 
the direction of underestimating their weight, so that they look skinnier (Elgar, Roberts, 
Tudor-Smith, & Moore, 2005). Women of reproductive age also underestimate their weight, 
and this happens regardless of their age, education, race, or marital status (Brunner Huber, 
2007). The misreporting is more frequently found in the responses of overweight individuals, 
who usually have a stronger desire to present themselves more positively. When height is 
reported, as might be expected, it is misreported in the opposite direction, so that people 
overestimate their height to look taller (e.g., Rowland, 1990). Although the magnitude of 
misreporting varies (e.g., see Spencer, Appleby, Davey, & Key, 2002), it is clear that the 
distortion is consistently self-enhancing.  
While research on implicit attitudes in the previous section suggests that individuals 
may possess negative implicit attitudes toward specific social objects, social desirability 
proposes that some individuals have a more general tendency to present themselves 
favorably, and so they tend to exaggerate their views of themselves (e.g. in their 
questionnaire responses). An influential account of this tendency is offered by impression 
management theory, which proposes that people are actively striving to present themselves 
favorably to others (Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971). According to impression 
management theory, “it is not the actor’s own perceptions that matter so much as the actor’s 
beliefs about the impression that an observer gains” (Tedeschi et al., 1971, p. 690). 
Consequently, some individuals might tend to inflate their self-reports in order to obtain more 
favorable impressions from others. More crucially, impression management theory developed 
from cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), and so individuals may not be 
consciously ‘fabricating’ their responses in order to deliberately enhance their self-image. 
Instead, they are probably engaged in an automatic process to resolve a dissonance that they 
are experiencing, without even being aware of it (e.g., I think I am good-looking, so I must be 
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skinny). Thus, this process is probably operating unconsciously. That these participants were 
unaware of this process may be supported by the fact that they were usually aware that their 
weight and height were going to be checked afterward and their self-reports verified, which 
should have functioned as an incentive to provide as accurate responses as possible. Based on 
this, it is not unreasonable to expect people to also provide similarly biased responses when it 
comes to other sensitive issues, such as their own motivation and diligence or their attitudes 
toward another ethnic or racial group, even when they intend to give truthful responses whose 
anonymity is guaranteed (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013). This has made social desirability an 
important consideration in self-report methodology in various disciplines (e.g., Perinelli & 
Gremigni, 2016).  
In addition to being prone to self-enhancing biases (whether conscious or 
unconscious), self-report measures may also fail to detect inclinations and tendencies that 
respondents do recognize in themselves but genuinely reject due to ethical or moral 
reasons—but that may nevertheless influence behavior (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007). 
Some of these inclinations, such as a dislike of another ethnic community, come from 
everyday experiences in one’s culture which are then unconsciously assimilated (Banaji, 
2001). Therefore, one might feel a dislike toward a certain group, but at the same time also 
recognize the ethical consequences of this feeling and genuinely tries to suppress it at the 
explicit level.  
4.6.2 Work by Crowne and Marlowe  
An important contribution to the social desirability literature comes from the work of Crowne 
and Marlowe (1960). Crowne and Marlowe hypothesized that some individuals might have a 
stronger tendency to present themselves favorably, and so the researchers tried to devise a 
scale to measure this tendency. Their study recommended a list of 33 true–false statements 
related to behaviors that are socially undesirable but that people nonetheless typically engage 
in routinely. Examples included ‘I like to gossip at times’ and ‘I am sometimes irritated by 
people who ask favors of me.’ The idea is that individuals who score highly on the social 
desirability scale would have a tendency to exaggerate their responses to questionnaire items 
related to other areas as well.  
Regarding the psychometric properties of the scale, Crowne and Marlowe (1960) 
showed the internal consistency of their 33 items was .88, and the test–retest correlation was 
.89. Subsequent tests of this scale also showed high reliability. For example, Holden and 
Fekken (1989) generated a coefficient of .78; on several administrations, Crino, Svoboda, 
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Rubenfeld, and White (1983) generated internal consistency coefficients ranging from .70 to 
.77, and test–retest correlations ranging from .86 to .89. Because of the length of this scale 
(i.e., 33 items), some researchers have tried to make shorter versions of it by dividing it into 
three subscales. However, in a large-scale study, Barger (2002) concluded that the shorter 
versions were inadequate. Barger also reviewed research showing that the social desirability 
scale predicts hypertension, cortisol levels, cholesterol, autonomic nervous system reactivity, 
lifetime psychiatric morbidity, and mortality following a cardiac event.  
Despite the controversy surrounding social desirability (e.g., Barger, 2002; Johnson, 
Fendrich, & Mackesy-Amiti, 2012), a growing literature is showing that social desirability is 
associated with various meaningful outcomes. For example, being high in social desirability 
is associated with exaggerating the amount donated to charitable organizations (Bekkers & 
Wiepking, 2011; Lee & Sargeant, 2011) and with ageist stereotypes (Cherry, Allen, Denver, 
& Holland, 2015). It is also associated with women’s stereotypical attitudes toward sex 
workers (Long, Mollen, & Smith, 2012), with men’s smoking behavior (Dumitrescu, Badiṭã, 
Dogaru, Toma, & Duṭã, 2014), and with psychological distress in students (H. L. Smith, 
Robinson, & Young, 2007).   
  
81 
 
4.7 Conclusion  
Just like the previous chapters, it seems appropriate to end this chapter with a positive note, 
highlighting the value of the conscious mind. Some scholars posit that what makes human 
uniquely different from other species is shared intentionality (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, 
Behne, & Moll, 2005), which provides the motivation to share psychological states with 
others and to participate in collaborative activities. Another account of human uniqueness 
points to future planning (see R. W. Byrne & Bates, 2007), especially when it comes to social 
planning. This is clearly an important function of the conscious mind. (For a book-length 
discussion of the characteristics that are thought to make humans unique, see Suddendorf, 
2013.)  
In addition, most memory researchers now agree that the role of conscious, explicit 
memory is not to reproduce the past experiences exactly (i.e., the reproductive function), but 
to reconstruct past experiences alongside illusions and distortions (the constructive function), 
which in turn allows one to simulate and imagine future events (Schacter & Addis, 2007). It 
is therefore reassuring that, while the conscious mind travels between the past and the future, 
the unconscious mind auto-pilots moment-by-moment activities. In other words, 
“Unconscious processes make this time travel possible by keeping the individual adaptively 
in touch with the present, ‘minding the store’ while consciousness is away” (Bargh et al., 
2010, p. 306).  
The accumulating research supporting the notion that unconscious influences do play 
a critical role in human motivation is thus an attestation to Zoltán Dörnyei’s anticipation that 
unconscious motivation would be rediscovered before long. 
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Chapter 5: Measures of Implicit Attitudes and Motivation 
 
Theory is constrained by the quality and versatility of measurement tools 
—Nosek and Banaji (2001, p. 625) 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter has reviewed different strands of research into unconscious attitudes 
and motivation. In many of these investigations, indirect measures were used to make 
inferences about implicit phenomena, without resorting to asking the participant directly. 
This chapter reviews the different instruments available and the mechanics of their 
implementation. Since such indirect measures are generally unfamiliar to language 
motivation researchers, this chapter aims to demystify these instruments. This chapter also 
discusses the Implicit Association Test and the Single-Target Implicit Association Test, since 
they are utilized in the research presented in the next chapter.  
The introduction of measures of implicit attitudes has “captured researchers’ 
imaginations and dramatically shifted research priorities in the attitude field” making the 
move from explicit-only to implicit measurement “one of the most significant changes to 
occur in the attitude literature in the last 20 years” (Blanton & Jaccard, 2015, p. 338). In his 
summary of the distinction between explicit and implicit measures, Gawronski (2009) 
explains that the basic distinction does not lie in the notion that the outcome of implicit 
measures is always unconscious. For example, research has shown that individuals can 
anticipate their results on implicit tests but usually reject the implications of these results 
explicitly, thus leading to a lower correlation between the outcomes of explicit and implicit 
measures (Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 2014). Neither that implicit attitudes reflect one’s ‘true 
self’. The notion of true self has two contradictory interpretations. On the one hand, some 
would argue the true self is revealed when one fails to exert intentional control on behavior 
(such as while under the influence). On the other hand, others would argue that your true self 
is only revealed when you have full control over your behavior. Nor is it that implicit 
attitudes are stable while explicit attitudes are susceptible to change. Implicit attitudes are 
also malleable (see also Chapter 7).  
Instead, Gawronski (2009) argues that the most basic distinction between explicit and 
implicit measures is that,  
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Drawing on generalised dual-process models of human information processing, 
several theorists argued that implicit measures provide a proxy for the activation of 
associations in memory regardless of whether these associations are regarded as 
accurate or inaccurate. Traditional self-report measures, in contrast, are assumed to 
reflect the outcome of a propositional validation process, which aims at assessing the 
(subjective) validity of these associations. (Gawronski, 2009, pp. 146–147) 
 
Gawronski goes on to explain that, at the empirical level, implicit measures predict behaviors 
even when the underlying associations are rejected explicitly. This is especially the case in 
spontaneous behaviors and under cognitive load.  
The implicit measures reviewed in this chapter are classified into two groups: 
traditional and modern. This classification does not seem to have been used in the literature 
before. It is used here because it would make the organization of this chapter more intuitive. 
It is not intended to imply that traditional measures are no longer considered valid.  
5.2 Traditional measures 
Before computers became widely available, researchers had developed ‘low-tech’ measures 
of implicit attitudes and motivation that required ingenuity and inventiveness. For example, 
Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest (1966) review some early ‘unobtrusive’ measures. 
One such approach is to ask the participant to solve a mathematical problem while being 
exposed to distractions of various types (e.g., related to anger, fear, or sex interests). Time 
needed to solve the mathematical problem could be used as an indication of interest in the 
content of the distractor. That is, the longer the time, the greater the interest. In another 
approach, each schoolchild is given a garden plot to tend to, as well as a common garden 
tended by all children. The amount of time spent on tending the private garden plot versus the 
general plot might be an indication of the individualistic and collectivistic orientation of the 
child, respectively. However, such time measures were not particularly popular before the 
age of computers. A Webb et al. (1966) put it, the “lack of general emphasis on time-duration 
methods is partly due to difficulty of measurement. For accurate observation, the hurly-burly 
conditions of a natural setting are damaging” (p. 135).  
In this section, two major instruments are surveyed, the Matched-Guise Technique 
and the Picture Story Exercise. These two measures generated a rather substantial interest 
over the decades. Both are originally paper-and-pencil measures, though nowadays it is also 
possible to administer them on a computer or online. Generally speaking, these measures 
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require blinding on the participant’s part, so that s/he performs the required tasks without 
knowing the real purpose of the experiment. 
5.2.1 The Matched-Guise Technique  
In the history of language attitudes research, some scholars recognized that publicly 
expressed attitudes might not tell the whole story about an individual’s underlying feelings 
and beliefs. In a seminal study, Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner, and Fillenbaum (1960) 
introduced the match-guise technique (MGT) in the hope of uncovering ‘private attitudes’ 
concerning cross-cultural dispositions. In the standard MGT, participants listen to audio-
recordings of speakers reading the same, neutral passage in two or more languages (or 
accents). The participants are then asked to act as judges of the personality of each speaker, a 
procedure akin to how people routinely try to form impressions of a person they listen to on 
the phone or on the radio. Unbeknownst to the participants, however, the ‘different speakers’ 
in the MGT are actually one speaker who is fluent in the languages in question. If a 
participant evaluates the personality of the speaker differently when they speak in a different 
language, this differential evaluation is presumed to reflect stereotyped characteristics of the 
respective language group.  
Some interesting results emerged from the early wave of the MGT research. For 
example, in the initial study by Lambert et al. (1960), responses to the (indirect) MGT were 
compared with responses to (direct) attitudinal scales related to English Canadians versus 
French Canadians. When the correlations turned out to be low and non-significant, the 
researchers attributed this to the independence of the two constructs. Subsequent research 
showed some intriguing results. For example, research on French Canadians documented 
developmental changes, where French-Canadian children start off evaluating their own group 
more favorably but by the age of 12 this pattern reverses (Anisfeld & Lambert, 1964; 
Lambert, Frankle, & Tucker, 1966). In addition, research on sex differences showed that 
French-Canadian males favor models from the English community, but French-Canadian 
females prefer men from their own group as if, as Lambert (1967) put it, they are guardians 
of their culture. Extending this research to the United Kingdom, Giles (1971) found that 
speakers of the Received Pronunciation—a standard accent in England—were rated as more 
prestigious (e.g., intelligent, ambitious), while speakers of Welsh English as more socially 
attractive (e.g., humorous, good-natured). These results suggest that language and accent 
might factor in how one’s personality is judged by others. In fact, “even a single vowel or 
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consonant sound, contrasting with others or with our expectations, can have evaluative 
repercussions on its utterer” (Giles & Coupland, 1991, p. 32).  
Commenting on the reliability of the MGT, Lambert argued that,  
 
The technique is particularly valuable as a measure of group biases in evaluative 
reactions; it has very good reliability in the sense that essentially the same profile of 
traits for a particular group appear when different samples of judges, drawn from a 
particular subpopulation, are used…. On the other hand, the technique apparently has 
little reliability when measured by test-retest ratings produced by the same group of 
judges; we believe this type of unreliability is due in large part to the main statistic 
used, the difference between an individual’s rating of a pair of guises on a single trait. 
Difference scores give notoriously low test-retest reliability coefficients although their 
use for comparing means is perfectly appropriate. (Lambert, 1967, p. 94, original 
emphasis) 
 
Nevertheless, interest in the MGT after this early wave has fluctuated, and this may be 
attributed to two primary reasons (see Garrett, 2010; Garrett, Coupland, & Williams, 2003; 
Giles & Coupland, 1991). On the one hand, critics started to point out potentially problematic 
aspects of the MGT. For example, some questioned the comparability of ‘reading’ a passage 
to the typical spontaneous conversation people engage in everyday practice, while others 
doubted the value of the artificially contrived ‘neutral’ content that the MGT requires by 
design. On the other hand, although researchers conducted “a very considerable number of 
studies” (Garrett et al., 2003, p. 57) which amounted to an “empirical avalanche” (Giles & 
Coupland, 1991, p. 37), the results were sometimes disappointing. In Garrett et al.’s (2003) 
words, the results “have not, arguably, led to the emergence of the cumulative body of 
knowledge one might have anticipated. Overall, the results have been inconclusive” (p. 67). 
In addition to these two factors, the general climate since the cognitive revolution in 
psychology may have been unfavorable to further research into unconscious processes. 
Consequently, in the 1990s and the early 2000s, the MGT lost its popularity (Garrett, 2010), 
though the past few years have witnessed a renewed interest in indirect measurement of 
attitudes (Giles & Rakić, 2014) including some explorations into other innovative methods 
such as the Implicit Association Test (e.g., Pantos & Perkins, 2013).  
Kircher (2016) offers a reader-friendly introduction to how to conduct a MGT 
experiment and the considerations that the researcher needs to keep in mind. Kircher 
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emphasizes the need to conceal the real purpose of the experiment from the participants. To 
achieve this, several speakers should ideally be used, and the order of their recordings should 
be shuffled so that recordings by one speaker do not appear consecutively. If it is not possible 
to obtain recordings from multiple speakers fluent in the languages in question, then 
recordings by the speaker should be separated by filler voices. This is done in the hope that 
the participants do not realize that some recordings were performed by the same speaker. 
After all, the purpose is to evaluate the personality of the ‘different’ speakers, and if the 
participants are aware that there is only one speaker, it may make little sense to evaluate the 
personality of the same speaker differently while reading the text in different languages.  
Kircher (2016) also explains that the MGT experiment should also be preceded by 
practice voices. These are recordings by speakers other than the ones that read the texts in the 
different languages. The purpose of these practice voices is to familiarize the participants 
with both the text to be read and the practicalities of the evaluation. These practice voices are 
not included in the final analysis. Typically, the analysis involves the participants responses 
to two dimensions related to the personality of the speaker. The first dimension has to do with 
status, which refers to power, economic opportunity, and upward social mobility (e.g., 
intelligent, educated, ambitious). The second dimension has to do with solidarity, which 
refers to appreciation, belonging, and intimate friendship (e.g., kind, warm, likeable). The 
participant may then be asked to supply qualitative data in an open-ended manner. Some 
researchers have specifically asked their participants to guess the speaker’s occupation, as 
this has implications about the perceived status of the speaker. Finally, the experiment should 
end with awareness probes. This aims to find out whether any of the participants has 
discovered the actual purpose of the experiment, or noticed that the same speaker has read the 
text more than once. These participants are typically excluded from the analysis. Variations 
of this standard MGT procedure are reviewed by Garrett et al. (2003). 
5.2.2 The Picture Story Exercise  
The Picture Story Exercise (PSE, which used to be called the Thematic Apperception Test) is 
an instrument that aims to uncover the participant’s implicit motives. As reviewed in more 
detail in the previous chapter, research has pointed out three specific implicit motives: need 
for achievement, for power, and for affiliation. These motives have explicit counterparts, 
elicited via conventional self-report questionnaires, and may or may not be congruent with 
the implicit motives uncovered by the PSE. As also reviewed in the previous chapter, scores 
from self-report questionnaires better predict controlled, or declarative, behavior. On the 
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other hand, scores from the PSE better predict spontaneous non-declarative behaviors, such 
as non-verbal (e.g., gestures, facial expressions) and para-verbal (e.g., fluency) behaviors 
(Schultheiss & Pang, 2007). For example, self-attributed achievement motivation may predict 
one’s decision to take part in a certain exercise, but the PSE would predict actual 
performance and persistence during that exercise.  
In the PSE, the participant is presented with a series of pictures. Each picture depicts a 
situation that is relatively ambiguous and open to interpretation. For example, one picture 
may show a young male staring blankly into the window and a female figure standing in the 
background. Another picture may show two or three people engaging a conversation or 
working on some project. The participant’s task is to make up a narrative story to describe 
what might be going on in the picture. The participant may, for example, describe who these 
people are, their relationship with each other, their plans, thought, and feelings, and what 
might have happened before or may happen next. The participant is instructed to be as 
creative as possible. The rationale behind the PSE is that individuals project their own 
motives in the imaginative narrative stories they make up. These stories are subsequently 
coded by the researchers in order to determine the motives underlying each story (C. P. 
Smith, 1992).  
As Schultheiss and Pang (2007) summarize, the achievement motive is represented by 
themes related to competition with a standard of excellence. This might reflect a success-
approaching orientation or a failure-avoiding one. The power motive, on the other hand, has 
to do with themes related to control and influence over others. Again, this might reflect a 
positive desire for power or a fear of weakness. Finally, the affiliation motive is concerned 
with relationships and connections with others. Here also, there are two tendencies, one 
relates to the desire to attain and maintain social relationships, while the other is concerned 
with the quality and intimacy of these relationships.  
In order to make this discussion more concrete, consider the following two stories, 
which were originally provided by psychologist Heinz Heckhausen. The two stories were 
written, originally in German, by two individuals in response to a picture portraying a student 
standing in front of a teacher next to the blackboard:  
 
An apprentice in training is being queried by his teacher. During class, questions are 
asked that need to be answered by the apprentice. While the teacher is waiting for the 
answer, the apprentice wants to give the right answer. After answering the question, 
the apprentice is dismissed. Another one follows. 
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A teacher testing a student; the student stands at the blackboard. Recently, the 
student’s grades have been really bad and the student’s progression into the next 
grade is at stake. Therefore, the teacher is testing him. Confronted with the task, the 
student is helpless. The teacher is frustrated. The teacher waits for the correct solution 
of the task. The task has not been solved; the student needs to repeat the grade. 
(Schultheiss, 2001, p. 104)  
 
In both stories, the need for achievement is manifested. However, the difference is striking. 
The first story interprets that achievement motive with a success theme. It also involves a 
reference to a desire for achievement: “the apprentice wants to give the right answer” and 
successfully achieving it. The other story, on the other hand, reflects a failure theme. It 
contains an incident of failure: “the student’s grades have been really bad” as well as an 
instance of a negative affect: “the student is helpless.”  
A major disadvantage in using the PSE is its practicality. In the SPE tradition, 
researchers have to follow detailed and thorough protocols in coding stories to extract motive 
categories. Each story also has to be coded manually, preferably by more than one coder, 
since this process cannot be automated. This process requires a considerable amount of time 
and effort. For example, Schultheiss and Pang describe their experience:  
 
On average, an experienced scorer needs 2–5 minutes to score one PSE story, not 
counting the time needed to determine word count (this task can be assigned to a 
research assistant). Thus, for a typical research sample of 80 participants who are 
administered a six-picture PSE, an experienced coder will need between 16 and 40 
hours to code all materials, plus some additional time to review the assigned scores. 
This is certainly a large time investment, but it is necessary to obtain valid motive 
scores. (Schultheiss & Pang, 2007, p. 336) 
 
Schultheiss and Pang also argue that each rater should first undergo at least 12 hours of 
training using practice materials before conducting the actual analysis.  
Thus, on the surface, the coding protocols followed in the PSE are akin to an 
everyday qualitative analysis. However, this analysis must follow detailed guidelines in order 
to be reproducible. While the coding protocols show generally satisfactory levels of interrater 
and test–retest reliability, there is some controversy about their internal consistency. 
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Cronbach’s alpha tends to be in the range of .20–.50 only (Schultheiss & Pang, 2007). 
However, some researchers have argued that internal consistency is not appropriate for this 
type of test (Atkinson, Bongort, & Price, 1977). That is, because motives are dynamic rather 
than static, once a motive is expressed in an imaginative story in response to one picture, this 
motive becomes satiated and so it drops down for some time. More recently, Gruber and 
Kreuzpointner (2013) have demonstrated that internal consistency reliability can be improved 
by using category-scores as items rather than picture-scores.  
In terms of practical administration, a number of publications have offered 
suggestions (e.g., Gruber & Kreuzpointner, 2015; Lundy, 1988; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007). 
Most notably, it is recommended that cues be presented non-verbally, such as via images, 
rather than via verbal descriptions. Each image should only be shown to the participants 
briefly (around 10–15 seconds) and then removed. The participants then start writing their 
stories for around five minutes. The number of images used should be around 4–5 only. 
Using more than eight images leads to participant fatigue and consequently lower validity.  
5.3 Modern measures  
With the advent and accessibility of computers, a number of measures have been developed 
to tap into implicit cognition (e.g., de Houwer, 2006; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski, 2009; 
Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014; Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 
2007). These measures cannot typically be administered in a paper-and-pencil format because 
they require accurate measurement of reaction times. Generally speaking, because they 
measure reaction time, these instruments tend to be resistant to faking to some extent even if 
the participants are informed of the purpose of the experiment in advance (e.g., McDaniel, 
Beier, Perkins, Goggin, & Frankel, 2009; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). This 
section describes the Implicit Association Test, which is arguably the most popular measure 
of implicit attitudes. It then describes one variant of this test, namely the Single-Target 
Implicit Association Test.  
5.3.1 The Implicit Association Test  
At present, the most widely used measure of implicit attitudes is the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998). The IAT is a computerized reaction-time measure that simply 
requires classifying a series of words to the right or left as fast as possible. As an illustration 
of how this test works, Figure 5.1 gives an example of the Flower–Insect IAT. This test 
measures how strongly the participant associates flowers and insects with good and bad. In 
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the first part of the test (Figure 5.1A), a stimulus appears in the middle of the screen (e.g., 
Roses) and the participant has to decide which box this stimulus belongs to and then press 
one of two designated buttons on the keyboard. In Figure 5.1A, Roses belongs to Flower, and 
so the correct answer is the left box. Afterward, another stimulus appears (say, Butterflies) 
and, again, the participant has to decide which of the four categories the stimulus belongs to 
in order to classify it to the correct box. The stimuli may belong to Flower (e.g., roses, 
orchids, tulips), Insect (e.g., cockroaches, mosquitoes, wasps), Good (e.g., smart, friendly, 
clean), or to Bad (e.g., dumb, enemy, dirty).  
 
A)           B) 
     
Figure 5.1: An illustration of the Flower–Insect IAT.  
 
Note that this is not an attitude test per se. The stimuli are shown to the participant in 
advance with their correct categorization and, if they misclassify a stimulus, they get an error 
message immediately. The participant’s task is not to guess (or express their attitude about) 
the correct response, but to simply perform the test as fast as possible. Most participants 
therefore find the configuration in Figure 5.1A very easy to perform and breeze through it.  
In the second part of the test (Figure 5.1B), Flower is paired with Bad while Insect 
with Good. This part suddenly feels considerably harder. This is because, in the first part, 
Flower and Good form one higher category (e.g., pleasant things), and Insect and Bad form 
another category (e.g., unpleasant things). Therefore, the participant in effect classifies the 
stimuli into only two—rather than four—categories (i.e., simply move all pleasant things to 
the left and unpleasant things to the right). In the second part, however, the participant has to 
sort the stimuli into the four categories (neither of the two pairs readily merges into one 
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intuitive category), and so the task requires substantially more cognitive resources, resulting 
in slower performance.  
This is why the two parts of the test (as in Figure 5.1) are conventionally described as 
‘compatible’ and ‘incompatible’, respectively. Compatible tasks are those that the researchers 
expect most participants to find easier (e.g., Flower–Good), while incompatible tasks are 
those that participant may find harder (e.g., Flower–Bad). This description also hints at why it 
is called the Implicit Association Test: implicit because participants find it hard to anticipate 
which configuration would be more difficult and are usually surprised by their own results, 
association because it measures the strength of the association of the categories in each pair, 
and test because it is a test of the participant’s performance speed. To the extent that 
categories of interest are paired with evaluative adjectives (e.g., good, bad), implicit attitudes 
are inferred from the response speed in the two parts of the test. The IAT is also flexible and 
can be easily adapted to measure implicit associations about various social objects, such as 
racial prejudice (e.g., White–Good, Black–Bad) and gender stereotypes (e.g., Male–Work, 
Female–Home). A discussion of the reliability and validity of the IAT has been presented in 
the previous chapter (see Section 4.5.3).  
Regarding the scoring algorithm used to analyze latencies in the IAT, the original 
article by Greenwald et al. (1998) used the so-called IAT effect. The IAT effect calculates 
IAT scores by deducting the average latencies in the two main blocks in the test (i.e., the 
compatible and incompatible blocks). IAT latencies are also log-transformed before the 
analysis. Subsequently, Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) systematically compared the 
performance of five candidate scoring algorithms: mean, median, log, reciprocal, and D. The 
analysis tested each of these five candidate algorithms in relation to various criteria, including 
correlation with self-report and internal consistency. Their results showed that the D scoring 
algorithm outperforms the other approaches. Calculating the D algorithm requires obtaining 
the difference between the compatible and incompatible blocks and then dividing by their 
pooled standard deviation. No log-transformation is required, but error trials are replaced 
with the mean of the respective block plus 600 ms error penalty. Because this approach is 
very similar to how Cohen’s d effect size is calculated, Greenwald, Nosek, et al. (2003) chose 
to call their algorithm D in uppercase to acknowledge this similarity. Currently, this is the 
standard procedure to analyze IAT scores (though see Blanton, Jaccard, & Burrows, 2015, for 
a critical perspective).  
Lane et al. (2007) offer an introduction to the considerations that researchers need to 
keep in mind when constructing IATs. Lane and colleagues point out that stimuli are 
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interpreted in context rather than in isolation. For example, while the names Albert Einstein 
and Adolf Hitler are generally considered positive and negative symbols respectively, they 
both acquire negative valence at a British–Foreign IAT performed by British individuals (De 
Houwer, 2001). This is because individuals typically evaluate concepts favorably when the 
concepts relate to themselves, and both Albert Einstein and Adolf Hitler are evaluated 
negatively for being foreign. In other words, individual stimuli have no inherent valence and 
are only meaningful in the context of the target category under which they fall. Similarly, 
Mitchell, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) used as stimuli names of (well-liked) Black athletes and 
(disliked) White politicians. Their participants evaluated the Black athletes favorably in the 
context of occupation, and unfavorably in the context of race. Mitchell et al. (2003) therefore 
argue that “continuous, online constructions… are inherently flexible and contextually 
appropriate, despite being outside conscious control” (p. 455). The researchers also conclude 
that, with context variation, “multiple evaluations of an attitude object may be evoked, but 
none of those evaluations is more true than any other” (p. 468).  
Lane et al. (2007) also explain that, since the IAT is a reaction-time measure, the 
stimuli selected must be very clear so that they can be recognized easily and quickly. This 
helps minimize variation that is merely an artifact of some idiosyncratic characteristic of a 
certain stimulus rather than an implicit association per se. This also applies to the use of 
negatively-worded items, such as ‘unintelligent’. Furthermore, the number of stimuli used is 
not crucial, and can range anywhere between 4 and 25 items. Instead, it is the number of trials 
in the test that matters the most, with 40 trials per test block showing adequate psychometric 
properties. Lane et al. (2007) therefore emphasize that “better construct validity will be 
obtained when researchers select the exemplars that best capture the construct of interest 
rather than trying to generate a longer list of exemplars that are not high-quality 
representations of the category” (p. 88).  
Regarding counterbalancing, there are at least two aspects where counterbalancing is 
relevant (Hofmann et al., 2005; Lane et al., 2007). The first is whether explicit and implicit 
measures should be counterbalanced; the second is whether the compatible and incompatible 
blocks within the implicit test should be counterbalanced. A meta-analysis by Hofmann et al. 
(2005) showed that order of explicit and implicit measures has little effect on responses to 
either measure. When it comes to counterbalancing blocks, the results showed that there is a 
minor effect of counterbalancing. Lane et al. (2007) therefore recommend that researchers 
counterbalance when the interest is finding out the overall magnitude if the IAT effect. On 
the other hand, when IAT scores are used as a predictor or a criterion variable, the variability 
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introduced by counterbalancing can potentially mask real effects. Lane and colleagues 
therefore recommend fixing the order of blocks and not counterbalancing in this situation.  
At the time writing, IATs related to various social topics are hosted at the Department 
of Psychology at Harvard University (see www.implicit.harvard.edu). These tests are 
available free of charge and are managed by psychologists from Harvard, Washington, and 
Virginia Universities.  
5.3.2 The Single-Target Implicit Association Test  
As reviewed above, the IAT measures the association between two categories (e.g., insects 
and flowers) and two attributes (e.g., good and bad). However, this makes IAT scores 
relative. The exact interpretation of IAT scores becomes ambiguous. To give a more concrete 
example of this limitation, consider an IAT related to attitudes toward the L1 group versus 
the L2 group. If a participant obtains a score favoring the L1 group, the first scenario in Table 
5.1 is the one that usually comes to mind. However, each of the other four scenarios is also 
plausible. In fact, as in the fifth scenario in Table 5.1, the individual might actual hold 
negative attitudes toward the L1 group, but his/her attitudes toward the L2 group are even 
more negative (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006; Nosek & Banaji, 2001).  
This ambiguity also applies to neutral scores. If a participant obtains a score showing 
no preference to either group, one might be tempted to think that the participant is indifferent 
to either group. However, the participant could have equally positive attitudes toward the two 
groups, or even equally negative attitudes toward them.  
 
Table 5.1: Possible interpretations of an IAT score favoring the L1 group over the L2 group.  
Scenario 
Attitudes toward L1 
group 
Attitudes toward L2 
group 
1 Positive Negative 
2 Positive Neutral 
3 Very Positive Positive 
4 Neutral Negative 
5 Negative Very Negative 
 
The relative nature of the IAT has led some psychologists to devise variations of it, 
such as the Single Target Implicit Association Test (Wigboldus, Holland, & van 
Knippenberg, 2004), the Single Category Implicit Association Test (Karpinski & Steinman, 
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2006), and Single-Attribute Implicit Association Test (Penke, Eichstaedt, & Asendorpf, 
2006). Generally, these variations revolve around dispensing with the contrasting category 
and sufficing with the category of interest.  
As an illustration, to test implicit attitudes toward flowers, the IAT requires another 
category to contrast with, such as insects. With the Single-Target Implicit Association Test 
(henceforth ST-IAT), the target category (i.e., flowers), would be enough on its own (see 
Figure 5.2). In the first condition (Figure 5.2A), Flowers is paired with Good, while in the 
second condition (Figure 5.2B) it is paired with Bad. Following the same logic as the IAT, 
response speed in the two conditions is compared, and faster performance implies stronger 
implicit association between Flowers and the respective attribute. The advantage of this 
approach is that it can deal with situations where the researcher is unable to find an obvious 
contrasting category, or where different contrasting categories lead to different results (cf. 
Karpinski, 2004; Nosek & Banaji, 2001). More importantly, it promises an absolute, rather 
than relative, score (though not in the purest sense; see Karpinski & Steinman, 2006).  
 
A)            B) 
       
Figure 5.2: An illustration of the Flower ST-IAT.  
 
In an early test of the ST-IAT, Wigboldus et al. (2004) provided evidence that the ST-
IAT may indeed be an absolute measure. In their study, ST-IATs for attitudes toward 
Christianity and Islam correlated with explicit scales related to Christianity and Islam 
respectively, but the IAT did not. In contrast, the IAT correlated with a relative explicit 
measure of Christianity versus Islam, but the ST-IATs did not. In another study by Karpinski 
and Steinman (2006), the researchers tested the ST-IAT in three different attitude domains: 
soda brand preferences, self-esteem, and racial attitudes. Their results showed that the ST-
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IAT shows satisfactory levels of internal consistency reliability. Their results also showed 
that the ST-IAT maintains its predictive validity even after controlling for both IAT scores 
and explicit ratings. In a third study by Penke et al. (2006), the researchers tested attitudes 
toward sociosexuality, or the tendency to engage in uncommitted relationships, using both the 
IAT and the ST-IAT. The results showed that both tests obtained satisfactory reliability. 
However, the ST-IAT correlated more strongly with explicit attitudes toward sociosexuality 
than did the IAT, thus again lending support to the rather absolute nature of scores derived 
from the ST-IAT. Other implicit measures have been also devised. Nosek et al. (2011), for 
example, review 20 different ones (for detailed methodological reviews, see de Houwer, 
2003, 2006; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014; Kihlstrom, 2004a; 
Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007).  
Still, despite the limitations of the IAT (which the ST-IAT tries to address), the IAT is 
still dominant. The vast majority of research on implicit attitudes uses the IAT (for a survey, 
see Nosek et al., 2011). This is why the research presented in the following chapter utilizes 
both tests.  
5.3.3 Flexibility of modern measures  
The flexibility of the modern measures has facilitated expanding the scope of research on 
attitudes and motivation. While traditional measures were able to provide relatively limited 
information in specific domains, modern measures can be easily adapted to suit a variety of 
research questions.  
As an illustration, consider gender differences. Language learning research has shown 
that a “recurring source of systematic variation” (You, Dörnyei, & Csizér, 2016, p. 100) is 
that females exhibit more positive attitudes toward language learning. In addition, this robust 
difference tends to disappear among English majors (You & Dörnyei, 2016; You et al., 
2016). These findings are mirrored by research on mathematics. Mathematics shows the 
opposite gender pattern, in that males tend to show more positive attitudes toward it. For 
example, a meta-analysis by Hyde, Fennema, Ryan, Frost, and Hopp (1990) shows that males 
tend to stereotype mathematics as more masculine. However, their meta-analysis also shows 
that this pattern is disappearing (p. 310). The emerging picture, therefore, is that females are 
increasingly rejecting the gender stereotype that language and mathematics being female and 
male subjects, respectively.  
This diminishing difference between the two genders, however, stands in stark 
contrast to the observation that fewer females are majoring in scientific disciplines. 
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According to latest report of the National Science Foundation (2015), the majors with the 
lowest female proportions are engineering, computer sciences, and physics. In addition, 
women with PhDs constitute only one-third in economics and around only one-fourth in 
mathematics and statistics. Therefore, explicit attitudes are showing a diminishing trend in 
gender differences, but reality shows that the gap still persists.  
One explanation for this paradoxical pattern is that we should take into account 
implicit attitudes as well. Because of the flexibility of modern measures of implicit attitudes, 
researchers can examine gender differences from various perspectives (e.g., see Table 5.2). 
Indeed, research has shown that females tend to show more implicit positivity toward 
language and arts (vs. math and science) than do males (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). 
This effect has also been observed in schoolchildren as young as 6 years of age (Cvencek, 
Meltzoff, & Greenwald, 2011). These results suggest that explicit attitudes may reveal only 
part of the overall picture in gender differences. It would not be as easy to adapt traditional 
measures to investigate the various perspectives listed in Table 5.2.    
 
Table 5.2: Different concepts that can be investigated with modern measures. Adapted from 
Nosek et al. (2002).  
        Concept             Description 
Language attitude Preference for language 
Language–gender stereotype Belief that language is a female subject 
Language identity  Identification of oneself with language 
Gender identity   Identification of oneself with male or female 
 
Another example of the flexibility of modern measures appears in the investigation of 
intergroup relations. The language motivation field has a long history of investigating the 
relationship between attitudes toward an L2 group and success in learning the language of 
that L2 group (Gardner, 1985, 2010). Traditional measures such as the MGT can offer some 
general information (primarily related to status and solidarity) that relies on the participant’s 
self-report. In contrast, modern measures can be designed to test specific attitudes and 
stereotypes without resorting to direct self-report.  
One advantage of this flexibility is that researchers can adapt these measures to 
examine sensitive topics, such as in-group identification and favoritism more directly. In the 
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American context, for example, Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014) maintain that “ingroup 
favoritism is plausibly more significant as a basis for discrimination… than is outgroup-
directed hostility” (p. 669). Indeed, a meta-analysis by Balliet, Wu, and De Dreu (2014) 
shows that, in the context of cooperation, intergroup discrimination is the result of in-group 
favoritism rather than out-group derogation. When it comes to language learning, it is also 
plausible that such in-group favoritism, including ethnocentrism and fear of assimilation, are 
important inhibitors of language learning.  
Another aspect of in-group favoritism is religiosity. Our field has only recently started 
to consider the role of religiosity and language learning (e.g., Wong, Kristjansson, & 
Dörnyei, 2013). To be sure, in societies where religion is a salient issue, as it is the case for 
Muslims, it is plausible that level of religiosity might be related to success in language 
learning. In Europe, for example, religiosity is commonly viewed as a hindrance to openness 
to other groups (e.g., Foner & Alba, 2008). Diehl and Koenig (2013) report that immigrants 
from different backgrounds experience a decrease in religious practices upon arriving to 
Germany. Muslim immigrants, however, subsequently resume their various religious 
activities, a process the researchers describe as ‘religious reorganization’. This process is 
relatively independent from social and structural assimilation. Another study by Kalmijn and 
van Tubergen (2006) in the Netherlands sheds more light on this process. In their study on 
ethnic intermarriage, Kalmijn and van Tubergen found that immigrants from Turkish and 
Moroccan backgrounds tend to be more closed than those from Caribbean backgrounds. For 
Muslims, marriage decisions are strongly influenced by the religious affiliations of potential 
partners. This shows that level of religiosity can have social consequences, affecting 
integration into the L2 group and proficiency in language learning. Modern measures are 
more suited to investigation of the implicit dimension of these processes than are traditional 
measures.  
Finally, modern measures can easily allow researchers to investigate the interaction 
between explicit and implicit attitudes. As argued in Chapter 2, individuals are not helpless in 
the face of unconscious sources of motivation, and can actively and agentically counteract 
them (e.g., Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002; Glaser & Knowles, 
2008). For example, Devine et al. (2002) have shown that when participants had implicit 
biases against an out-group but also had internalized motivations to control these biases, they 
were able to control their prejudice better than participants with similar biases but without the 
motivation. Similarly, Glaser and Knowles (2008) found that there is an interaction between 
an implicit attitude toward prejudice and an implicit belief that oneself is prejudiced. More 
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specifically, those who exhibited a weak association between prejudice and bad, and at the 
same time a strong association between oneself and prejudice, turned out to be the most 
biased group of the participants.  
5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has offered an overview on several measures of implicit attitudes and 
motivation. Two measures were described as traditional (the Match-Guise Technique and the 
Picture Story Exercise), and the other two as modern (the Implicit Association Test and the 
Single-Target Implicit Association Test). There are many more measures. Nosek et al. 
(2011), for example, list 20 different implicit measures. The discussion in this chapter was 
limited to a sample of four measures in order, first, to offer a comparison between modern 
with traditional measures and, second, to show the flexibility of modern measures. In addition 
to this, the next chapter presents two empirical studies, each using one of the two modern 
measures reviewed in this chapter.  
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Chapter 6: The Present Research  
 
Put your money where your mouth is  
—English saying  
 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapters have involved only speculations about the relevance of unconscious 
motivation to language learning, rather than any direct empirical evidence. It is yet to be 
known whether the various paradigms and theoretical frameworks reviewed (especially in 
Chapter 4) would make any meaningful contribution to our field. This chapter puts some of 
these ideas to the test.  
It is possible for the language motivation field to gain insights from the wide-ranging 
literature on unconscious motivation and attitudes reviewed in this thesis. For example, one 
of the most central concepts in L2 motivation theory is the notion that positive attitudes 
toward L2 speakers play an important facilitative role in L2 learning success. First introduced 
by Gardner and Lambert (1959), the claim that learning an L2 is unlike other school 
subjects—because of the social baggage it entails—has enjoyed continuing popularity 
throughout the decades. In more recent developments, L2 motivation has been construed 
cognitively in terms of future self-guides (e.g., Dörnyei, 2009b; Dörnyei & Kubanyiova, 
2014). Nonetheless, because there is “no doubt that L2 speakers are the closest parallels to 
the idealised L2-speaking self” (Dörnyei, 2009b, p. 27), the new self interpretation is “fully 
compatible” (p. 28) with the traditional emphasis on attitudes toward L2 speakers. In fact, “it 
is difficult to imagine that we can have a vivid and attractive ideal L2 self if the L2 is spoken 
by a community that we despise” (p. 28).  
However, research on learners’ attitudes and motivation in our field has generally 
focused on explicit attitudes, as evident from the predominance of self-report questionnaires 
and interviews (Ushioda, 2013). It is plausible that another, implicit dimension also plays a 
role in language motivation. The present research therefore investigated this possibility by 
adopting implicit attitudes as a broad theoretical framework, and by drawing from some 
aspects from the implicit motives tradition. Two studies were conducted to answer a series of 
research questions. These two studies and their results are detailed in this chapter. The 
procedures followed in this research were endorsed by the ethics committee at the University 
of Nottingham. 
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6.1.1 Analysis of the context of this research  
Most of the participants of Study 1, and virtually all participants in Study 2, come from Saudi 
Arabia. This section therefore discusses the potential relevance of implicit attitudes to this 
context. The Saudi context is definitely a curious one: While few Saudi people would 
(explicitly) endorse terrorism, at the same time this very context has been a major breeding 
ground for Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, the latter considered the most resourced terrorist 
group in the history of terrorism (Lock, 2014). For this reason, it is likely that this context is 
fertile for the development of negative implicit attitudes toward Westerners and possibly 
toward learning English itself. This section therefore tries to shed light on this context in an 
attempt to understand what might make it unique in this respect.  
One reason why negative implicit attitudes might develop in this context has to do 
with prevalence of intolerant discourse. Anti-Western discourse is rampant, systematic, and 
institutionalized in this context. Many mosques spread hate speech, especially during Friday 
sermons, which are broadcast via loudspeakers so that you can hear them from anywhere in 
the neighborhood. Even children watching television at home can listen them. This recently 
prompted the Saudi Shoura Council (a parliament-like entity) to call on the government to 
regulate and monitor these sermons (Arab News, 2016). School textbooks are also rife with 
intolerance, prescribing hatred of non-Muslims as a duty of every devout Muslim. Several 
heads of major publishing houses have therefore written an article arguing that “the Saudi 
education system continues to indoctrinate children with hatred and incitement” (Bernstein et 
al., 2012). The authors give some examples:  
 
A ninth-grade textbook published by the Ministry of Education states, “The Jews and 
the Christians are enemies of the believers, and they cannot approve of Muslims.” An 
eighth-grade textbook says, “The Apes are the people of the Sabbath, the Jews; and 
the Swine are the infidels of the communion of Jesus, the Christians.” These are just 
two examples of a long list of hate-filled passages. 
 
A more detailed report was published by the Center for Religious Freedom (2006), 
which cites examples from various grades levels. A lesson from a ninth-grade textbook 
teaches students about ‘the condemnable characteristics in Jews’. The answer, which the 
students might be tested on in exams, includes ‘practicing sorcery’ and ‘obeying the Devil’. 
The Saudi government is trying hard to tackle this problem but they face resistance from 
conservatives. Religious conservativism is not specific to Saudi Arabia (a similar issue has 
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been reported in Israeli textbooks, Peled-Elhanan, 2012). The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has 
augmented the problem, as the society generally perceives the West as unjustly siding with 
Israel. News of an attack on Israeli soil therefore becomes a cause for rejoicing, even if the 
casualties include civilians. A large section of the society also subscribes to American–Israeli 
conspiracy theories, according to which the West is actively trying to prevent Muslims from 
becoming one powerful nation and are responsible for the many plights of Muslims 
throughout modern history. Children are taught to glorify the early Muslim conquests and to 
anticipate the ‘Islamic dream’ of reconquering the regions that early Muslims had conquered 
and then spreading Islam globally through jihad someday. This is prophesized to successfully 
happen after Al-Mahdi’s and Jesus’s Coming to fight the one-eyed Al-Masih ad-Dajjal (the 
Antichrist in Islamic tradition) alongside Christians, Jews, and pretty much everybody on 
earth who will dare to oppose the future Islamic empire. These views routinely appear in the 
media and in documentary-like television programs.  
Considering all this, it should no longer be surprising that this ideology produced 15 
of the 19 hijackers in the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Nor should it be 
surprising that Saudi militants currently constitute the second largest proportion (after 
Tunisia, The Soufan Group, 2015) of foreign fighters for Islamic State terrorist group, itself 
partly motivated by the prophesy of Islamic domination after the Coming. According to some 
reports (Dearden, 2015), Saudi fighters reportedly dominate Islamic State’s suicide-bomber 
waiting lists, and regularly jump the line through ‘nepotism’, making suicide-hopefuls from 
other nationalities complain about ‘corruption’ within Islamic State! Inside Saudi Arabia, 
Islamic State sympathizers (as well as from other Gulf states) have donated generously to it, 
which prompted the Saudi government to blanket-ban unauthorized donations to any part of 
Syria (di Giovanni, Goodman, & Sharkov, 2014). Another section of the society is in denial, 
again blaming an American–Israeli or Iranian conspiracy for the creation of Islamic State, 
citing as ‘evidence’ the fact that Islamic State has killed many Muslims but hardly any Jews.  
After all, English is sometimes referred to there as ‘the language of the infidels’. This 
raises the question of why a devout Muslim would want to learn the language of their infidel 
enemies. In order to justify that, official textbooks state that one objective of the English 
curriculum is to enable students to “present and explain the Islamic concepts and issues and 
participate in spreading Islam” (cited by Alrabai, 2010, p. 8). In a similar vein, some English 
teachers justify to their students that “the one who learns the language of a people will 
safeguard against their cunnings.” This is certainly not the type of integrative motivation to 
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learn a language that the field has examined (cf. Gardner, 1985). Nor is this the ideal vision 
of a native speaker a learner holding these views would like to approximate (Dörnyei, 2009a). 
Considering these characteristics, it is possible that implicit attitudes toward native 
speakers of English might play a role in the motivation to learn English in the Saudi context 
(and other contexts in that part of the world). This chapter presents two Studies attempting to 
find out whether implicit attitudes are relevant to language learning in these contexts.  
  
103 
 
6.2 Study 15 
Study 1 aimed to answer three research questions. These are discussed next.  
Openness to the L2 group. Since L2 motivation is associated with openness to the L2 
group (Dörnyei, 2009b), this Study investigated whether learners with positive implicit 
attitudes would exhibit more openness. Openness might be indicated directly by more 
favorable attitudes toward the L2 group, or indirectly by lower L1 group affiliation such as 
ethnocentrism and fear of assimilation (see Freynet & Clément, 2015). As reviewed in 
Chapter 5, another indication of L1 group affiliation is religiosity—especially in Europe, 
where religiosity is commonly viewed as a hindrance to openness to other groups (e.g., Foner 
& Alba, 2008). Since the participants of this Study are L1 Arabic learners of English in the 
UK (see Participants below), and since Islam is inseparable from one’s L1 identity for many 
Arabs, this Study also investigated the association between religiosity and implicit attitudes 
toward the L2 group. In addition to this, Chapter 5 reviewed evidence that the role of implicit 
attitudes might be gender-specific. This Study therefore examined whether the results are 
different for males and females.  
Furthermore, rather than simply comparing learners with positive versus negative 
attitudes, this Study examined the congruence between explicit and implicit attitudes. 
Drawing from the literature on explicit–implicit congruence, attitudes might be thought of as 
varying along two dimensions. An individual’s attitude toward a certain social object might 
be congruently favorable (or unfavorable) at the explicit and implicit levels, or it may be 
incongruently favorable on one dimension but not the other (see Table 6.1). 
 
Table 6.1: The four types resulting from the two-dimensional conceptualization of attitudes.  
 Attitudes 
          Comment 
Type Explicit  Implicit  
1 Positive Positive Most favorable scenario 
2 Negative Negative Least favorable scenario 
3 Negative Positive Norm of mediocrity?  
4 Positive Negative Resilient motivation? 
Note. Although attitude falls along continua, this categorical classification (positive vs. 
negative) is intended for illustrative purposes.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Part of this Study has appeared in Al-Hoorie (2016a).  
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Type 1 in Table 6.1 is the ideal scenario, while Type 2 is the least preferable one. 
Type 3 would be unusual, and might be a reflection of the norm of mediocrity (see Dörnyei & 
Ushioda, 2011; Taylor, 2013). The norm of mediocrity refers to the situation where some 
learners deliberately show mediocre motivation and achievement in order to avoid being 
penalized by their peers. Type 4 can arguably be seen as the most interesting scenario for the 
present purposes because it parallels Type 1 in terms of explicit attitudes. Individuals in both 
types express positive attitudes explicitly, but they differ in their implicit attitudes. 
Comparison of these two types could shed important light on the role of implicit attitudes. 
For this reason, this research question focused on Types 1 and 4 by first selecting learners 
who expressed positive attitudes at the explicit level, and then dividing them into those with 
congruently positive and incongruently negative attitudes at the implicit level.  
Finally, because this type of classification might seem artificial, a cluster analysis was 
also conducted to validate the results from this classification. As detailed below, the results of 
the two approaches led to very similar results. This research question could be summarized as 
follows:  
RQ 1: Compared with incongruent learners, do congruent Arab learners of English in 
the UK exhibit more openness to the L2 group?  
 
Note that the ‘L2 group’ is used generically here. Although it is true that L2 speakers 
are not a monolithic group, the intention is the learner’s subjective evaluation. As an 
illustration, one learner might form an attitude toward a certain group through extensive 
interactions with them, while another might form another attitude based on, say, simply a 
story s/he heard. In both cases, the attitude becomes a subjective reality for the individual that 
can potentially affect his/her perception, behavior, and desire to communicate with members 
of the group in question, regardless whether it is actually true. This demonstrates the 
importance of such subjective beliefs. They can have an effect even if they are false.  
 
Personality coherence. Based on the personality coherence literature, explicit–implicit 
conflict is uncomfortable and therefore individuals with incongruent attitudes (i.e., Types 3 & 
4) may tend to adopt explicit attitudes that are aligned with their implicit attitudes. This is 
certainly good news for individuals whose implicit attitudes are positive. However, as 
reviewed in Chapter 5, when implicit attitudes are negative (e.g., against another group), 
research shows that these negative implicit attitudes can be counteracted by factors such as 
high explicit motivation (e.g., Devine et al., 2002).  
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When it comes to language learning, it is therefore plausible that the effect of negative 
implicit attitudes toward L2 speakers may not be the same across the board: While some 
learners might submit to these attitudes (by adopting explicit attitudes that are also negative), 
others may have sufficiently high motivation to actively counteract them (and adopt positive 
explicit attitudes instead). The latter can happen when, for example, the learner recognizes 
the value of the language in degree attainment or in career advancement. From this 
perspective, then, learners with negative implicit attitudes range from those adopting their 
negative attitudes explicitly (for the sake of psychological comfort) to those counteracting 
them (for the sake of the pragmatic value of the language). In contrast, those with already 
positive attitudes implicitly would have little reason to adopt negative attitudes explicitly.  
Thus, the personality coherence literature suggests that individuals with positive 
versus negative implicit attitudes may be two distinct groups. If this is the case, then treating 
them as a single group can be misleading. In the context of correlational analysis, for 
example, pooling heterogeneous groups and then calculating correlation coefficients has been 
described by some statisticians as nonsensical (Hassler & Thadewald, 2003). Because 
correlational analysis is by far one of the most common statistical procedures in language 
research (Plonsky, 2013), it would be interesting to find out whether taking implicit attitudes 
into account changes the resulting correlations. This Study therefore compared the 
correlations among attitudinal and motivational variables within each of these two groups. 
This research question can be formulated as follows:  
RQ 2: Do Arab learners with positive versus negative implicit attitudes exhibit 
equivalent relationships among attitudinal and motivational orientations?  
 
The moderating effect of implicit attitudes. Although finding novel results is 
interesting in itself, it is also important to consider how they relate to existing theory. As 
reviewed in Chapter 3, one particularly popular theory of L2 motivation at present is the L2 
Motivational Self System (L2 MSS, Dörnyei, 2005, 2009b). In this model, attitudes toward 
L2 speakers predict the strength of the individual’s ideal L2 self, which in turn predicts both 
the criterion measures and attitudes toward learning the language (see Figure 6.1). The 
current Study focuses on Arrows A and B in Figure 6.1 (Arrow C is relatively weak, e.g. 
Taguchi, Magid, & Papi, 2009; You et al., 2016; for a discussion, see Islam, Lamb, & 
Chambers, 2013, p. 239). The analysis explored whether implicit attitudes would moderate 
either of these two paths. Because this was the first attempt to integrate implicit attitudes with 
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the L2 MSS, no prior expectations were made about the direction of the effects. The relevant 
question can be stated as follows:  
RQ 3: Do Arab learner’s implicit attitudes toward L2 speakers moderate the 
relationship between explicit attitudes toward L2 speakers and the ideal L2 self, and 
between the ideal L2 self and attitudes toward learning English? 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Schematic representation of the L2 Motivational Self System. Adapted from 
Taguchi et al. (2009) with persmission.  
 
Moderation was tested here using multi-group structural equation modeling (SEM) 
without modeling the moderator explicitly. Modeling the moderator explicitly in SEM is one 
approach for moderation analysis, called the MIMIC model. In discussing this approach, 
however, T. A. Brown (2015) describes it as “less common” (p. 241) and as usually 
appropriate for continuous variables (unlike the case here). After discussing different 
approaches to moderation, Hayes (2013) similarly argues that “Multiple-group structural 
equation modeling provides a more formal test of moderation of various paths in the model” 
(p. 409).  
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Finally, this Study involved the construction of a new scale related to religious 
attitudes. Because little is known about the relationship between religiosity and language 
learning, exploratory analyses were conducted on the religious attitudes scale in order to 
examine its relationship with the other variables in more detail.  
6.2.1 Method 
Participants  
A total of 365 Arabic L1 speakers qualified for the final analysis. Data were collected from 
11 more participants who were excluded either for random responding or for not being a 
native speaker of Arabic (see Data analysis below for more details). The qualifying 
participants (male = 257, female = 108) were studying English at various British universities 
and language institutes when they volunteered to take part in this Study. They came from 
various Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia (33.2%), Libya (29.3%), and Iraq (22.5%), 
and had lived in an English-speaking country for a minimum of half a month and a maximum 
of 96 months (M = 22.43, SD = 20.3). Different age groups were also represented in the 
sample (11% 17–20 years old, 25.5% 20–25, 23.3% 26–30, 16.4% 31–35, 14.8% 36–40, 
7.9% older), with four participants having missing age data. As detailed below, length of 
residence and age were statistically controlled for (and this had no effect on the results).  
Materials  
Implicit test: The Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998) was adapted to 
measure attitudes toward English speakers. As shown in Table 6.2, in each of the seven parts 
(called blocks), a left or right button on the keyboard was to be pressed in order to rapidly 
categorize a series of stimuli appearing in the center of a computer screen. In the first two 
blocks, the participants practiced categorizing words as to whether they were Pleasant or 
Unpleasant (conventionally called ‘attributes’), and then whether they were related to Arabic 
or English (‘categories’). Then the actual test started. In the first condition, Blocks 3 and 4, 
Arabic was paired with Pleasant while English with Unpleasant (see Figure 6.2). In the other 
condition, Blocks 6 and 7, the categories were switched so that English was now paired with 
Pleasant, and Arabic with Unpleasant. The participants also practiced the reversed attributes 
alone in Block 5. Before each block, the participants read instructions and were reminded to 
perform as fast as possible. The whole implicit test took around five minutes to complete. 
(See Appendix A for the stimuli used.) Note that the implicit test is concerned with Arabic 
and English speakers, not the languages per se.  
108 
 
 
Table 6.2: Overview of the Implicit Association Test.  
Block  Trials Function 
                  Response key assignment 
Left button (E) Right button (I)  
1 20 Practice  Pleasant Unpleasant  
2 20 Practice  Arabic English 
3 20 Test 1 Pleasant or Arabic Unpleasant or English 
4 40 Test 2 Pleasant or Arabic Unpleasant or English 
5 20 Practice  Unpleasant  Pleasant  
6 20 Test 1 Unpleasant or Arabic Pleasant or English 
7 40 Test 2 Unpleasant or Arabic Pleasant or English 
 
 
  
Figure 6.2: A trial of the IAT. The correct answer here would be the left button (E) because 
the stimulus Honest belongs to Pleasant. In the actual test, Pleasant, Unpleasant, and their 
stimuli appeared in green font, while Arabic, English, and their stimuli appeared in white. 
 
The order of the combined tasks was not counterbalanced because counterbalancing 
can artificially suppress explicit–implicit correlations (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001; 
Gawronski, 2002) and sometimes artificially inflates them (Hofmann et al., 2005). When an 
incorrect response was given, a red X appeared and the participant had to correct the error, by 
pressing the other button, before proceeding to the next trial. The stimuli in the test blocks 
were alternatively drawn from the Arabic and English categories (odd-numbered trials) and 
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from the Pleasant and Unpleasant attributes (even-numbered trials). Each stimulus was 
selected randomly and without replacement, and therefore all stimuli were used once before 
any were reused. As explained in more detail in Chapter 5, the IAT is not a measure of 
attitudes per se. The IAT does not ask the participant about his/her opinion about whether, 
say, Honest should be pleasant or unpleasant. Instead, all stimuli are shown to the participant 
in advance with their correct categorization, and so the participant’s task is not to guess (or 
express their attitude about) the correct response, but to simply perform the task as fast as 
possible. Implicit attitudes are then deduced from the response speed in the test. If one 
participant is able to associate Pleasant with Arabic more easily than with English, we 
conclude that this participant has an implicit preference for Arabic over English. This result 
may or may not be congruent with the participant’s expectations or his/her responses on a 
questionnaire.  
This test was first trialed informally to make sure that the stimuli represent their 
respective categories and attributes unambiguously. In the main study, split-half analysis 
based on even-versus-odd trials showed that the IAT had very good reliability (Spearman–
Brown’s ρ = .83). The IAT scores were coded so that a positive score reflected implicit 
preference for the L2 group, and a negative score reflected implicit preference for the L1 
group. The IAT is a relative measure, in that a positive score indicates preference for the L2 
group but does not necessarily imply negative attitudes toward the L1 group (i.e., only more 
positive attitudes toward the L2 group). For this reason, instead of using the conventional 
terminology that describes learners as having positive versus negative attitudes toward the L2 
group, they are labelled here simply as having implicit preference for the L2 group versus the 
L1 group, respectively. All participants were taking the IAT for the first time. The software 
used was Inquisit 4 (2014). 
Explicit measures: The participants also completed nine self-reported attitudinal and 
motivational scales that seemed particularly relevant when drawing comparisons between 
explicit and implicit dispositions (reliability details are discussed in the Results section):  
1) Attitudes toward English-Speaking People (3 items). Example: I wish I could have 
many more English friends.  
2) Attitudes toward Learning English (4 items). Example: Learning English is very 
interesting.  
3) The Ideal L2 Self (4 items). Example: I can imagine myself mastering English one 
day.  
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4) The Ought-to L2 Self (3 items). Example: I must study English because it will earn 
me respect in the society. 
A higher score in each of these four scales, adapted from Taguchi et al. (2009), indicated 
more positive attitudes. Three other scales measured the strength of affiliation to one’s own 
group and the desire to preserve and spread its values:  
5) Fear of Assimilation (5 items), adapted from S. Ryan (2009). Example: I think 
that the interest in the West has a negative influence on the Arab culture.  
6) Ethnocentrism (5 items), adapted from Neuliep and McCroskey (1997). Example: 
I find it difficult to work together with people who have different customs.  
7) Religious Attitudes (4 items), developed for this Study. Example: The idea of 
sharing my Islamic faith with my non-Muslim friends is always present in my 
mind.  
A higher score in each of these three scales reflected stronger L1 group affiliation. The above 
seven scales all involved a seven-point Likert response format ranging from Strongly Agree 
to Strongly Disagree. Finally, the instrument also included two semantic differential scales 
developed for this Study:  
8) Attitudes toward the English (10 bipolar adjective scales).  
9) Attitudes toward Arabs (10 bipolar adjective scales).  
The ten adjectives used in these two scales were identical to each other, and to the stimuli 
used for the Pleasant and Unpleasant attributes of the IAT (though ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ were 
dropped from the semantic differential scales). Semantic differential scales were used here 
instead of Likert scales due to the observation that a higher explicit–implicit consistency is 
found when implicit scores are compared with scores from semantic differential scales 
(Hofmann et al., 2005). Because the participants were residing in the UK, both explicit and 
implicit measures addressed British speakers of English specifically. All materials in the 
explicit and implicit measures were also translated into Arabic to avoid language 
interference. The complete list of questionnaire items is available in Appendix B.  
Procedure  
During a one-to-one meeting with the researcher, each participant responded to items 
randomly drawn in a fixed order from the seven Likert scales, to the Arab semantic 
differential scale, to the English semantic differential scale, to the implicit test, to 
demographic questions, and to the Religious Attitudes scale, in this sequence—all on a 
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computer. The explicit and implicit parts were not counterbalanced because previous research 
has documented little order effect (see Lane et al., 2007).  
Data analysis 
Eight participants were excluded from the analysis for having more than 10% latencies faster 
than 300 ms in the implicit test, which is indicative of random responding. Three more 
participants were excluded because their L1 was Kurdish not Arabic, though they passed as 
native speakers of Arabic. The sample was restricted to Arabs because the scales related to 
L1 group affiliation were worded to specifically address Arab identity and Arabic as L1.  
For the implicit test, the analysis closely followed the improved scoring algorithm, 
called the D Measure, recommended by Greenwald, Nosek, et al. (2003). The four test blocks 
were included in the analysis, and the latency of each incorrect response was replaced with 
the block mean plus 600 ms error penalty. The analysis differed from the recommended 
algorithm in two ways, however. First, the 10,000 ms latency threshold used to determine and 
exclude extreme responses, which was selected “somewhat arbitrarily” (Greenwald, Nosek, 
et al., 2003, p. 201), was replaced with the more stringent threshold of 5,000 ms. Despite the 
stringency of this new procedure, virtually all participants had less than 10% latencies that 
were slower than 5,000 ms, and so no participant had to be excluded because of it. Second, 
the standard IAT score ranges from –2 to +2 (Nosek & Sriram, 2007), with conventional 
break points of > .15, > .35, and > .65, which signify slight, moderate, and strong implicit 
preference, respectively. The IAT scores were multiplied by 1.5 here so that the new scale 
ranged from –3 to +3. The break points therefore became .20, .50, and 1.0 after rounding. In 
addition to its intuitive appeal, this rescaling made the IAT scores directly comparable to 
scores derived from the explicit measures.  
For the explicit measures, all items were centered on zero, so that they also ranged 
from –3 to +3. Following Greenwald, Nosek, et al. (2003), a relative explicit measure was 
obtained from the two semantic differential scales using a formula adapted from the D 
Measure in order to facilitate comparison with the implicit scores: 
 
 
      𝐸𝑛 − 𝐴𝑟      
𝑆𝐷𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑑
 × 1.5 (6.1) 
 
where En is Attitudes toward the English, Ar is Attitudes toward Arabs, and SDpooled is their 
combined standard deviation. The resulting score, called the Explicit D Measure here, ranged 
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from almost –3 to +3 (from –2.92 to +2.92 to be exact) and correlated very strongly with the 
mean of these two semantic differential scales (r = .96, p < .001).  
In addition to this, an analysis of the measurement model was conducted. The 
measurement model aims to examine the reliability and validity of the scales. In order to 
achieve this, procedures from both classical test theory and item response theory were used. 
Cronbach’s (1951) alpha from classical test theory, despite its psychometric limitations (see 
Sijtsma, 2009) was used because it is extremely common in the field, and so it was presented 
here in order to facilitate comparison with other studies in the literature. From item response 
theory, Mokken (1971) scale analysis was implemented, which is the nonparametric 
counterpart of Rasch (1980) scaling.  
To make the difference between the alpha and Mokken clearer, consider their 
formulas. For Cronbach’s alpha, the following formula is used: 
 
 α =  
k
k − 1
(
SDx
2  − ∑ SDi
2k
i=1
SDx2
) (6.2) 
 
where k is the number of scale items. Equation (6.2) indicates that alpha is a function of the 
variance of the total score of each person (SD2x) minus the sum of the variance of the 
responses to each item (SD2i). In other words, the higher the variance of the respondents 
relative to the variance of individual items, the higher the alpha. On the other hand, high item 
variance is considered noise that obscures the true score. This is why alpha has been 
described as a measure of the internal consistency of the items, though Sijtsma (2009) points 
out that internal consistency is an ambiguous construct and has no clear definition. 
Additionally, because Equation (6.2) is multiplied by a term involving the number of items 
(k), another property of alpha is that it can be an artifact of the number of items in the scale. 
The longer the scale, the higher the resulting alpha, even if some items are actually unrelated 
to the underlying construct. In this Study, Cronbach’s alpha was computed for each scale 
using SPSS 22 (IBM Corp, 2013). 
On the other hand, Mokken scaling utilizes Loevinger’s coefficient of homogeneity 
(H). H is a criterion of scalability: 
 
 𝐻 = 1 −
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠
 (6.3) 
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where errors refers to Guttman errors. Guttman scale assumes that the items are of increasing 
difficulty (e.g., become harder to endorse in the case of questionnaire items). Then, the model 
assumes that each respondent who endorses an item should have also endorsed all ‘easier’ 
items. For example, if a scale has five items of increasing difficulty, endorsing the hardest 
item implies that the individual has also endorsed all other easier items. Deviations from this 
pattern (i.e., observed errors in the Equation [6.3]) are then divided by errors expected under 
statistical independence (van Schuur, 2011), which is analogous to a chi-square procedure. 
Therefore, the patterns of persons and of items can be analyzed independently, i.e. whether 
the items can be scaled in terms of difficulty and whether the respondents can be scaled in 
terms of ability. Thus, the focus of Mokken becomes the scalability of items and persons 
rather than deviation from a true score as in the case of Cronbach’s alpha. Consequently, 
Mokken scaling involves two models: the monotony homogeneity (which scales persons), and 
double monotonicity (which additionally scales items). In the case of questionnaire data, the 
monotone homogeneity is typically sufficient.  
Despite the apparent simplicity of Equation (6.3), simulation research has shown that 
Mokken scale analysis performs very well in detecting the underlying structure of the data. 
For example, Karabatsos (2004) reports that H “consistently had the best detection rates over 
the 60 data sets” (p. 637). In another simulation study involving 2400 datasets, van der Eijk 
and Rose (2015) report that “the risk of incorrectly diagnosing any of the items as not 
belonging to the same latent dimension as the other items is 0.7%” (p. 25). Meijer and 
Baneke (2004) similarly recommend applying Mokken scaling, even if the purpose is to use 
the more restrictive Rasch model subsequently, in order to avoid misleading results. 
Therefore, the major advantage of Mokken scaling is to ensure the unidimensionality of the 
construct, in that the items of each construct belong to it and not to other constructs, 
something that Cronbach’s alpha is not designed to do. Factor analysis can also achieve this, 
but it typically requires continuous data, and with ordinal data there is a risk of spurious 
overdimensionality especially with maximum likelihood estimation (van der Eijk & Rose, 
2015). Other estimation procedures are available in some specialized software, such as robust 
maximum likelihood and diagonally weighted least squares, but their merits are still debated 
(for a recent analysis, see Li, 2016). In this Study, the scales were submitted to Mokken scale 
analysis using MSP5 (Molenaar & Sijtsma, 2000). 
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6.2.2 Results 
The measurement model 
The aim of the measurement model is to investigate the psychometric properties of the scales 
in this Study before proceeding to the statistical analysis. The results of the measurement 
model are in Table 6.3. This table presents the number of items in each scale along with its 
Cronbach’s alpha, rho (another reliability measure similar to Cronbach’s alpha based on 
Mokken scaling), and homogeneity (H). Conventionally, H is interpreted using the break 
points of ≥ .30, ≥ .40, and ≥ .50 to refer to weak, medium, and strong homogeneity, 
respectively (Mokken, 1971, p. 185). All scales exhibited acceptable levels of reliability and 
homogeneity. One exception is a homogeneity just below the recommended threshold for 
Attitudes toward the English. This is a rather interesting finding because this pattern did not 
emerge for Attitudes toward Arabs, even though the adjectives used for the two scales were 
identical. This implies that attitudes toward the L2 group may be differently structured than 
attitudes toward the L1 group. Inspection of Q–Q plots showed that the variables are 
reasonably normally distributed.  
 
Table 6.3: Reliability and homogeneity of scales.  
Scale No. of items α rho H 
Attitudes to English-Speaking People 3 .85 .86 .68 
Attitudes to Learning English  4 .74 .73 .43 
Ideal L2 Self 4 .78 .79 .52 
Ought-to L2 Self 3 .65 .65 .41 
Fear of Assimilation  5 .78 .77 .43 
Ethnocentrism  5 .74 .69 .33 
Religious Attitudes 6 .75 .77 .38 
Attitudes to the English—SDS  10 .74 .74 .24 
Attitudes to Arabs—SDS 10 .84 .84 .37 
Note. H = scale homogeneity.  
 
Because RQ 3 involves a SEM analysis, a measurement model was also conducted on 
the latent variables used in that part of the analysis. The results of that measurement model 
are discussed under RQ 3, along with the SEM results.  
Descriptive statistics  
Because the majority of the sample come from three countries (Saudi Arabia, Libya, and 
Iraq), a chi-square test was first performed in order to find out whether the distribution of 
individuals with high and low implicit attitudes was statistically equivalent across these 
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countries. Based on a median-split of the implicit test score, there was no evidence of unequal 
distribution either for males, χ2(2) = 4.892, p = .09; or for females, χ2(2) = 0.251, p = .88. 
These results, therefore, suggests that the distribution of implicit attitudes is independent of 
the three main countries in the sample. The observed and expected counts per cell are shown 
in Table 6.4. Note that this analysis was based on participants from the three major 
nationalities only, and not the whole sample. This is why the total number of participants in 
Table 6.4 is slightly smaller than that reported in the Participants section above.  
 
Table: 6.4: Chi-square results for the distribution of the sample showing observed and 
expected counts based on gender and nationality.  
  Saudi Iraqi Libyan Total 
Male 
Low Implicit 33 (30.5) 25 (32.5) 54 (49) 112 
High Implicit 28 (30.5) 40 (32.5) 44 (49) 112 
Total 61 65 98 224 
Female 
Low Implicit 32 (31.4) 9 (8.9) 4 (4.7) 45 
High Implicit 28 (28.6) 8 (8.1) 5 (4.3) 41 
Total 60 17 9 86 
Note. This analysis was based on participants from the three major nationalities, and not the 
whole sample. Values in parentheses are the expected values.  
 
Table 6.5 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables and their inter-
correlations. The Explicit D Measure had a neutral mean but a relatively higher standard 
deviation—indicating wide disagreement among the participants—while the Implicit D 
Measure suggests that the overall sample was actually moderately inclined more toward their 
L1 group. The newly developed Religious Attitudes scale correlated moderately to strongly 
with Ethnocentrism and Fear of Assimilation, suggesting that it also reflects an aspect of L1 
group affiliation.  
The table also shows that the participants expressed generally positive explicit 
attitudes toward English-speaking people and toward learning English and had high ideal L2 
selves. This was to be expected given that the sample was made up of individuals who chose 
to go to the UK to study English. This positive slant would make the case more interesting if 
subsequent analyses reveal that some participants have an influential L1 implicit preference 
operating beneath this positive surface.  
The correlations in Table 6.5 show that the Explicit and Implicit D Measures did not 
correlate with each other. However, they did behave similarly in correlating negatively with 
all three L1 group affiliation scales. There were no significant differences in how strongly 
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they correlated with these three scales (the strong correlations between the Explicit D 
Measure and the two semantic differential scales were merely an artifact of being derived 
from them). In line with previous research, females outperformed males both in the implicit 
test, t(363) = 1.91, p = .057, d = 0.22, and in the Ideal L2 Self, t = 4.93, p < .001, d = 0.57.  
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Table 6.5: Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations for the overall sample (N = 365). All scales are centered on zero and range 
from –3 to +3.  
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  1. Attitudes to English- 
      Speaking People 
  1.59   1.05 —          
  2. Attitudes to  
      Language Learning 
  1.77   0.84   .41*** —         
  3. Ideal L2 Self   1.95   0.77   .17**   .17*** —        
  4. Ought-to L2 Self   0.77   1.27   .30***   .32***   .15** —       
  5. Fear of Assimilation   0.00   1.29 –.14** –.06 –.07   .14** —      
  6. Ethnocentrism  –0.65   1.29 –.10†   .13* –.03   .19***   .53*** —     
  7. Religious Attitudes    1.17   1.40 –.02   .12*   .04   .01   .34***   .48*** —    
  8. Attitudes to Arabs— 
      SDS 
  0.73   0.90   .05   .04   .12*   .03   .11*   .27***   .29*** —   
  9. Attitudes to the 
      English—SDS 
  0.77   0.76   .36***   .20*** –.03   .19*** –.20*** –.11* –.10†   .12* —  
10. Explicit D Measure   0.01   1.11   .21***   .13* –.10†   .09 –.22*** –.30*** –.27*** –.70***   .56*** — 
11. Implicit D Measure –0.78   0.61   .02   .00 –.01 –.03 –.24*** –.16** –.18*** –.11*   .02   .07 
Note. SDS = sematic differential scale. *** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, , * p ≤ .05, † p < .10.  
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RQ 1: Are congruent learners more open to the L2 group?  
This question is concerned with whether participants with explicit–implicit congruence (i.e., 
Type 1 in Table 6.1) would exhibit more openness to the L2 group than would incongruent 
participants (Type 4 in Table 6.1). Because both of these types share positive attitudes toward 
L2 speakers at the explicit level, this part of the analysis included only participants who 
obtained a score higher than the neutral zero (i.e., positive) in Attitudes toward English-
Speaking People. This is the first step. The two types differ in their implicit attitudes, and so 
participants selected in the first step were then subdivided based on their Implicit D Measure 
scores into those in the upper or lower quartiles (i.e., excluding middle-range participants). 
As a result, this two-step selection procedure produced two subgroups with contrasting 
implicit attitudes but commonly shared positive explicit attitudes.  
A t-test demonstrated that the participants who exhibited explicit–implicit congruence 
also exhibited significantly more positivity in Attitudes toward English-Speaking People (M 
= 2.05, SD = 0.75, n = 78) than the ones with explicit–implicit incongruence (M = 1.81, SD = 
0.77, n = 84), t(160) = 1.99, p = .048, d = 0.32. These results lend support to the view that 
explicit–implicit congruence predicts more openness to the L2 group. Table 6.6 contains a 
summary of the differences in the other group-related scales. All results are also consistent 
with this view.  
 
Table 6.6: Differences between participants with explicit–implicit congruence (n = 78) and 
incongruence (n = 84).  
          Scale     Group     M    SD t d 
Fear of Assimilation  
Congruent  –0.42   1.27 
  3.35***   0.53 
Incongruent   0.28   1.36 
      
Ethnocentrism  
Congruent  –0.96   1.27 
  2.49**   0.39 
Incongruent –0.45   1.34 
      
Religious Attitudes  
Congruent    0.82   1.44 
  3.11**   0.49 
Incongruent   1.47   1.22 
      
Attitudes toward Arabs 
Congruent    0.50   0.89 
  2.48**   0.40 
Incongruent   0.85   0.86 
Note. Bonferroni correction implemented. Adding length of residence in an English-speaking 
country and age as covariates does not influence these results. ** p ≤ .01, *** p = .001 
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As explained above, the approach used here to classify learners (see Table 6.1) might 
seem artificial. It is possible that different researchers may follow slightly different 
classification approaches. These results were therefore validated using cluster analysis. A 
two-step log-likelihood cluster analysis based on these five scales readily yielded two clusters 
with a ratio of 1.05. A t-test showed that the cluster showing more explicit openness to the L2 
group also scored significantly higher in the implicit test, t(363) = 3.60, p < .001, d = 0.38. 
This suggests that implicit attitudes are associated with more openness to the L2 group for the 
sample overall. Further analyses showed that this effect is markedly stronger within the male 
subsample, t(250) = 3.27, p = .001, d = 0.41; but not statistically significant for the female 
subsample, t(106) = 1.49, p = .14, d = 0.29. These results suggest that implicit attitudes are 
especially relevant for male learners.  
RQ 2: Are correlations equivalent for learners with L1 vs. L2 preference?  
This question compared the correlation coefficients for learners with implicit preference for 
the L1 versus L2 groups. An analysis was conducted based on a median-split of the Implicit 
D Measure scores. Table 6.7 presents the results for the two genders. Typically, researchers 
examine the first column (i.e., rall), which pools all participants regardless of their implicit 
attitudes. The next two columns separate those with a low implicit score showing preference 
for the L1 group (the rL1-pref column) from those with a high implicit score showing 
preference to the L2 group (the rL2-pref column). The crucial part is the last column. It 
examines whether the correlation coefficients in the rL1-pref and rL2-pref columns differ 
significantly. (That is, two correlation coefficients might be different [e.g., .20 vs. .22] but the 
magnitude of this difference may not be large enough to warrant statistical significance.) This 
column reports Fisher’s r-to-z transformation, which is a standard approach to comparing the 
magnitude of two correlation coefficients (e.g., Kenny, 1987, p. 275). Dörnyei and Chan 
(2013) for example have used it to compare correlation pairs related to the motivation to learn 
two different languages.  
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Table 6.7: Correlations for males and females comparing the overall sample, those with L1 
and L2 implicit preference, and the difference between the latter two groups.  
 
           Scales 
rall 
(n = 257) 
rL1-pref 
(n = 128) 
rL2-pref 
(n = 129) 
   z 
Male 
 
Explicit D Measure   
Implicit D Measure 
  .14*   –.08   .21* 2.32* 
Explicit D Measure 
Attitudes to L2 Speakers 
  .18**     .03   .33*** 2.48* 
Explicit D Measure 
Attitudes to L2 Learning 
  .13*   –.04   .29*** 2.68** 
Attitudes to L2 Learning  
Attitudes to the English—SDS 
  .21***     .09   .32*** 1.91† 
Attitudes to L2 Learning  
Fear of Assimilation 
–.08     .08 –.23** 2.49** 
Attitudes to L2 Speakers  
Ideal L2 Self 
  .31***     .04   .32*** 2.31* 
Implicit D Measure  
Fear of Assimilation 
–.27***   –.11 –.34*** 3.68*** 
Implicit D Measure   
Ethnocentrism 
–.19**   –.01 –.22** 1.69† 
Implicit D Measure   
Religious Attitudes 
–.21***   –.05 –.29** 1.97* 
Implicit D Measure   
Attitudes to Arabs 
–.12*     .05 –.19* 1.92* 
Attitudes to L2 Speakers  
Fear of Assimilation 
–.13*   –.06 –.27** 1.72† 
Attitudes to L2 Speakers  
Attitudes to Arabs—SDS  
  .03     .18* –.10 2.24* 
            Scales 
rall 
(n = 108) 
rL1-pref 
(n = 54) 
rL2-pref 
(n = 54) 
   z 
Female 
Attitudes to L2 Speakers  
Attitudes to L2 Learning 
  .34***     .05   .61*** 3.33*** 
Implicit D Measure 
Ideal L2 Self 
–.02   –.08   .29* 1.91† 
Explicit D Measure  
Ethnocentrism 
–.12     .08 –.29* 1.91† 
Attitudes to L2 Learning  
Implicit D Measure  
–.09   –.32*   .11 2.23* 
Attitudes to the English—SDS  
Ethnocentrism 
  .06     .27* –.18 2.32* 
Note. All hypotheses two-tailed. SDS = semantic differential scale.  
† p < .10, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
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Table 6.7 shows a total of 17 instances in which pairs of correlation coefficients 
differed significantly between the two subgroups (the full correlation tables are available in 
Appendix C). As mentioned above, the rall column—which does not take implicit attitudes 
into account—is the one typically examined by researchers. However, when the participants 
were separated based on their implicit attitudes, the correlations of the L1 preference 
participants dropped to non-significance in 14 instances, whereas the correlations of the L2 
preference participants became even stronger. For example, for females, Attitudes toward L2 
Speakers and Attitudes toward L2 Learning appeared moderately correlated for the overall 
sample (r = .34), which is the expected result from the literature. However, the next two 
columns show that this pattern actually holds only when implicit attitudes toward the L2 
group are favorable, and disappears for the other group. This suggests that pooling these two 
different groups can be misleading.  
In the only three instances in which this pattern was reversed, the correlations that 
emerged for those with L1 preference were theoretically somewhat unexpected. It is not clear 
why the women had a negative correlation between L2 learning attitudes and implicit 
attitudes toward L2 speakers, or why the more they rated the English favorably the more they 
were also ethnocentric. Also, the men tended to rate the two groups similarly as if they did 
not see much difference between them. These results suggest that learners with lower implicit 
attitudes do not seem to follow theoretically expected patterns. Future research is needed to 
shed more light on the motivation of this group of learners.  
Again, this effect is more marked for males than females, as fewer significant 
differences emerged from the female subsample. This pattern supports the results of RQ 1 
above showing that implicit attitudes play a larger role for males. Overall, therefore, the 
results demonstrate that pooling learners without regard to their level of implicit attitudes 
carries the danger of masking salient internal differences that may in turn suppress the overall 
correlation coefficient6. 
 
                                                 
6 The Bonferroni correction was not implemented in this part of the analysis following the convention in the 
field. Language motivation researchers do not correct for multiple comparisons when they use correlations (like 
those in Table 6.5), and the present analysis is intended to show what the results might look like when implicit 
attitudes are taken into account. Still, future research should attempt to replicate the results using this 
instrument, and this potential limitation is acknowledged here.  
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RQ 3: Do implicit attitudes moderate the L2 MSS?  
This question examined whether implicit attitudes moderate the relationship between 
(explicit) Attitudes toward L2 Speakers and the Ideal L2 Self, and between the Ideal L2 Self 
and Attitudes toward Learning English. A multi-group SEM analysis was conducted using 
Amos 22 (J. L. Arbuckle, 2013). The SEM analysis followed the recommended two-step 
approach of examining the measurement model before proceeding to the structural model 
(see Fornell & Larcker, 1981).  
The SEM measurement model. This part of the analysis involves a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) with the aim of establishing the construct validity of the three latent variables 
used in the SEM analysis, which is a crucial step in any SEM analysis. Both convergent and 
discriminant validity were examined. To examine convergent validity, i.e. that the indicators 
satisfactorily represent their latent constructs, three aspects were investigated. First, construct 
reliability (also called composite reliability) was computed. In the context of latent variables, 
reliability is calculated differently from the classical approaches, such as Equations (6.2) and 
(6.3) that were discussed above. Construct reliability is computed using this formula:  
 
 ρη =
(∑ 𝜆𝑦𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 )
2
(∑ 𝜆𝑦𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 )
2
+  ∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖)
𝑝
𝑖=1
 (6.4) 
 
where the reliability of the latent variable η is a function of the squared sum of the 
standardized factor loadings (λ) and the sum of the error variances of (ε). Construct reliability 
is not computed automatically by SEM software, and so the user must calculate it him-
/herself from the CFA output using Equation (6.4). The rule of thumb for construct reliability 
is that it should be .70 or higher, which was satisfied for the three constructs as shown in 
Table 6.8.  
Second, the average variance extracted (AVE) was computed. The AVE aims to 
establish whether the variance captured by the latent variable is larger than the variance due 
to measurement error. The AVE can be computed as follows: 
 
 ρvc(η) =
∑ 𝜆𝑦𝑖
2𝑝
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜆𝑦𝑖
2𝑝
𝑖=1 +  ∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖)
𝑝
𝑖=1
 (6.5) 
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where the average variance extracted (ρvc) of latent variable η is a function of the sum of the 
squared standardized factor loadings (λ) and the sum of the error variances of (ε). A variation 
of Equation (6.5) is to simply use the number of items (k) in the denominator. These two 
variations are equivalent. Again, the AVE values is not computed automatically by SEM 
software, and so the user has to calculate it for each latent variable from the CFA output 
using Equation (6.5). As a rule of thumb, the AVE should be .50 or higher. Attitudes toward 
English-Speaking People satisfied this recommendation, but each of the Ideal L2 Self and 
Attitudes toward Language Learning had to have one item dropped. This improved their AVE 
to a satisfactory level (see Table 6.8).  
A final rule of thumb for convergent validity suggests that the standardized factor 
loadings of each indicator variable should be .50 or higher. All factor loadings were 
statistically significant and higher than this threshold except for one indicator of Attitudes 
toward Language Learning that was just under this threshold (.46). The overall trend, 
therefore, suggested acceptable convergent validity.  
To examine discriminant validity, i.e. that the constructs are sufficiently distinct from 
each other, the recommended measure is that the AVE values should be greater than their 
respective inter-construct correlations squared. The rationale behind this rule of thumb is that 
the construct should explain more of the variance of its items than it shares with other 
constructs (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). This was also satisfied as shown in Table 
6.8. This can be verified by noting that the each value in the diagonal is always larger than 
the correlations of its respective construct with the other two constructs.  
Finally, most standardized residuals did not exceed the recommended threshold of 
±2.0, suggesting that the observed covariance terms fitted the estimated covariance terms. 
The fit of the measurement model was also acceptable, χ²(175) = 391.517, p < .001, χ²/df = 
2.237, CFI = .937, TLI = .909, RMSEA = .034, PCLOSE = 1.007. These results suggested 
that the measurement model was satisfactory and that it was safe to proceed to the structural 
model.   
 
                                                 
7 According to the publication manual of the American Psychological Association (2010): “Use a zero before 
the decimal point with numbers that are less than 1 when the statistic can exceed 1…. Do not use a zero before a 
decimal fraction when the statistic cannot be greater than 1 (e.g., correlations, proportions, and levels of 
statistical significance)” (p. 113). Since the TLI fit index is ‘nonnormed’ in that its value can sometimes exceed 
1.0, it should have been written as 0.909 (i.e., with a zero before the decimal). However, since it exceeds 1.0 
only in special and rare cases, the convention is not to use a zero before the decimal and to treat it like the other 
fit indices.  
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Table 6.8: Reliability and validity of the constructs in the measurement model and their inter-
construct correlations.  
 CR AVE 1 2 3 
1. Attitudes to  
    Language Learning 
.741 .503 .709   
2. Ideal L2 Self .745 .494 .356 .703  
3. Attitudes to English- 
    Speaking People 
.853 .662 .406 .165 .813 
Note. CR = construct reliability, AVE = average variance extracted. Values in the diagonal 
are the square roots of their respective AVE. 
 
The structural model. Before multi-group SEM analysis can be justifiably performed, 
the measurement invariance must be established. The measurement invariance aims to find 
out whether the groups to be compared do not substantially differ in terms of how they have 
understood and responded to the various items. Measurement invariance has three primary 
levels: configural, metric, and scalar. For the purpose of comparing structural coefficients, 
rather than latent means, satisfying the first two levels (configural and metric) is sufficient. In 
the present analysis, full metric invariance was achieved, in that all factor loadings of the 
three factors were equivalent between the two groups. The residuals of Attitudes toward 
English-Speaking People and Attitudes toward Language Learning covaried with each other 
(.45), possibly due to their shared underlying theme related to aspects of the L2 culture. None 
of the standardized residuals exceeded ±2.5, suggesting a very good fit between the observed 
and estimated covariance terms. The structural model also had an adequate fit, χ²(75) = 
199.701, p < .001, χ²/df = 2.663, CFI = .945, TLI = .921, RMSEA = .048, PCLOSE = .660. 
There were no missing data to handle in this part of the analysis because the computer 
program reminded the participant if s/he left an item unanswered.  
The results for the overall sample (see Figure 6.3, above the arrows; see also Table 
6.9) show that both paths are statistically significant. Again, these are the typical results 
researchers obtain when they do not take implicit attitudes into account. However, when 
implicit attitudes were taken into account, a different picture emerged. Learners with an L2 
preference outperformed their L1 preference counterparts in the path from Attitudes toward 
English-Speaking People to the Ideal L2 Self (z = 1.88, p < .10), while the opposite pattern 
emerged in the other path (z = 2.48, p < .05).  
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.     .16* .30***  
                                   
                                   .05 / .28** .45*** / .13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Standardized structural coefficients of final model for all participants (above the 
arrows) and for those who had L1 vs. L2 implicit preference (under the arrows). Structural 
coefficients and factor loadings are detailed in Tables 6.9 and 6.10, respectively. Error terms 
and their covariances were deleted for simplicity.  
*** p < .001 
  ** p < .01 
    * p < .05 
 
Table 6.9: Standardized and unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, and critical ratios in 
the final model for the overall sample, and for participants with L1 vs. L2 implicit preference.  
Path Group β B SE     CR 
Attitudes to English-Speaking People →  
Ideal L2 Self 
Overall   .16   0.13 0.05   2.51* 
L1-pref   .05   0.04 0.07   0.51 
L2-pref   .28   0.23 0.08   3.09** 
Ideal L2 Self → 
Attitudes to L2 Learning 
Overall   .30   0.40 0.09   4.48*** 
L1-pref   .45 0.62 0.14   4.34*** 
L2-pref   .13   0.17 0.12   1.45 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
  
Attitudes to 
English-
Speaking 
People 
Ideal  
L2 Self 
Attitudes to 
Language 
Learning 
AS1 
AS2 
AS3 IS1 
IS2 
IS3 AL1 
AL2 
AL3 
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Table 6.10: Standardized and unstandardized factor loadings, standard errors, and critical 
ratios in the final model for the overall sample, and for participants with L1 vs. L2 implicit 
preference.  
Path Group  β   B  SE      CR 
Attitudes to English-Speaking 
People → 
AS1 
Overall .83 1.40 0.10 14.24*** 
L1-pref .84 1.49 0.17   8.10*** 
L2-pref .81 1.32 0.12 11.03*** 
AS2 
Overall .71    
L1-pref .66  —  
L2-pref .75    
AS3 
Overall .89 1.32 0.09 14.40*** 
L1-pref .87 1.47 0.16   8.95*** 
L2-pref .93 1.24 0.11 11.67*** 
Ideal L2 Self → 
IS1 
Overall .74 1.16 0.12   9.46*** 
L1-pref .78 1.31 0.21   6.23*** 
L2-pref .70 0.98 0.14   7.17*** 
IS2 
Overall .71 1.08 0.12   9.46*** 
L1-pref .69 1.13 0.18   6.24*** 
L2-pref .73 1.01 0.14   7.23*** 
IS3 
Overall .65    
L1-pref .59  —  
L2-pref .73    
Attitudes to L2 Learning → 
AL1 
Overall .76 0.81 0.05 15.23*** 
L1-pref .69 0.80 0.09   9.04*** 
L2-pref .80 0.80 0.07 12.41*** 
AL2 
Overall .85    
L1-pref .83  —  
L2-pref .87    
AL3 
Overall .46 0.75 0.09   8.35*** 
L1-pref .42 0.78 0.15   5.17*** 
L2-pref .50 0.73 0.11   6.73*** 
Note. *** p < .001  
 
Exploring the Religious Attitudes scale 
In this Study, a new scale was constructed to measure the participants’ self-reported level of 
religiosity. Because of the centrality of religion to many Arabs, this section explores the 
relationship between religiosity and language learning. A t-test was conducted based on a 
median-split of the Religious Attitudes scale in order to compare learners with high versus 
low levels of religiosity. The results are in Table 6.11. These results are somewhat 
comparable to those presented in Table 6.5 earlier. However, the advantage of this additional 
analysis is that, in the Study 2, the t-values will be synthesized using Bayes factors.   
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Table 6.11: Differences between participants with low (n = 178) and high (n = 152) 
religiosity.  
          Scale Religiosity     M  SD     t   d 
Ideal L2 Self  
    Low    1.96 0.78 
0.02 0.00 
    High   1.96 0.74 
      
Ought-to L2 Self  
    Low    0.74 1.31 
0.70 0.08 
    High   0.84 1.21 
      
Fear of Assimilation   
    Low  –0.37 1.29 
5.92*** 0.58 
    High   0.44 1.16 
      
Ethnocentrism  
    Low  –1.22 1.08 
9.97*** 1.09 
    High   0.03 1.20 
      
Attitudes to English-
Speaking People 
    Low    1.57 1.09 
0.09 0.01 
    High   1.56 1.03 
      
Attitudes to L2 Learning  
    Low    1.68 0.83 
1.90 0.21 
    High   1.86 0.88 
      
Attitudes to Arabs—SDS   
    Low    0.52 0.89 
5.15*** 0.57 
    High   1.01 0.83 
      
Attitudes to the 
English—SDS   
    Low    0.82 0.71 
1.10 0.13 
    High   0.72 0.80 
      
Explicit D Measure 
    Low    0.25 1.08 
4.63*** 0.51 
    High –0.31 1.10 
      
Implicit D Measure   
    Low  –0.67 0.65 
3.05* 0.33 
    High –0.87 0.55 
Note. Bonferroni correction implemented. SDS = semantic differential scale.  
* p < .05, *** p = .001 
 
Virtually all the significant results reported in Table 6.11 are for variables concerned 
with intergroup relations, in that those reporting lower religiosity were more open to the L2 
community. This pattern therefore suggests that religiosity is more than just a belief 
concerning a deity, but also has interpersonal and intergroup implications. This pattern also 
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supports the use of this scale as a further measure of L1 group affiliation. Interestingly, this 
scale is related even to implicit attitudes, and not just explicit attitudes, toward L2 speakers. 
Considering that openness to the L2 community (real or imagined) is considered an important 
factor in L2 learning, religious attitudes therefore seem a potentially interesting aspect in 
understanding language learning motivation for Arab learners.  
The p-values reported in Table 6.11 are Bonferroni-corrected adjusting for 10 
exploratory comparisons. Therefore, only highly significant differences survived this 
adjustment. For example, the difference between learners with high versus low religiosity 
would have been marginally significant for Attitude toward L2 Learning (with the t-value 
approaching 1.96, which is associated with the 5% level of significance). This significance 
disappeared after implementing the Bonferroni correction. This could be a genuine difference 
that was lost after the Bonferroni correction, or it could be merely due to chance. Study 2 
explores the Religious Attitudes scale further, shedding more light on these results.  
6.2.3 Discussion  
Conventional language motivation theories tend to portray language learners as rational 
agents, varying along one (conscious) dimension: a continuum from high to low motivation. 
This is evident both in theoretical discussions and in actual empirical investigations where 
self-report questionnaires and interviews are predominant. This Study has presented the first 
attempt in the L2 field to use the Implicit Association Test to examine language learners’ 
implicit attitudes. The results are encouraging. They demonstrate that another (unconscious) 
dimension has important implications for language learning motivation. Perhaps the most 
interesting finding in this Study is that explicit and implicit attitudes can potentially be 
incongruent, and that incongruent learners subsequently exhibit less openness to the L2 
community. The implicit attitudes construct may therefore have the potential to move the 
field forward toward interesting directions.  
This Study has provided support for the notion that implicit attitudes toward L2 
speakers are relevant to language learning motivation. More specifically, language learners 
who exhibited preference for L2 group (over the L1 group) in the implicit test, also reported 
more openness to this L2 group. This was represented in significantly more favorable 
attitudes toward L2 speakers and less favorable attitudes toward Arabs and, on the other 
hand, in lower levels of ethnocentrism, fear of assimilation, and religious attitudes. This is in 
line with a long-standing principle in the L2 motivation field, namely that language learning 
is facilitated by a positive disposition toward the L2 community (real or imagined). The 
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present results add a further layer of complexity to this principle, namely that attitudes need 
to be positive at the implicit level also in order to attain more openness to the L2 community.  
The present results also show that there is a systematic association between explicit 
and implicit attitudes toward L2 speakers. This finding may be seen as lending support to the 
validity of the Implicit Association Test. That is, one way to investigate the validity of a 
construct is to examine its convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent validity requires 
that constructs sharing some similarity to successfully correlate with each other; discriminant 
validity requires that constructs not sharing this similarity not to correlate as strongly with 
each other. The Implicit Association Test has already demonstrated these patterns in various 
domains in the psychological literature (Greenwald et al., 2015). The present results (e.g., 
Table 6.5) show that the scores from Implicit Association Test correlated to a statistically 
significant level only with scales related inter-group relations, while not correlating with any 
of the other variables included in this Study. This pattern therefore corroborates the 
psychological literature supporting the validity of scores derived from this test. The present 
results add to this literature by showing that such meaningful patterns also emerge in the 
context of language learning. Study 2 addresses convergent and discriminant validity further 
using a different approach.  
These results also support Higgins’s (e.g., Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; Shah & 
Higgins, 2001) argument that self-guides can be investigated using reaction-time measures. 
As reviewed in Chapter 3, Higgins argued strongly against the utility of self-report measures 
in studying self-guide discrepancies. Reaction-time measures, one the other hand, can reveal 
aspects about self-guides that one is unaware of. This is because reaction time is sensitive to 
the accessibility and activation of one’s self-guides. In the present Study, the participants 
were asked to associate positive and negative attributes, such as Honest and Dishonest, with 
Arabic and English speakers. The ones who were able to associate positive attributes with 
English speakers more easily are the ones who have more activation and accessibility to 
positive self-guides related to speakers of the L2 community. This interpretation reinforces 
the above analysis of the need to add another layer of complexity to openness to the L2 
community. Openness does not have to be restricted to explicit attitudes reported in 
questionnaires and interviews, but may also extend to implicit attitudes that require 
alternative measures such as those that are based on reaction time.  
The results have also shown that implicit attitudes can shed new light on existing 
results. Both in the context of correlation and SEM analyses, learners with different levels of 
implicit attitudes exhibited different patterns of association. In the context of correlations, 
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learners with higher (vs. lower) implicit scores had significantly stronger correlations among 
attitudinal and motivational variables. This suggests that pooling them can potentially 
produce misleading results. In the context of SEM, attitudes toward L2 speakers predicted the 
ideal L2 self only for learners with higher implicit scores. This suggests that learners resort to 
the L2 group to develop their ideal L2 selves only when their implicit attitudes toward that 
group are already favorable. This makes sense. In order for the learner to adopt members of 
the L2 group as ideals of a language speaker, s/he first needs to have a positive attitude 
toward them. The present results suggest that this positivity need to be both at the explicit and 
implicit levels. On the other hand, the ideal L2 self predicted attitudes toward L2 learning 
only for learners with lower implicit attitudes. It seems that learners with higher implicit 
scores do not require much conscious effort in resorting to their ideal L2 selves to remain 
motivated; their motivation may be maintained spontaneously. When implicit attitudes are 
low, however, it probably becomes more urgent to develop and cultivate a conscious ideal L2 
self to guide one’s motivation and sustain it over time. Thus, implicit attitudes seem to reveal 
a more nuanced picture of language learning motivation, showing different motivational 
dynamics underlying learners with high versus low implicit test scores.  
Implicit attitudes also appeared more relevant to males than to females. The above-
mentioned results were consistently more salient for males. This supports previous research 
showing that females tend to exhibit more positivity toward languages (vs. math and science) 
both explicitly and implicitly, and consequently females may have less reason to develop 
explicit–implicit incongruence. Implicit attitudes may therefore be a valuable pathway for a 
better understanding of gender differences in language learning.  
The present results also offers support for the utility of religious attitudes for Arab 
learners as a further indicator of openness to the L2 group. That religious attitudes were 
associated with less openness to the L2 group is in line with previous research showing that 
religiosity can be a hindrance to integrating with the host community, especially in Europe. It 
is still unclear to what extent this would be useful in societies in which religion is not a 
salient aspect. Overall, thus, the results of Study 1 are encouraging. Study 2 builds and 
expands on Study 1. 
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6.3 Study 28  
Although it has found support for all of its research questions, Study 1 still has a number of 
limitations. First, the participants in Study 1 chose to travel to the UK to study English, and 
so these learners might not be representative of others who either cannot travel abroad or do 
not want to do so. Individuals living in foreign language contexts represent the majority of 
language learners today. Additionally, because the sample in Study 1 were all students at 
British universities and language institutes, both the questionnaire items and the implicit test 
addressed attitudes toward British people specifically. Therefore, it is not clear whether the 
same results would emerge if the instruments were concerned with English speakers in 
general and were administered to a sample of learners in a foreign language context—as is 
the standard practice in most language research today. Study 2 therefore overcame this 
limitation by recruiting learners living a foreign language context, and by defining the 
concept of English speakers more broadly, rather than limiting it to British people.  
A second limitation in Study 1 is that the sample came from various universities and 
language institutes and from various levels of study, and so it was not possible to obtain a 
standardized measure of their academic achievement in the L2. Including a measure of 
language achievement would be desirable as it would allow investigating whether implicit 
attitudes are also related to academic outcomes. These learners also come from various 
countries in the Arab world, each with its own culture and background. Study 2 dealt with 
this limitation by recruiting a sample of learners from one institution (in Saudi Arabia). At 
this institution, students study a standardized curriculum and take the same exams and 
quizzes. The students were all in their foundation year, receiving intensive English instruction 
before moving to their engineering or business majors. This institution is not selective, and so 
students come from various levels of English proficiency and from many parts of the country.  
A further limitation in Study 1 is that the Implicit Association Test is a relative 
measure by design. As explained in Chapter 5, the results of the Implicit Association Test are 
ambiguous. A positive score does not necessarily mean a positive attitude toward one group 
and a negative attitude toward the other. It only means that the learner has a more positive 
attitude toward one over the other. Similarly, obtaining a neutral score might mean that the 
participant is indifferent to the two groups, but it might also be that s/he equally likes or 
dislikes both groups. This is why Study 1 has referred to learners as having L1 versus L2 
 
                                                 
8 Part of this Study has appeared in Al-Hoorie (2016b).  
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preference, rather than having a positive versus negative attitude toward one over the other. 
Study 2 therefore utilized the Single-Target Implicit Association Test (ST-IAT, Wigboldus et 
al., 2004), which promises more absolute scores of implicit attitudes, in order to examine 
whether similar results would be obtained.  
Another limitation in reaction-time measures in general is that it is not clear what their 
scores represent (e.g., Greenwald et al., 2015; Greenwald et al., 2009; Oswald et al., 2013; 
Rudman, 2008). As reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5, scores from implicit tests might indeed 
represent implicit attitudes, but they might also represent certain cognitive aspects such as 
working memory capacity or better task-switching skills. An efficient way of controlling for 
such potential confounds is to administer another irrelevant implicit test. If the implicit scores 
are a result of such confounds and artifacts, this should apply equally to the two tests and 
therefore conclusions derived from the two tests should be very similar. On the other hand, if 
we obtain different results, this means that the content of the test matters and it is not just a 
matter of cognitive ability. Another advantage of using two different tests is that this 
approach would also reveal whether those who perform faster are simply the ones take the 
test more seriously, such as to please the researcher. If this is the case, these participants 
would obtain similar scores regardless of which implicit test they take. Therefore, Study 2 
included an additional implicit test as a measure of attitudes toward the L2 course. In order 
for the implicit test to be valid, it was expected that implicit attitudes toward L2 speakers 
would be related to L2 group affiliation, but implicit attitudes toward the L2 course (which 
reflect the here and now) would not.   
Using two implicit tests can also help shed light on construct validity. In Study 1, the 
correlational patterns of the implicit test showed that it correlated only with variables related 
to intergroup relations, and not with variables unrelated to intergroup relations. These two 
patterns were considered as evidence of convergent and discriminant validity, respectively. 
Both convergent and discriminant validity contribute to construct validity. In Study 2, 
construct validity was addressed using a different approach, namely through the use of two 
implicit tests. The two implicit tests were concerned with two different targets: L2 speakers 
and the L2 course. Although these two targets are different, they are also sufficiently related 
to each other. Obtaining meaningful results from these two different implicit tests would 
provide compelling evidence of the construct validity of the implicit scores.  
In addition, the results from the implicit test in Study 1 were interpreted as reflecting 
implicit attitudes. However, these results could plausibility be interpreted as reflecting social 
desirability responding. That is, the participants who reported positive attitudes toward L2 
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speakers—but then obtained low scores in the implicit test—may have simply been trying to 
present themselves favorably by reporting that they like L2 speakers. The low scores in the 
implicit test do not necessarily mean that the respondent has negative implicit attitudes which 
they were unaware of. In other words, if these participants were to respond to the 
questionnaire items more frankly, they would have revealed less positive attitudes toward the 
L2 group, just like their scores on the implicit test.  
Study 2 therefore included a measure of social desirability. If a scale is sensitive to 
social desirability, that could be a reason for concern. Responses to that scale may be inflated 
by some participants who are high on social desirability. In recognition of this possibility, 
some early studies in L2 motivation research examined social desirability. For example, 
Gardner, Lalonde, and Moorcroft (1985) argued that there was “virtually no evidence” (p. 
219) of an association between the Attitude/Motivation Test Battery and social desirability. 
However, Gardner and Gliksman (1982) reported that social desirability did have a 
correlation of .40 with motivational intensity, a magnitude the authors described as 
“substantial” (p. 197). To the extent that the ‘intended effort’ scale is concerned with 
motivated behavior, it is conceptually similar to Gardner’s ‘motivational intensity’. 
Therefore, it is possible that intended effort would similarly be prone to social desirability 
biases. In a more recent study, Gardner and MacIntyre (1991) utilized a measure of social 
desirability but it resulted in a very low internal consistency coefficient (α = .23), which the 
authors attributed to the use of Likert items instead of the original true–false format. Because 
of this, Study 2 used the original dichotomous response format.  
Study 2 posed two research questions. First, it compared the motivational profiles of 
language learners with different academic achievement levels. The goal was to find out which 
of motivational variables in Study 1, as well as the two new implicit tests, would be able to 
successfully discriminate between high- versus low-achieving learners. This research 
question can be formulated as follows:   
RQ 1: Do high- and low-achieving Saudi learners of English differ in their attitudinal 
and motivational orientations?  
 
Second, Study 2 attempted to replicate the most important finding of Study 1, namely 
that congruent learners (i.e., those with positive attitudes toward L2 speakers both explicitly 
and implicitly) would show more affiliation with the L2 group than would incongruent 
learners (i.e., those with positive explicit, but negative implicit attitudes):  
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RQ 2: Compared with incongruent learners, do congruent Saudi learners of English 
exhibit more openness to the L2 group? 
 
For both research questions, social desirability was included as an explicit control, 
while the additional implicit test—concerned with the L2 course—was used as an implicit 
control. Since Study 1 found that the results were more salient for male rather than female 
learners, Study 2 recruited an all-male sample in order to examine this effect more closely. 
Finally, Study 2 included some additional exploratory analyses. It builds on the 
analysis of the Religious Attitudes scale presented in Study 1. Study 2 also explored a 
Parental Support scale, since this variable has received little attention in the literature 
especially with young adult learners. The analysis explored its relationship with explicit and 
implicit attitudes.  
6.3.1 Method 
Participants 
A total of 311 participants qualified for the final analysis after excluding those who did not 
complete all study tasks or who responded randomly to the implicit test (see Data analysis 
below for more details). The qualifying participants (18–24 years old, M = 19.8, SD = 0.95) 
were Arabic L1 males studying English language as a foundation-year requirement at an all-
male higher education institution in Saudi Arabia. The majority (over 85%) had never visited 
an English speaking country. Less than 10% had lived in an English speaking country for a 
maximum of three months, while less than 5% had stayed there for a longer duration. All 
participants took part in the present Study on a voluntary basis.  
Materials 
Implicit measures: The Single-Target Implicit Association Test (ST-IAT, Wigboldus et al., 
2004) was adapted to measure attitudes toward L2 speakers and toward the L2 course 
separately. Performing the ST-IAT requires pressing a left or right button on the keyboard in 
order to rapidly categorize a series of stimuli appearing in the center of a computer screen. 
Table 6.12 gives an overview of the L2 Speakers ST-IAT. In the first block, the participants 
practiced 20 times categorizing words as either Pleasant or Unpleasant. Then the actual test 
started. In the first condition, Blocks 2 and 3, Pleasant was paired with L2 Speakers (see 
Figure 1). In the other condition, Blocks 4 and 5, L2 Speakers moved to the other side to pair 
up with Unpleasant. Before each block, the participants read instructions and were reminded 
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to perform as fast as possible. The L2 Course ST-IAT followed the same format but used L2 
Course in place of L2 Speakers (see Appendix A for the stimuli used). All participants were 
taking this type of test for the first time. Each ST-IAT took less than 10 minutes to complete.  
 
Table 6.12: Overview of the L2 Speakers Single-Target Implicit Association Test.  
Block  Trials Function 
             Response key assignment 
Left button (E) Right button (I)  
1 20 Practice  Pleasant Unpleasant  
2 40 Test 1a Pleasant or L2 Speakers Unpleasant  
3 80 Test 1b Pleasant or L2 Speakers Unpleasant  
4 40 Test 2a Pleasant  Unpleasant or L2 Speakers 
5 80 Test 2b Pleasant  Unpleasant or L2 Speakers 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: A trial of the L2 Speakers ST-IAT. The correct answer here would be the left 
button (E) because the stimulus Honest belongs to Pleasant.  
 
The stimuli were randomly drawn without replacement from Pleasant, Unpleasant, 
and L2 Speakers or L2 Course where appropriate. A red X appeared when an incorrect 
response was given, and the participant had to correct the error before proceeding. Split-half 
analyses based on even-versus-odd trials showed that both the L2 Speakers ST-IAT 
(Spearman–Brown’s ρ = .73) and the L2 Course ST-IAT (ρ = .72) had good reliabilities. The 
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ST-IAT scores were coded so that a higher score reflected a more positive attitude. The 
software used was Inquisit 4 (2014).  
Explicit measures: The participants also completed 10 self-reported attitudinal and 
motivational scales relevant to explicit and implicit dispositions (scale reliabilities are 
discussed in the Results section):  
1) The Ideal L2 Self (4 items). Example: I can imagine myself mastering English one 
day.  
2) The Ought-to L2 Self (4 items). Example: I must study English because it will earn 
me respect in the society.    
3) Intended Effort (5 items). Example: I am prepared to expend a lot of effort in 
learning English.  
4) Family Support (4 items). Example: My parents encourage me to study English. 
A higher score in each of the above four scales indicated stronger endorsement. Three other 
scales were concerned with the degree of affiliation with the L1 group:  
5) Fear of Assimilation (5 items), adapted from S. Ryan (2009). Example: I think 
that the interest in the West has a negative influence on the Arab culture. 
6) Ethnocentrism (2 items), adapted from Neuliep and McCroskey (1997). Example: 
I find it difficult to work together with people who have different customs. 
7) Religious Attitudes (6 items), adapted from Study 1. Example: When I see a non-
Muslim, the idea of sharing my Islamic faith with them comes to my mind 
immediately. 
A higher score in each of these three scales reflected stronger L1 affiliation. The above seven 
scales all involved seven-point Likert scales. 
8) Social Desirability (28 true–false items), adapted from Crowne and Marlowe 
(1960). Example: My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a 
restaurant.  
A higher score in this scale reflected higher social desirability. Finally, the participants also 
responded to two semantic differential scales:  
9) Attitudes toward L2 Speakers (10 bipolar adjective scales), concerned with 
individuals whose L1 is English.  
10) L2 Learning Experience (8 bipolar adjective scales), concerned with attitudes 
toward the L2 course.  
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The adjectives used in these two scales were based on the stimuli of implicit tests. All 
materials in the explicit and implicit measures were translated into Arabic to avoid language 
interference. The complete list of questionnaire items is available in Appendix B. 
Procedure 
The participants completed the study tasks in small groups in a laboratory. The participants 
were informed at the beginning that the current Study was part of a research project at a 
British university, which incidentally might have activated their social desirability. Each 
participant first responded to items randomly drawn in a fixed order from the seven Likert 
scales, and then to the L2 speakers and to L2 learning experience semantic differential scales. 
Afterwards, they completed the two implicit measures with the social desirability scale in 
between. The order of the two implicit tests was counterbalanced, but this did not have an 
effect on responses either to the L2 Speakers ST-IAT (d = .02) or to the L2 course ST-IAT (d 
= .05).  
The participants’ final achievement in the L2 course (on a 9-point scale ranging from 
A+ to F) was obtained. At the institution in question, students learn the four skills as well as 
vocabulary and grammar. They are taught by at least three different teachers who assess them 
independently, mostly through computerized, objective testing. Tests and quizzes follow the 
curriculum taught closely, and so high achievement requires dedication and effort from the 
learner. Therefore, it seems reasonable to use grades at this institution as a fair reflection of 
L2 achievement.  
Still, one particular difficulty in using real-life course grades is that the researcher is 
rarely in full control of the process. On the other hand, examining real-life academic 
achievement is also important because it is a meaningful outcome in educational settings. As 
an additional step to make the achievement variable more interpretable, learners were 
considered high achievers if they obtained A or B, and low achievers if they obtained D or F. 
This procedure excluded learners in the middle, gray area. Still, because it might seem 
artificial, this dichotomization procedure was used only when the aim was to compare high 
versus low achievers. The full 9-point achievement measure was used for the rest of the 
analysis. As detailed below, both approaches led to positive results supporting the relevance 
of implicit attitudes.  
Data analysis 
The analysis of the implicit tests closely followed the improved scoring algorithm, called the 
D Measure, recommended by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). The four test blocks 
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were included in the analysis, and the latency of each incorrect response was replaced with 
the block mean plus 600 ms error penalty. Participants with more than 10% latencies faster 
than 300 ms—an indication of random responding—were excluded, while responses longer 
than 5,000 ms were removed. The responses from the social desirability scale were summed 
to obtain a score with a maximum of 24. All other measures, explicit and implicit, were 
rescaled so that they centered on zero and ranged from +3 to –3.  
6.3.2 Results 
The measurement model 
Just like Study 1, the reliabilities (α and rho) and the homogeneity of each scale are reported 
in Table 6.13. The results show generally satisfactory levels of reliability and homogeneity. 
Social desirability was three-dimensional as expected but was left intact in order to use the 
full version (α = .66, rho = .63), though reliability has no straightforward interpretation with 
multidimensional scales. Inspection of Q–Q plots also showed that the variables are 
reasonably normally distributed. 
 
Table 6.13: Reliability and homogeneity of the scales.  
Scale No. of items α rho H 
Ideal L2 Self 4 .80 .82 .56 
Ought-to L2 Self 4 .65 .73 .46 
Intended Effort 5 .67 .68 .34 
Family Support 4 .57 .63 .37 
Fear of Assimilation 5 .72 .72 .35 
Ethnocentrism 2 .59 .60 .44 
Religious Attitudes 6 .78 .78 .40 
Attitudes to L2 Speakers—SDS  10 .82 .82 .34 
L2 Learning Experience—SDS 8 .87 .88 .51 
Note. H = scale homogeneity.  
 
Descriptive statistics  
The first two columns Table 6.14 present the descriptive statistics of the variables in this 
Study. Each of the core variables in the L2 MSS—the Ideal L2 Self, the Ought-to L2 Self, the 
L2 Learning Experience, and Intended Effort—was highly endorsed by the participants and 
showed relatively high inter-correlations. Intended Effort also had the strongest correlation 
with social desirability. As expect, Fear of Assimilation, Ethnocentrism, and Religious 
Attitudes also correlated with each other.   
139 
 
Table 6.14: Means, standard deviations, and Pearson product-moment correlations among the variables (N = 311).  
    M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.   Ideal L2  
      Self 
2.18 0.82    —            
2.   Ought-to L2  
      Self 
2.07 0.88   .14**    —           
3.   Family  
      Support  
1.96 0.90   .25***   .21***    —          
4.   Fear of  
      Assimilation 
0.51 1.26 –.05 –.08   .08    —         
5.   Ethno- 
      centrism  
–0.44 1.41 –.09   .05   .09   .21***    —        
6.   Religious  
      Attitudes  
1.22 1.10   .19***   .09   .28***   .50***   .25***    —       
7.   Attitudes to  
      L2 Speakers 
1.10 0.83   .13   .22***   .06 –.15** –.08 –.09    —      
8.   L2 Speakers  
      ST-IAT 
0.27 0.36   .01   .08   .13* –.08 –.03   .01 –.03    —     
9.   L2 Learning  
      Experience 
1.18 1.09   .33***   .20***   .15** –.09   .00   .06   .26***   .01    —    
10. L2 Course  
      ST-IAT 
0.56 0.34   .00   .00 –.06   .01   .03   .01   .06   .26***   .02    —   
11. Social  
      Desirability  
13.25 3.71   .12   .04   .10   .07 –.10   .16**   .08 –.01   .12* –.01    —  
12. Intended  
      Effort 
1.76 0.89   .38***   .44***   .21*** –.14** –.13*   .10†   .25***   .12*   .33***   .06   .21*** — 
13. Grades 4.22 2.48   .09 –.09 –.12* –.12* –.14* –.22**   .06   .13*   .17* –.03 –.03 .00 
Note. *** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 . Grades are used here in the full 9-point format ranging from A+ to F. 
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RQ1: What variables discriminate between high- vs. low-achievers? 
The first goal of this Study was to investigate the participants’ motivational profiles in order 
to determine which variables are associated with high versus low achievement. A one-way 
MANCOVA was conducted to determine the effects9 of Achievement (high versus low) on 
the dependent variables with Social Desirability as a covariate. A few outlying values (z > 
±3.3) were detected and removed in order to satisfy univariate normality; no multivariate 
outliers were found based on Mahalanobis distance scores, χ²(12) = 32.91, p = .001. The 
homogeneity of variance–covariance matrices was assumed, Box’s M = 72.89, F = 1.10, p = 
.27. Using Pillai’s trace, there was a significant main effect of Achievement, V = .186, F(11, 
252) = 5.25, p < .001, 2p = .186. There was also a significant main effect of Social 
Desirability, V = .091, F = 2.29, p = .011, 2p = .091. 
The lower panel of Table 6.15 presents the results. Low achievers significantly 
outperformed high achievers in the first four variables listed in the table: the Ought-to L2 
Self, Family Support, Religious Attitudes, and Ethnocentrism. On the other hand, high 
achievers scored significantly higher in the next two variables: the L2 Speakers ST-IAT (i.e., 
implicit attitudes toward L2 speakers) and the L2 Learning Experience (i.e., explicit attitudes 
toward the L2 course). The remaining variables failed to discriminate between the two 
groups.  
The upper panel of Table 6.15 lists the variables that exhibited proneness to Social 
Desirability. It is clear that Intended Effort is the most extreme case, while some others were 
mildly prone to it.  
  
 
                                                 
9 The use of terms like ‘effect’ and ‘predict’ throughout this paper is intended to be in the statistical sense only. 
The direction of causality cannot be determined by the design of this study, and would require future 
experimental investigation. This point is discussed further in the next chapter (Section 7.3.1).  
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Table 6.15: Upper panel: variables exhibiting proneness to Social Desirability as a covariate. 
Lower panel: MANCOVA results for low and high achievers.  
       Variable Group    EMM SE          F      p 2p 
Social 
Desirability 
Ideal L2 Self   2.93 .088 
     
Family Support   3.48 .063 
     
Ethnocentrism    3.73 .054 
     
Religious Attitudes    5.91 .016 
     
Intended Effort   12.62 < .001 
       
Achieve-
ment 
Ought-to L2 Self 
Low  2.20 0.072 
7.35 .007 .027 
High 1.93 0.070 
      
Family Support 
Low 2.16 0.073 
8.23 .004 
High 1.87 0.071 
      
Religious Attitudes 
Low 1.49 0.088 
12.37 .001 .045 
High 1.06 0.085 
       
Ethnocentrism 
Low –0.22 0.122 
6.46 .012 .024 
High –0.65 0.118 
       
L2 Speakers ST-IAT 
Low   0.20 0.032 
5.88 .016 .022 
High   0.31 0.031 
       
L2 Learning Experience  
Low 0.95 0.089 
9.97 .002 .037 
High  1.34 0.086 
       
Ideal L2 Self 
Low 2.14 0.070 
0.74 .389 .003 
High  2.22 0.068 
       
Intended Effort 
Low 1.80 0.074 
0.40 .528 .002 
High  1.73 0.071 
       
Attitudes to L2 Speakers 
Low 1.03 0.072 
1.37 .243 .005 
High  1.14 0.069 
       
Fear of Assimilation 
Low 0.62 0.108 
1.08 .299 .004 
High  0.46 0.105 
       
Course ST-IAT 
Low 0.06 0.030 
< 0.001 .975 < .001 
High  0.06 0.071 
Note. The same pattern emerges when the covariate is excluded. EMM = estimated marginal 
mean, SE = standard error.  
 
142 
 
The results in Table 6.15 suggest that positive implicit attitudes toward L2 speakers 
(L2 Speakers ST-IAT) are associated with higher achievement. The underlying assumption of 
implicit attitudes is that they influence behavior without conscious awareness, and therefore 
their influence is non-self-reportable. If this is the case, implicit attitudes should still be able 
to predict achievement after controlling for the other explicit measures. Hierarchical linear 
regression was conducted as it would allow investigating the unique variance accounted for 
by implicit attitudes. This analysis was conducted on the full 9-point achievement measure. 
The results showed that implicit attitudes towards L2 speakers did predict achievement over 
and above all the other variables in this Study, β = .19, SE = 0.39, t = 3.33, p = .001.  
RQ2: Are congruent learners more open to the L2 group?  
The purpose of this part of the analysis was 1) to replicate the results from Study 1, showing 
that congruent learners are more open to the L2 community, and 2) to extend these results to 
L2 achievement. Following Study 1, a two-step procedure was applied (see Table 6.16). First, 
learners who obtained a score higher than the neutral zero in Attitudes toward L2 Speakers 
were selected for the analysis. This step satisfied the first column in Table 6.16 (i.e., positive 
explicit attitudes). Second, these learners were then divided based on a median-split of their 
L2 Speakers ST-IAT scores. This two-step procedure generated learners with positive–
positive scores (i.e., congruent) and learners with positive–negative scores (i.e., incongruent). 
The same procedure was followed to obtain congruent and incongruent learners in terms of 
implicit attitudes toward the course. Just like Study 1, cluster analysis was also conducted to 
validate the results from this procedure.  
 
Table 6.16: Illustration of (in)congruence between explicit and implicit attitudes.  
Explicit Attitudes Implicit Attitudes Type 
Positive Positive Congruent 
Positive Negative Incongruent 
 
A two-way MANCOVA was conducted to determine the effects of L2 Speakers 
Attitudes (congruent vs. incongruent) and L2 Course Attitudes (congruent vs. incongruent) 
on the dependent variables with Social Desirability as a covariate. As above, outlying values 
were removed, and no participant violated multivariate normality. The homogeneity of 
variance–covariance matrices was also assumed, Box’s M = 33.39, F = 1.04, p = .40. Using 
Pillai’s trace, there was a significant main effect of L2 Speakers Attitudes, V = .048, F(4, 
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231) = 2.91, p = .022, 2p = .048. As expected, there was neither an effect of L2 Course 
Attitudes, V = .014, F = 0.80, p = .53, 2p = .014; nor a significant interaction, V = .017, F = 
0.98, p = .422, 2p = .017. There was also a significant main effect of Social Desirability, V = 
.052, F = 3.19, p = .014, 2p = .052. Only Religious Attitudes showed significant 
susceptibility to Social Desirability, F = 8.39, p = .004, 2p = .035.  
The results are shown in Table 6.17. Just like Study 1, congruent learners scored less 
in all of Fear of Assimilation, Ethnocentrism, and Religious Attitudes, indicating more 
openness to the L2 group. Some p-values are slightly over the conventional .05 threshold, but 
it has been argued that it is not critical for replication research to satisfy an arbitrary threshold 
as long as the direction of the effect is maintained (e.g., Anderson & Maxwell, 2016; Nassaji, 
2012).  
 
Table 6.17: MANCOVA results for L2 Speakers Attitudes for congruent (n = 112) and 
incongruent learners (n = 125).  
    Group   EMM SE       F      p 2p 
Fear of Assimilation 
Cong  0.09 0.166 
5.31 .022 .022 182.63 
Incong 0.56 0.116 
       
Ethnocentrism  
Cong  –0.80 0.203 
3.51 .062  
Incong –0.33 0.141 
       
Religious Attitudes 
Cong  0.97 0.149 
3.19 .075 .013 31.68 
Incong 1.29 0.103 
        
Grades 
Cong  5.04 0.345 
5.46 .020 .023 2.75 
Incong 4.06 0.239 
Note. Repeating this analysis without the covariate leads to the same results, with the 
exception that Religious Attitudes drops to non-significance (F = 2.15, p = .144, 2p = .009). 
This indicates that the covariate has increased the estimation efficiency. B = Bayes factor, 
Cong = Congruent, EMM = estimated marginal mean, Incong = Incongruent, SE = standard 
error. Note also that Grades are used here as the full 9-point measure.  
 
Still, that the direction of the effects in this Study are the same as those in Study 1 is 
only suggestive. A more systematic approach is to meta-analytically synthesize the results 
from the two Studies. One way to synthesize the results is to use the Bayes factor. The meta-
analytic Bayes factor can be computed using the following formula (Rouder & Morey, 2011):  
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 𝐵 =
∫ ∏ 𝑃𝑟(𝑡𝑚|𝛿) 𝑓(𝛿)𝑑
𝑀
𝑚=1
∏ 𝑃𝑟(𝑡𝑚|𝛿 = 0)
𝑀
𝑚=1
 (6.6) 
 
where δ is the effect size, tm the t-values from m studies, f the probability density function of 
the Cauchy (a distribution similar to the Normal), and ∏ the product of terms. Although this 
formula looks complicated, it basically computes the likelihood of the observed effect sizes 
(from Studies 1 and 2) given a null effect size constrained to equal zero. Because the result is 
a likelihood, values over 1.0 indicate evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis while 
values under 1.0 indicate evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. Calculation of the Bayes 
factor requires a prior belief about the size of the effect.   
For this Study, the meta-analytic Bayes factor was computed using the BayesFactor R 
package (Morey & Rouder, 2015) using a 0.30 prior. This Bayes factor is computed via 
Gaussian quadrature, with posterior samples drawn via independent candidate Metropolis-
Hastings (the full R code is available in Appendix D). The results, presented in the last 
column of Table 6.17, all exceed 1.0, thus lending support for the hypothesis that congruent 
learners are more open to the L2 group.  
Still, the analysis above was based on a Cauchy prior of 0.30, which is equivalent to a 
standardized effect size (Cohen’s d) of 0.30. Because there is an element of subjectivity in 
choosing the prior, sensitivity analysis was subsequently conducted using both a lower (0.10) 
and a higher (0.50) prior. The results are presented in Table 6.18. The results show that the 
Bayes factor is stable across the different priors and does not drop to 1.0.  
 
Table 6.18: Sensitivity analysis of the stability of the Bayes factors (reported in Table 6.17) 
using three different priors.  
 0.10 Prior 0.30 Prior 0.50 Prior 
Fear of Assimilation    105.82     182.63     174.80 
Ethnocentrism         9.96       12.85       10.90 
Religious Attitudes       21.73       31.68       28.13 
Grades         2.51         2.75         2.29 
 
Tables 6.17 and 6.18 also show that congruent learners obtained significantly higher 
achievement, with the Bayes factor showing support for this hypothesis. The Bayes factor for 
Grades is the lowest, but this is not the meta-analytic Bayes factor (as in the other three 
analyses in Table 6.18) because Study 1 did not have a measure of achievement. Because 
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only one effect size was used here, this Bayes factor has lower power than the other three 
Bayes factors.  
Finally, because the selection procedure used in the above analyses (cf. Table 6.16) 
might seem artificial, a two-step log-likelihood cluster analysis based on the four variables in 
Table 6.18 was conducted on the whole sample. The results readily yielded two clusters with 
a ratio of 1.03. A t-test showed that the cluster showing more explicit openness to the L2 
group also scored significantly higher in the L2 Speakers ST-IAT, t(270) = 2.34, p = .02, d = 
0.28. The meta-analytic Bayes factor, drawing from the male subsample of Study 1, also 
showed substantial support for the hypothesis and was stable across different priors, B0.10 = 
147.14, B0.30 = 234.60, B0.50 = 212.97. The two clusters had equivalent scores on the L2 
Course ST-IAT (d = 0.001). This demonstrates that only implicit attitudes toward L2 
speakers, and not toward the L2 course, are relevant to the affiliation with L2 group. Because 
different results emerge from different implicit test, this pattern supports the validity of the 
scores derived from the implicit test. These results cannot be simply explained away either by 
cognitive confounds (such as working memory capacity or task-switching skills) or social 
confounds (such as taking the test seriously to please the teacher or to appear in a socially 
desirable manner).  
Exploring the Religious Attitudes and Family Support scales 
In Study 1, some analyses were conducted to explore the Religious Attitudes scale, which 
was newly developed for this thesis. This section continues that analysis in order to find out 
whether similar results would be obtained from a different sample studying the L2 in a 
foreign language context. This section then explores the Family Support scale.  
Religious Attitudes. In Study 1, a t-test was conducted to compare those with high 
versus low self-reported religiosity (see Table 6.11). Table 6.19 performs the same analysis 
on the present sample. The results show that learners with low religiosity were also 
significantly lower in Fear of Assimilation and Ethnocentrisms. This lends further support to 
the notion that the Religious Attitudes scale is closely related to intergroup relations. Learners 
with lower religiosity also achieved higher Grades. It is interesting that both Religious 
Attitudes and Ethnocentrism (see Table 6.15) predict success in language learning. This 
suggests that attachment to the L1 community can hamper openness to the L2 community. In 
other words, openness to the L2 community may not be enough at the presence of attachment 
to the L1 community.   
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Table 6.19: Differences between participants with low (n = 153) and high (n = 129) 
religiosity.  
       Scale Religiosity M  SD    t   d         B 
Ideal L2 Self  
Low   2.06 0.87 
2.88* 0.35 1.05 
High   2.34 0.72 
       
Ought-to L2 
Self  
Low   1.99 0.80 
2.13 0.30 1.11 
High   2.20 0.82 
       
Fear of 
Assimilation   
Low   0.07 1.15 
7.14*** 0.85 4.16 × 1015 
High   1.06 1.18 
       
Ethnocentrism  
Low –0.69 1.41 
3.77** 0.44 1.55 × 1017 
High –0.07 1.39 
       
Attitudes to L2 
Speakers  
Low   1.19 0.79 
2.01 0.23 0.43 
High   1.00 0.83 
       
L2 Learning 
Experience   
Low   1.14 1.09 
0.45 0.05 0.74 
High   1.20 1.14 
       
L2 Speaker ST-
IAT 
Low   0.27 0.35 
0.05 0.00 2.00 
High   0.27 0.37 
       
L2 Course ST-
IAT 
Low   0.56 0.34 
0.06 0.00 0.28 
High   0.56 0.33 
       
Family Support 
Low   1.80 0.94 
4.25*** 0.50 581.38 
High   2.21 0.67 
       
Intended Effort  
Low   1.67 0.90 
1.69 0.20 0.91 
High   1.84 0.84 
       
Social 
Desirability  
Low  13.71 3.68 
1.13 0.14 0.47 
High  14.21 3.68 
       
Grades   
Low   4.59 2.51 
3.05* 0.36 13.65 
High   3.71 2.34 
Note. Bonferroni correction implemented.  
* p < .05, *** p = .001 
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Table 6.20: Sensitivity analysis of the stability of the Bayes factors (reported in Table 6.19) 
using three different priors.  
 0.10 Prior 0.30 Prior 0.50 Prior 
Ideal L2 Self  1.51 1.05 0.73 
Ought-to L2 Self  1.58 1.11 0.77 
Fear of Assimilation   1.60 × 1015  4.17 × 1015 5.50 × 1015 
Ethnocentrism  5.87 × 1016 1.55 × 1017 2.08 × 1017 
Attitudes to L2 Speakers  0.78 0.43 0.28 
L2 Learning Experience   1.16 0.74 0.50 
L2 Speaker ST-IAT 2.48 2.00 1.44 
L2 Course ST-IAT 0.57 0.28 0.18 
Family Support 281.34 281.68 628.38 
Intended Effort  1.19 0.91 0.67 
Social Desirability  0.78 0.47 0.32 
Grades   9.40 13.65 12.40 
 
Since this part of the analysis is exploratory, the significance tests reported in Table 
6.19 have been Bonferroni-adjusted. Without this adjustment, any t-value of 1.96 and above 
would have been significant at the .05 level. Thus, the results for the Ought-to L2 Self and 
Attitudes toward L2 Speakers would have been significant. However, whether such 
significant results would be genuine or just a Type I error is not clear. In order to investigate 
this, Table 6.19 also reports the Bayes factors meta-analyzing these results with those from 
Study 1 using a 0.30 prior (the full R code is available in Appendix D). The Bayes factor for 
Attitudes toward L2 Speakers is below 1.0, and so the evidence is against the hypothesis that 
there is any genuine difference between the two groups. The Bayes factor for the Ought-to L2 
Self is above 1.0, but only just so. This raises the questions whether this results is robust. 
Table 6.20 reports a sensitivity analysis to examine the robustness of the Bayes factors with 
different priors. Indeed, the Ought-to L2 Self does drop below 1.0, showing that this result is 
not robust.  
It is also rather unexpected that learners with high religiosity reported higher Ideal L2 
Selves and Family Support. However, before attempting to interpret these results, it is 
important to establish their robustness first. Although the Ideal L2 Self has passed the 
Bonferroni correction and remained significant—and with a moderate effect size—combining 
the results from the two Studies leads to questioning the robustness this result. The sensitivity 
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analysis in Table 6.20 shows that the Bayes factors for the Ideal L2 Self drop below 1.0. 
Thus, caution must be exercised before claiming that learners with higher Religious Attitudes 
have higher Ideal L2 Selves. On the other hand, the Bayes factors for Family Support are 
large and stable. This leads to more confidence in this finding.  
The same applies to Grades. The Bayes factors for Grades are relatively stable across 
priors. As for Fear of Assimilation and Ethnocentrisms, the Bayes factors are extremely large. 
Tables 6.19 and 6.20 report the Bayes factors for these two scales in scientific notation 
because the values would be too large to report in the tables. Fear of Assimilation, for 
example, has a Bayes factor with 16 digits!  
Note that the last five variables Table 6.20 were not included in Study 1, and so the 
Bayes factors reported here represent the likelihoods of these results only, rather than a meta-
analysis. This leads to lower power, since the more studies are included the higher the power. 
Despite this, Grades and Family Support still obtained large and stable results.  
Family Support. The above exploratory analyses, as well as RQ 1, examined the 
Family Support scale using t-tests. The results above have shown that Family Support is 
associated with lower Grades and higher Religious Attitudes. In order to examine these 
findings more closely, this final part of the analysis investigated the correlational patterns of 
Family Support with the other attitudinal and motivational variables. The results are shown in 
Table 6.21.  
The first two columns of the table report the correlations of the variables with Family 
Support for low and high achievers, respectively. The last column tests whether the 
magnitude of the difference between each pair of correlation coefficients is statistically 
significant. These results show that low achievers tended to associate Family Support with 
their Ideal L2 Selves and their L2 Learning Experience more strongly than did high 
achievers. This suggests that low achievers are more susceptible to external influences. High 
achievers, on the other hand, probably developed their Ideal L2 Selves and enjoyed the 
learning situation regardless of whether there was pressure to do so. This implies a level of 
autonomy on the part of high achievers.  
The pattern reverses, however, for L2 Speakers ST-IAT (i.e., implicit attitudes toward 
L2 speakers). High achievers’ implicit attitudes were associated more strongly with Family 
Support than it is the case for their low-achieving counterparts. Family Support for high 
achievers is reflected on implicit, not explicit, attitudes. This might imply that Family 
Support for high achievers goes ‘deeper’ and reaches implicit attitudes, rather than remaining 
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at a more ‘superficial’ level. Still, because these are exploratory analyses, it is imperative for 
future research to validate them before any firm conclusions can be made.  
 
Table 6.21: Correlation of motivational scales with Family Support for low (n = 134) and 
high achievers (n = 140).  
       Scale     rLow    rHigh    z 
Ideal L2 Self   .43***   .14† 2.62** 
L2 Learning Experience    .31***   .11 1.75† 
Intended Effort   .24**   .15† 0.75 
Ought-to L2 Self   .20*   .15† 0.45 
Attitudes to L2 Speakers   .10   .05 0.40 
L2 Speakers ST-IAT   .05   .28*** 1.92† 
Note. All hypotheses two-tailed.  
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01; † p < .10. 
 
6.3.3 Discussion 
Study 2 has reported the first investigation in the L2 field examined language achievement in 
the context of implicit attitudes, and the results show that implicit attitudes toward L2 
speakers successfully predict L2 achievement. This prediction involved explaining unique 
variance of L2 achievement, over and above that explained by the other explicit variables, 
thus indicating that this relationship is not mediated by any of these explicit variables. This 
pattern supports the unconscious nature of the scores derived from the implicit test.  
Study 2 also replicated the results of Study 1, showing that explicit–implicit 
congruence is associated with more openness to the L2 community. That this effect was 
present only for implicit attitudes toward L2 speakers, rather than toward the L2 course, 
indicates that these results were not mere artifacts of the learner’s cognitive skill or interest in 
the test, thus lending support to the implicit attitudes construct.  
More concretely, Study 2 has attempted to answer two research questions. The first 
concerned comparing the motivational profiles of high and low achievers, and the second 
investigated the replicability of Study 1 results. The results of the first research question 
showed that implicit attitudes toward L2 speakers were a positive predictor of L2 
achievement. This is in line with the long-held view that learning an L2 successfully is 
facilitated by a positive disposition toward the speakers of the target language. However, it 
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was implicit, not explicit, attitudes that predicted L2 achievement. The fact that explicit 
attitudes did not show any predictive validity should not be surprising. For example, Gardner 
(1985, 2010) places integrativeness farther away from achievement, mediated by motivation. 
Integrativeness is seen as a supporting factor of motivation, rather than a direct predictor of 
achievement. On the other hand, implicit attitudes toward L2 speakers did predict 
achievement directly, and did so over and above the other explicit variables. This suggests 
that, when it comes to attitudes toward L2 speakers, implicit attitudes may be more powerful 
than explicit attitudes.  
The second variable that predicted L2 achievement was explicit attitudes toward the 
L2 course. In fact, this variable had the largest effect size. Indeed, the classroom is the 
primary contact between the learner and the educational content, and this contact is sustained 
throughout the academic year. It is therefore reasonable that success in L2 learning is 
associated with favorable attitudes toward the L2 course. Note however that attitudes toward 
the L2 course were operationalized here using a semantic differential scale. This was not an 
intentional deviation from the standard approach in the field. A semantic differential scale 
was used only for the purpose of having an explicit scale that is parallel to the implicit test. 
That is, the same bipolar adjectives were used to measure explicit and implicit attitudes 
toward the L2 course. Indeed, semantic differential scales do have some interesting 
properties. A study by Friborg, Martinussen, and Rosenvinge (2006) provides interesting 
insights in this context. Friborg et al. compared the psychometric properties of two versions a 
resilience scale, one Likert-based and the other sematic differential-based. Their sample was 
also university students, thus making it comparable to the sample in this thesis. Their results 
showed that the semantic differential-based version exhibited superior psychometric 
properties. The factor structure of the semantic differential scale outperformed the Likert 
scale in terms model fit and unidimensionality. The researchers explain their results by 
arguing that Likert scales raise the risk of acquaintance bias, while semantic differential 
scales increase complexity and the cognitive load required from individuals responding to the 
questionnaire items. The next chapter addresses this scale in more detail and reinterprets its 
results in light of unconscious motivation.  
A negative predictor of L2 achievement turned out to be parental support (for similar 
results, see Lamb, 2012, Table 9). It seems rather counterintuitive that parental support is 
associated with lower achievement. A likely explanation is that when parents see their 
children struggling in school, they start offering them more support. From this perspective, 
underachievement becomes the causal factor in this relationship. Another interesting insight 
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emerged from the correlational patterns of family support with the other motivational 
variables. Namely, low achievers had stronger correlations between family support and each 
of the ideal L2 self and the L2 learning experience. That high achievers did not exhibit this 
pattern might suggest that they had dissociated these two factors from parental influence. 
They for example enjoyed learning regardless of whether their parents proactively 
encouraged them to do so. These explanations are speculative, and further research should 
investigate them more closely.  
Another negative predictor of L2 achievement was the ought-to L2 self. This variable 
has not shown consistent results in previous research (e.g., Dörnyei & Chan, 2013; You et al., 
2016). This might be explained by the fact that the ought-to L2 self represents an external 
image that it not fully internalized by the learner. Learning a foreign language is a long-term 
enterprise that requires a substantial amount of investment. An external factor may not be 
sufficient to support successful learning. That is, “while [ought-to selves] do play a role in 
shaping the learners’ motivational mindset, in many language contexts they lack the 
energising force to make a difference in actual motivated learner behaviours by themselves” 
(Dörnyei & Chan, 2013, p. 454).  
The intended effort scale demonstrated susceptibility to social desirability. This 
suggests a potential limitation in this variable. Social desirability indicates that the 
individuals inflate their responses in order to present themselves in a favorable light. 
Individuals who score higher in the social desirability scale tend to also score higher in the 
intended effort scale. This might be because intended effort reflect an intention to conform to 
social norms. The items reflect intentions that are admired by the society, such as “I am 
prepared to expend a lot of effort in learning English.” It seems that individuals high in social 
desirability tend to be influenced by social pressures in their responses, rather than simply 
reporting their own feelings and impressions. Therefore, researchers may need to control for 
social desirability before being able to interpret responses to this scale.  
The two implicit tests yielded different patterns of the results, thus the content of the 
two tests made a difference. Scores from the implicit test concerned with L2 speakers showed 
an associated with explicit attitudes toward L2 speakers, but scores from the other implicit 
test—concerned with the L2 course—did not. This lends support to the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the implicit test. That is, explicit and implicit scores converged when 
they were related to L2 speakers (convergent validity), and diverged when one was related to 
L2 speakers and the other to the L2 course (discriminant validity).  
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An interesting finding is that the implicit test related to the L2 course did not exhibit 
any associations, even with explicit attitudes toward the L2 course. This suggests that explicit 
attitudes may not always have implicit counterparts in every domain. Implicit attitudes are 
thought to develop through exposure from the milieu. That is, when the individual is exposed 
to messages from others (even if these messages are subtle and indirect), one would develop 
implicit attitudes. This happens even if one declares the opposite attitude explicitly. It is 
possible that the L2 course may not receive consistent messages, positive or negative, in the 
context of this Study.  
Another possible interpretation is that the ‘L2 course’ is an abstract entity that does 
not warrant the development of implicit attitudes. Implicit attitudes might tend to develop in 
rather sensitive areas. In the seminal paper introducing the Implicit Association Test, 
Greenwald et al. (1998) state that the potential value of the test is in measuring “significant 
automatic associations” (p. 1465). In a similar vein, in their review of the Implicit 
Association Test, Nosek et al. (2007) explain that the test has the “potential for revealing 
disquieting aspects about human minds” (p. 286). Therefore, implicit attitudes might be more 
salient in socially sensitive domains.  
Finally, the research presented in this thesis has demonstrated the importance of 
replicating research results and then systematically meta-analyzing them. It also has shown 
the importance of conducting sensitivity analysis in order to examine the robustness of the 
results. For example, the results in this thesis show that the relationship between explicit–
implicit congruence and openness to the L2 group is robust and holds in more than one 
context. On the other hand, the results from Study 2 first suggested that higher ideal L2 self is 
associated with higher religiosity, which was rather unexpected. However, the sensitivity 
analysis showed that this finding is not robust enough, and so it should not be over-
interpreted. Admittedly, our field has not shown keen interest in systematically replicating 
and meta-analyzing findings, probably because this requires somewhat advanced knowledge 
of statistical analysis. However, this is an essential step that we need to take for the sake of 
developing a cumulative science.   
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Chapter 7: General Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 A true test of any theoretical formulation is not only its ability to explain and account for 
phenomena which have been demonstrated, but also its ability to provide suggestions  
for further investigations, to raise new questions, to promote further developments  
and open new horizons  
—Gardner (1985, p. 166) 
 
7.1 Introduction  
Chapter 6 has presented two studies testing a series of research questions related to language 
learning motivation in light of unconscious motivation. The aim of this chapter is to 
summarize the main results of this thesis and attempt to link them to existing language 
motivation theory and findings. The discussion is organized based on the four main 
components of the L2 MSS: the ideal L2 self, the ought-to L2 self, the L2 learning 
experience, and intended effort. After that, the discussion moves to highlight the implications 
of the present thesis to the role of attachment to the L1 community. Finally, some limitations 
and possible future directions are highlighted.   
7.2 Summary of findings and general discussion  
The overall goal of the research presented in this thesis has been to gain a better 
understanding of the role of implicit attitudes in language learning and motivation. This 
research was conducted to investigate various aspects related to implicit attitudes, while 
recruiting a fairly large sample. Study 1 investigated a number of research questions, and then 
Study 2 successfully replicated some of the results and extended them. Study 2 also involved 
additional controls, including social desirability as an explicit control and a second implicit 
test as an implicit control.  
While conventional language motivation theories tend to paint a one-dimensional 
picture according to which learners vary along one (conscious) dimension, the results in this 
thesis point to the possibility of classifying learners along two dimensions: conscious and 
unconscious. As reviewed in Chapter 3, most motivational theories are not, in principle, 
opposed to an unconscious facet of motivation. Instead, the reason behind the predominance 
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of self-report measures such as questionnaires and interviews mostly has to do with the 
paucity of instruments that could easily tap into unconscious phenomena.  
The present research has used two tests of implicit attitudes, the Implicit Association 
Test (Greenwald et al., 1998) and the Single-Target Implicit Association Test (Wigboldus et 
al., 2004). Despite the ambiguity of the scores derived from the Implicit Association Test (cf. 
Chapter 5), the results from the two tests are very similar. In fact, the Single-Target Implicit 
Association Test seems weaker. That is, although the two Studies had equivalent sample 
sizes, the Single-Target Implicit Association Test was only marginally significant (see Table 
6.17), suggesting that the Implicit Association Test might be more sensitive. In any case, 
these results are encouraging, in that convenient and easy-to-use instruments seem to offer 
insights into aspects of learners’ attitudes that explicit self-report may not easily capture. 
These implicit tests require only around five minutes of a button pressing exercise that most 
research participants find enjoyable and entertaining, more like a game than a ‘test’.  
At the same time, it has to be emphasized that such implicit measures are not intended 
to be a replacement of self-report measures. As reviewed in Chapter 2, most scholars still 
give agency to conscious thought. According to these scholars, studying human motivation is 
somewhat analogous to the job of a doctor evaluating a patient’s health. It would be 
unreasonable for the doctor to either rely solely on the patient’s conscious self-report about 
her health, or to disregard it completely. Doctors normally need to complement self-reports 
with additional checks using specialized instruments (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2009). Thus, a 
more moderate perspective would encourage researchers to draw from unconscious 
motivation in order to assess “individual difference dimensions for which self-report 
measures are insensitive” (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001, p. 91). The following sections discuss 
the main implications of the findings in more detail.   
7.2.1 The ideal L2 self 
The results of this thesis show that the ideal L2 self could not predict L2 achievement. In the 
context of intended effort, previous empirical research has supported the predictive validity 
of the ideal L2 self, with the results being “straightforward” (Dörnyei & Ushioda, 2011, p. 
87), and providing “solid confirmation” (Dörnyei, 2009b, p. 31) in that “the emerging picture 
consistently supports [its] validity” (Dörnyei, 2014b, p. 521).  
On the other hand, in line with the results of this thesis, the predictive validity of the 
ideal L2 self in the context of actual achievement has been less conclusive. A number of 
studies have also found null results when they examined the relationship between the ideal L2 
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self and actual achievement or performance. For example, Kim and Kim (2011) have 
investigated the motivation of Korean secondary school students and found that the ideal L2 
self could not predict school grades. The researchers note that “being motivated by 
developing a vivid ideal L2 self through a dominant visual preference seems to be irrelevant 
to the level of academic achievement” (p. 36). Similarly, Lamb (2012) used a C-test as a 
measure of L2 proficiency and found that the ideal L2 self could not predict achievement in 
any of his three groups. MacIntyre and Serroul (2015) also tested the relationship of the ideal 
L2 self and actual L2 performance in their idiodynamic paradigm, which examines individual 
motivational variability on a per-second timescale. In line with the findings of this thesis, 
MacIntyre and Serroul (2015) found “no evidence” (p. 126) that the ideal L2 self is 
associated with idiodynamic ratings. In one study (Moskovsky, Assulaimani, Racheva, & 
Harkins, 2016), the ideal L2 self was a negative predictor of language achievement. The 
researchers argue that, overall, the results “at best indicate a tenuous link between the self 
guides and achievement” (Moskovsky et al., 2016, p. 650). 
At first sight, these results might seem to suggest that the ideal L2 self has failed to 
explain language achievement. However, a more likely explanation of these mixed results has 
to do with how the ideal L2 self is currently operationalized. That is, the most common 
method of operationalizing the ideal L2 self currently is to use Likert statements in the order 
of ‘I can imagine myself…’. However, this approach does not do justice to the complexity of 
the ideal L2 self. Since it was initially introduced, the ideal L2 self has come with a set of 
conditions that need to be satisfied in order for it to be effective (Dörnyei, 2009b). These 
conditions include perceived desirability, accessibility, plausibility, and present–future 
discrepancy, harmony with the ought-to self, and being offset by a feared L2 self. Without 
satisfying these conditions, the ideal L2 self has never been expected to be effective in the 
first place (cf. Henry & Cliffordson, 2015; Hessel, 2015). The above empirical studies have 
not involved additional measures to ensure that these conditions are satisfied. Thus, although 
the results have so far been inconclusive, they should not be seen as detracting from the 
potential contribution the ideal L2 self can make to our understanding of L2 motivation.  
7.2.2 The ought-to L2 self 
The results of this thesis show that the ought-to L2 self is a negative predictor of L2 
achievement. This finding is in line with previous research showing that the ought-to L2 self 
yields inconsistent results (see Dörnyei & Chan, 2013; You et al., 2016). One possible 
explanation is that the ought-to self, by definition, is concerned with meeting the expectations 
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of others. Therefore, they represent “someone else’s vision for the individual” (Dörnyei, 
2009b, p. 14), and so “ought self-guides function more like minimal goals” (Higgins, 1998, p. 
5). Consequently, “while [ought-to selves] do play a role in shaping the learners’ 
motivational mindset, in many language contexts they lack the energising force to make a 
difference in actual motivated learner behaviours by themselves” (Dörnyei & Chan, 2013, p. 
454). Dörnyei and Chan (2013) go on to explain that “while the participants perceived the 
external pressures on them as being valid and did intend to adjust their behavior accordingly, 
this intended effort was not manifested in their actual grades” (p. 454, original emphasis). In 
line with the suggestion that it concerns minimal goals, the ought-to L2 self has been shown 
to be associated with the less internalized, preventive forms of motivation (see Dörnyei & 
Ushioda, 2011, p. 86; Taguchi et al., 2009). As the name suggests, minimal goals are those 
that the learner wants to achieve only minimally rather than thoroughly. Unsurprisingly, such 
minimal goals are less likely to sustain engagement in learning and enthusiasm in the long 
run.  
One possible way to address this limitation of the ought-to L2 self is by expanding its 
scope. That is, rather than conceptualizing the ought-to self as a monolithic construct 
concerned primarily with minimal goals, it might be conceptualized along a continuum of 
internalization (cf. Lanvers, 2016). Some motivational theories posit external influences with 
different gradation. For example, in Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2002), 
extrinsic motivation falls along four degrees of internalization. The least internalized (called 
external regulation) concerns engaging in an activity simply to obtain a certain reward or 
avoid punishment. Beyond that, external influences in Self-Determination Theory may be 
perceived as valuable to significant others and so they acquire self-esteem implication 
(introjected regulation), may facilitate attainment of other self-defining values (identified 
regulation), or may be perceived as consistent with one’s sense of self and its values 
(integrated regulation). There is some evidence that the more internalized forms of extrinsic 
motivation are associated positively with L2 achievement, while the less internalized forms 
are associated negatively with it (e.g., Wang, 2008). In fact, the more internalized forms of 
extrinsic motivation have been found to outperform even intrinsic motivation in predicting 
educational outcomes (e.g., Joe, Hiver, & Al-Hoorie, 2017; Noels, 2009). In contrast, since 
the ought-to L2 self is conceptualized as an external force that is not internalized, it functions 
more like an “imported image” (Dörnyei & Ryan, 2015, p. 88) reflecting “social pressures 
coming from the learner’s environment” (Dörnyei, 2014a, p. 8) to perform “the duties and 
obligations imposed by friends, parents and other authoritative figures” (Dörnyei, 2009b, p. 
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32, emphasis added). It is therefore not surprising that it exhibits a negative association with 
L2 achievement. Indeed, Mackay (2014, p. 394) reports that some of her participants 
construed external pressures to learn the language as a demotivating factor.  
In the context of languages other than English (LOTEs), it is highly conceivable that a 
less homogeneous ought-to L2 self is in operation (see Dörnyei & Al-Hoorie, in press). This 
is because learning a LOTE does not usually receive as much societal and institutional 
support as does learning English. Some languages receive support, others receive 
indifference, and yet others might even receive opposition and active discouragement. This 
suggests an inter-language heterogeneity in the ought-to L2 self. In fact, even in the context 
of learning a global language like English, it is also conceivable that the ought-L2 self is not 
homogenous. In a study by Dörnyei and Chan (2013), factor analysis uncovered two, rather 
than just one, dimensions underlying the ought-to L2 self. The researchers therefore 
concluded that, “in light of the ambiguities that have surfaced with regard to the ought-to self, 
it would have been better to apply more elaborate scales targeting different types of external 
pressures separately… instead of using a single ought-to self scale” (p. 456).  
Still, an important consideration in broadening the scope of the ought-to L2 self is that 
it would constitute an explicit departure from Higgins’s original conceptualization of ought 
self-guides as only ‘minimal’ goals. This departure is not a problem per se, but it should be 
debated whether this gradation should be still treated as part of the ought-to L2 self or the 
ideal L2 self. After all, if it is internalized to some extent, why is it still an ought? Many 
‘ideals’ have also originated from socialization process and then internalized. This may lead 
to an arbitrary distinction between ideal and ought-to L2 selves.  
Furthermore, describing a construct as an ought, despite it being internalized to some 
extent, raises the risk of downplaying its potential in the research community. Although this 
might appear as a mere semantic issue, Brophy (2009) argues that Self-Determination Theory 
has suffered from “lingering constraints” (p. 151), in that too much focus has been paid to 
intrinsic motivation at the expense of the highly self-determined forms of ‘extrinsic’ 
motivation. As mentioned above, it does not help that empirical evidence shows that the latter 
can be a better predictor of educational outcomes than intrinsic motivation (e.g., Joe et al., 
2017; Noels, 2009).  
Some L2 scholars still argue that this gradation should be part of the ought-to L2 self. 
In Taylor’s (2013) words,  
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The [L2 MSS] model also dismisses much of the influence of the ought-to self on the 
individual’s motivation and self development. In Dörnyei’s view (2009: 32), “because 
the source of the second component of the system, the Ought-to L2 Self, is external to 
the learner… this future self-guide does not lend itself to obvious motivational 
practices.” This is contrary both to a considerable body of literature showing that 
socially induced possible selves can enhance school persistence and academic 
achievement… and to the experience of all of us who have ever done anything 
because we felt we should, rather than because we really wanted to. (Taylor, 2013, p. 
32) 
 
In this quote, Taylor refers to the fact that the ought-to L2 self has yielded few classroom 
applications. However, there is at least one aspect that might have practical implications, 
namely a lack of discrepancy between the ideal and ought-to selves. This is what Hadfield 
and Dörnyei (2013) describe as “aligning the future selves” (p. 8). This unification can be 
achieved by trying to bring together these two self-guides so that they function in harmony.  
In line with the results of this thesis, it might be possible to postulate a further 
condition for the effectiveness of self-guides, namely a lack of discrepancy between the 
explicit and implicit dimensions of these self-guides. According to the results of this thesis, 
explicit–implicit congruence was associated with more openness to the L2 community. In a 
similar vein, it is conceivable that a positive ideal or ought-to disposition might be 
undermined when the implicit disposition is less positive. Success in long-term pursuits is 
facilitated by explicit–implicit congruence because the individual can harness both (explicit) 
proactive organization of goals, as well as (implicit) spontaneous inclination to keep pursuing 
these goals (Thrash et al., 2010). 
7.2.3 Intended effort 
This scale and its variations (e.g., motivated behavior) have been used extensively recently as 
a primary criterion measure in validating the L2 MSS. In fact, the original argument in favor 
of the L2 MSS equates self-reported intended effort with the criterion measure: “The Ideal L2 
Self was consistently found to correlate highly with the criterion measure (Intended effort), 
explaining 42% of the variance” (Dörnyei, 2009b, p. 31). However, little attention has been 
paid to validity of this scale in the first place, which is obviously an equally important issue. 
In the present research, intended effort has emerged as a poor predictor of actual achievement 
(r = .00, see Table 6.11). There are a number of possible explanations for this outcome.  
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One possibility is that self-report rating, by nature, is a crude estimate that is 
incapable of eliciting precise responses. This explanation is reminiscent of an early study by 
McClelland and Atkinson (1948), who compared the self-reported hunger of participants who 
had abstained from eating for one hour, four hours, or 16 hours. Although the last condition 
would certainly lead to the most hunger, the researchers found that self-reported hunger could 
not distinguish it from the four-hour condition (though their implicit test did), and thus self-
ratings provided “a less sensitive index” (McClelland, 1987, p. 188). It seems that standard 
self-report measures are unable to capture subtleties beyond a certain threshold (e.g., learners 
with high vs. very high intended effort), and so most respondents tend to simply mark 
‘Strongly Agree’ on the questionnaire. More recently, Zogmaister, Perugini, and Richetin 
(2016) obtained similar results for both hunger and thirst using the Implicit Association Test, 
with implicit scores showing more sensitivity to motivational states. Other studies also found 
this effect in relation to smoking (S. J. Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson, & Chassin, 2003) and 
unfinished goal pursuit (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). In reviewing research that has compared 
self-reports with objective measures of actual behavior, Back and Vazire (2012) report low to 
moderate correlations and conclude that “there are substantial blind spots in personality self-
views when it comes to predicting actual behavior” (pp. 138–139).  
Another possible reason for the poor predictive validity of intended effort is simpler. 
Common sense suggests that intended effort should not function as a consistent and reliable 
predictor of achievement in classroom settings. For example, it is possible that some learners 
will express lower levels of intended effort because they believe they would obtain higher 
grades (e.g., confidence in one’s ability to pass the test of a particular course). On the other 
hand, some low achievers might express higher intended effort because they realize they are 
in danger of failing, thus trying to do too much too late. The dynamics of academic 
achievement thus seem very different from the dynamics of general ‘L2 proficiency’, and in 
some circumstances it seems naïve to expect a straightforward link between intended effort 
and academic achievement. A similar view has been expressed by Gardner (2007), who 
argues that there are two distinct types of motivation. The first type is language learning 
motivation, and it concerns a general interest in learning the L2 and is relatively stable over 
time. The other type is classroom learning motivation, which is highly influenced by various 
factors, such as the teacher, the course content, and the class atmosphere (see also 
Moskovsky et al., 2016, p. 651, for a similar view). Because classroom motivation is dynamic 
and changing all the time, using a one-off intended effort scale is unlikely to do justice to it.  
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Finally, intended effort also showed a high level of susceptibility to social desirability. 
Self-report measures vary in the extent to which they are susceptible to social desirability 
(Chan, 2009), and intended effort turned out to be the most highly susceptible scale to it. This 
is in line with findings reported earlier by Gardner and Gliksman (1982) in relation to 
‘motivational intensity’ in the Attitude/Motivation Test Battery. Adding a control like social 
desirability to the statistical model serves to increase the efficiency of the estimate 
(Rutherford, 2000, p. 105) by reducing standard errors without a substantial change in effect 
size. While this procedure was effective in the case of the religious attitudes scale, it did not 
help intended effort. This adds to its problematic nature. 
Finally, it is not uncommon for people to make serious ‘intentions’ but then never 
actually act upon them. A good example is New Year’s resolutions. Every year, people make 
resolutions for the new year, but few follow them through. According to research by the 
University of Scranton, only 8% of people are successful in achieving their New Year’s 
resolutions (Statistic Brain, 2016). It is therefore easier said than done, as the saying goes.  
7.2.4 The L2 learning experience 
This thesis found that the L2 learning experience to be the strongest predictor of 
achievement. Some previous research has also shown that the learning situation is the best 
predictor of L2 achievement (e.g., Lamb, 2012), as well as being one of the most dynamic 
constructs in L2 motivation (e.g., MacIntyre & Serroul, 2015). However, rather than 
celebrating these positive results, this section evaluates them critically and concludes that 
their interpretation is not as straightforward as it might seem.  
Although the role of the learning context has been recognized for decades (e.g., 
Gardner, 1979), it is unfortunate that this is probably the least theorized aspect in L2 
motivation theory. For example, Dörnyei (2009b) has described the L2 learning experience as 
the “situated, ‘executive’ motives” (p. 29) and “the causal dimension” (Dörnyei, 2005, p. 
106). However, little work has been done since then to clarify the role of such executive 
motives and the mechanisms underlying their causal effect. In contrast to this, Gardner has 
repeatedly expressed skepticism about any direct effect the learning situation might have. For 
example, Gardner (2007) presented the results of two studies on language learners from 
Catalonia showing that the relationship between attitudes toward the learning situation and 
achievement is either small or non-significant. Commenting on these weak results, Gardner 
states,  
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one would expect that in cooperative classes with an experienced and skilled teacher 
and good teaching materials, etc., that students would have more favourable attitudes 
toward the situation and thus would learn more English and thus get higher grades. 
One could hypothesize any number of reasons for this result, but the simple truth is 
that we obtain similar [weak] results in many of our studies, some of which use grades 
as the measure of language proficiency while some use other indices of achievement 
as well. (Gardner, 2007, p. 17)  
 
Elsewhere, Gardner has elaborated on the relationship between the learning situation and 
achievement, explaining that the relationship is not direct but mediated by motivation. In 
Gardner’s words,  
 
integrativeness and attitudes toward the learning situation are seen as supports for 
motivation, but it is motivation that is responsible for achievement in the second 
language. Someone may demonstrate high levels of integrativeness and/or very 
positive attitudes toward the learning situation, but if these are not linked with 
motivation to learn the language, they will not be particularly highly related to 
achievement. (Gardner, 2010, p. 91) 
 
Indeed, this seems like a reasonable view. However, two issues can be raised here. First, is 
this relationship mediated by conscious motivation only? And second, is this relationship 
causal?  
Regarding the first point, there seems to be no reason to limit the mediation to 
conscious motivation. In line with this possibility, the results in this thesis show that the 
effect of the L2 learning experience was not mediated by intended effort, a scale that is 
comparable to the motivated behavior scale in Gardner’s framework. This leads to the 
speculation that more ‘unintended’ mediators might also be playing a role, such as increased 
cognitive attention during enjoyable learning lessons. Such unintended motivated behavior 
triggered by particular situational cues may be too subtle to be detectable and self-reportable. 
In fact, according to Bargh and colleagues,  
 
one important reason for the observed power of the situation in determining behavior 
is that the mere, passive perception of environmental events directly triggers higher 
mental processes in the absence of any involvement by conscious, intentional 
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processes… In other words, much of the power of situational and contextual stimuli 
comes from the direct, automatic, and unconscious effect they have over social 
behavior, an effect relatively independent from that of their dual-process partner, 
conscious processes. (Bargh et al., 2010, p. 288) 
 
From this perspective, learning motivation may be unconsciously activated by the 
mere presence of motivationally-charged stimuli in the environment that are not even 
‘noticed’ by learners. A number of studies have lent support to this possibility. For example, 
Stajkovic, Locke, and Blair (2006) conducted two experiments and found that ‘assigned 
conscious goals’ and ‘primed unconscious goals’ both enhanced task performance. 
Interestingly, the researchers also found an interaction between the two goals, in that when 
both conscious and unconscious goals were activated at the same time, unconscious goals 
improved the performance to achieve the conscious goals. Again, this points to the facilitative 
property of explicit–implicit congruence. In another study, Radel et al. (2013) exposed their 
participants to a ‘barely audible’ conversation (i.e., just above the auditory threshold) to 
which the participants could not have attended because they were engaged in a cognitively 
demanding task. When this conversation was about an intrinsically motivating activity 
reflecting enjoyment and satisfaction, the participants’ motivation was automatically 
activated so that they consistently outperformed their control counterparts both in solvable 
tasks and in perseverance in unsolvable ones. The authors argue that studies successfully 
eliciting unconscious motivation through situational cues have yielded “indisputable 
evidence” (Radel et al., 2013, p. 763). These findings support the view that unconscious 
motivation can mediate the relationship between aspects of the learning situation and 
learning.  
Regarding the second question, whether the relationship is causal, this has simply 
been taken for granted in the field. For example, structural equation modeling studies posit a 
causal relationship (represented by an arrow from the learning situation to the outcome 
variables). Whether the results show that this relationship is strong or weak, is it causal in the 
first place? Many experienced teachers would probably tell you that enjoyment of the course 
and learning from it are two different things. If anything, the relationship can sometimes be 
negative, especially in cases where effective learning requires sweat and tears. Many 
experienced teachers would also downplay the value of end-of-course ‘student satisfaction 
surveys’ administered at many institutions around the world (such student satisfaction 
surveys are comparable to ‘attitudes toward the learning situation’ used in motivation 
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research). Are the students the best judges of teaching and of course effectiveness? Put 
differently, if the student enjoys the course and then expresses positive attitudes toward the 
learning situation (whether in course evaluation forms or in motivation research 
questionnaires), can we conclude that s/he has actually learned from the course?  
Research shows the answer to this question is in the negative. A number of 
experimental studies conducted in different contexts around the world—including Italy 
(Braga, Paccagnella, & Pellizzari, 2014), France (Boring, 2015), and the United States (J. 
Arbuckle & Williams, 2003; Carrell & West, 2010; MacNell, Driscoll, & Hunt, 2015)—have 
demonstrated that student satisfaction with the course is biased (based on objective measures) 
and is negatively correlated with success in subsequent, more advanced courses. In other 
words, students who report enjoying the learning situation more are the ones who have 
probably learned less from it!  
It is indeed a conundrum that the results from experimental research show a negative 
relationship between the learning situation and actual learning, while the results from studies 
in our field (which are typically observational, including this thesis) show a positive 
relationship. For example, a meta-analysis by Masgoret and Gardner (2003) that involved 75 
studies and 10,489 participants in total shows the correlation between attitudes toward the 
learning situation and grades is r = .24, which is equivalent to d = .49. This is a positive 
relationship with a magnitude approaching moderate. Now, if student rating of the course has 
little to do with learning from it, how do we explain this positive relationship?  
When results from experimental and observational studies are in conflict, priority 
goes with experimental studies. Since the vast majority of studies in our field (again, 
including this thesis) are observational, there is always the risk of confounds. Beleche and 
colleagues point out the need for caution in interpreting observations studies:  
 
The positive association between grades and course evaluations may also reflect 
initial student ability and preferences, instructor grading leniency, or even a favorable 
meeting time, all of which may translate into higher grades and greater student 
satisfaction with the course, but not necessarily to greater learning. (Beleche, Fairris, 
& Marks, 2012, p. 709) 
 
When Beleche et al. (2012) controlled for these confounds, they found that the relationship of 
course evaluation with achievement in that course was very small in magnitude (βs = .054–
.065) and was nonsignificant with achievement in the subsequent course. These findings led 
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the researchers to the recommendation that “it may be prudent for institutions wishing to 
capture the extent of knowledge transmission in the classroom to explore measures beyond 
student course evaluations” (p. 718).  
This should be sobering. Could it be that the positive results we have obtained over 
the past decades represent such confounds rather than a genuine relationship between course 
evaluation and actual learning? Inasmuch as these studies were observational and did not 
control for these confounds, this possibility cannot be ruled out. To make things even worse, 
Beleche et al. (2012) did not control for all potential confounds biasing course evaluations. 
Other potential confounds include the student’s grade expectations, and the teacher’s gender, 
ethnicity, age, and even clothes and attractiveness (for reviews, see Marsh & Roche, 1997; 
Ottoboni, Boring, & Stark, 2016; Stark & Freishtat, 2014). As an illustration of the extent of 
confound in student evaluation, the vice dean of Rutgers University School of Law recently 
sent a mass email to students asking them not to comment on the attire of female professors 
in teacher evaluation forms (Flaherty, 2015). However, is simply ‘telling’ the students to be 
objective going to make student evaluations objective? (If this is the case, then we as 
researchers can also do it.) Results by Ambady and Rosenthal (1993) show that students form 
impressions about their teachers after watching a very brief silent video (less than 30 
seconds), and that these first impressions then predict end-of-course evaluations. Thus, it 
seems individuals simply cannot help forming these attitudes automatically, even if they do 
not intend to. Because of these confounds, it seems impractical for an observational study to 
control for all these potential biases. This is why Ottoboni et al. consider student evaluation 
to be biased beyond adjustment:  
 
Given the many sources of bias in SET [student evaluations of teaching] and the 
variability in magnitude of the bias by topic, item, student gender, and so on, as a 
practical matter it is impossible to adjust for biases to make SET a valid, useful 
measure of teaching effectiveness. (Ottoboni et al., 2016, p. 10)  
 
These results are disconcerting. They raise doubts about a motivational component 
that language motivation theories have included for decades. This component is originally 
found in Gardner’s (1985, 2010) Integrative Motive under the title attitudes toward the 
learning situation, which is comprised of evaluation of the teacher and evaluation of the 
course. These are posited to have a causal effect in the model (e.g., Gardner, 2000). Since 
then, this component has appeared in different theories under various guises (e.g., Dörnyei, 
165 
 
2005, 2009b; Noels, 2001; Ushioda, 2001). In all these theories, the association between the 
learning situation and language learning is considered causal.  
However, it is not an unusual experience for the learner to get the ‘impression’ that 
they have learned the subject well, but to subsequently discover that there were gaps in their 
knowledge that they were not aware of. This misleading impression of mastery can happen 
for many reasons, including a teacher with a charismatic personality and an entertaining 
approach.  
Evidence of this misleading impression has been demonstrated graphically in a classic 
experiment titled ‘The Doctor Fox Lecture: A paradigm of educational seduction’ (Naftulin, 
Ware, & Donnelly, 1973). Naftulin et al. invited a professional actor to give a lecture about 
Game Theory (which he knew nothing about). The actor was given a fake name, Dr. Myron 
L. Fox, and was introduced to the unsuspecting audience as an expert in the application of 
mathematics to human behavior. The actor’s lecture involved meaningless, conflicting, and 
irrelevant information, but he exhibited a charismatic personality and sounded authoritative 
while peppering his speech with some humor. Despite the empty content of the lecture, the 
results showed that the audience rated him significantly favorably in that they reported 
having enjoyed the lecture and even learned from it. (In fact, one person even reported that 
s/he had read the speaker’s publications!) Despite these favorable ratings, we can state with 
confidence that no knowledge transmission or learning whatsoever happened in that situation. 
‘Dr. Fox’ simply did not know the material in the first place. The feeling of having learned 
from the lecture is little more than a misattribution. The audience enjoyed the lecture and then 
misattributed this feeling to the informativeness of the lecture, while in fact it may have been 
simply the charismatic and authoritative personality of lecturer that led to this feeling. 
Naftulin et al. (1973) conclude that “student satisfaction with learning may represent little 
more than the illusion of having learned” (p. 630). This is now known as the Dr. Fox effect10.  
The evidence questioning to validity of learners’ attitudes toward the learning 
situation ties in well with the running theme of this thesis concerning the vulnerability of 
reliance on self-report to all sorts of biases. This is therefore another argument against the 
overreliance on self-reports, even if the results are consistently positive. Hence, the findings 
of this thesis in relation to attitudes toward the learning situation should be interpreted with 
 
                                                 
10 In the original experiment, Naftulin et al. videotaped the lecture by ‘Dr. Fox’. Some of its footage is now 
available on YouTube: www.youtube.com/watch?v=RcxW6nrWwtc.  
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extreme caution, especially when it comes to making causal claims. This issue is discussed 
further in the limitations section below.  
7.2.5 Attachment to the L1 community 
One of the first concepts introduced in the language motivation field was the idea of 
integrative motivation (Gardner, 1979, 1985, 2010). According to this concept, L2 learning is 
different from other school subjects in that it is social in nature, and that it is facilitated by 
one’s openness to adopt features of the target language community. That is, integrativeness 
“reflects a genuine interest in learning the second language in order to come closer to the 
other language community” (Gardner, 2001a, p. 5). In recent years, integrative motivation 
has largely fallen out of favor since Global English is no longer associated any specific 
Anglophone community. From the perspective of Global English, also, some integrative and 
instrumental orientations have become hardly distinguishable (Lamb, 2004). For these 
reasons, the general flavor of the field has shifted from integrative motivation to 
identification with “a non-specific global community of English language users” (Ushioda & 
Dörnyei, 2009, p. 3). This is one of the basic assumptions of the L2 MSS.  
Both of these models are therefore in agreement that some level of openness to the L2 
community (according to the integrative motive) or to L2 speakers in general (the ideal L2 
self) is important for successful learning. The results of this thesis do not dispute this idea. 
They suggest that it may not be enough to focus on openness to the L2 community without 
also considering the other side of the coin, namely attachment to the L1 community. In other 
words, it is likely that there is no necessary symmetry in one’s orientation toward the two 
communities; openness to the L2 community can coexist with attachment to the L1 
community. When strong attachment is present, this may lower the effect of existing 
openness to the L2 group. Strong attachment to the L1 community might be motivated by a 
sense of threat to one’s L1 identity. In this case, learners may need a sense of security 
through believing that the L2 does not subtract one’s L1 identity (cf. Lambert, 1973). 
In this study, attachment to the L1 community was operationalized by three scales: 
fear of assimilation, ethnocentrism, and religious attitudes. That implicit attitudes correlated 
negatively with these scales, especially with fear of assimilation, invites speculation on the 
nature of implicit attitudes. Originally, fear of assimilation was investigated primarily in the 
Canadian context, where French speakers were at risk of being assimilated into the dominant 
Anglophone culture (e.g., Clément, 1980). Today, with the unprecedented worldwide spread 
of the English language, fear of assimilation may no longer be confined to minorities living in 
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the shadows of another a dominant group. Many learners around the world probably feel that 
Global English is a form of Westernization invading their cultural distinctiveness (see 
Dörnyei et al., 2006, for an in-depth analysis). According to Giles, Bourhis, and Taylor 
(1977), cultural distinctiveness becomes under threat when ethnolinguistic vitality is 
undermined. Ethnolinguistic vitality depends on three dimensions: language status (such as 
economic, social, and historical), the demography of speakers of the language (including their 
number and their distribution), and the institutional support it receives (both formal and 
informal). Perceived threat to any of these dimensions can raise fear of assimilation into the 
dominant group.  
Thus, fear of assimilation must be conceptualized as a relative construct, one that 
accounts for both openness to the L2 group and attachment to the L1 group. As Clément 
(1980) puts it: “Whether the resulting tendency is positive or negative would be determined 
by a delicate balance, here expressed as a subtractive relationship, of the respective statuses 
of the first and second culture in a given community” (p. 150). Therefore, it is likely that 
openness to the L2 group represents only half of the picture. The other half is represented by 
the confidence in the preservation of the L1 community as perceived by the learner. Without 
a sufficient degree of assurance, the learner may still experience fear of assimilation.  
The ensuing fear of assimilation need not be explicit, however. Proficiency in a 
language like English certainly leads to undeniable advantages, including in degree 
attainment and career advancement. At the social level, in many contexts around the world, 
English “correlates with urbanity, advanced education, an international outlook that tends to 
go together with higher social strata” (Schneider, 2011, p. 342). It is also the “language of 
modernity, superiority, prestige, and sophistication” (Sugiharto, 2015, p. 232). This is an 
interesting predicament. The learner is faced with two choices, whether to learn the language 
and reap its benefits ‘selfishly’, or to try and preserve the distinctiveness and vitality of the 
first language ‘selflessly’. A learner in this situation may be bound to experience ambivalent 
feelings reflecting an explicit–implicit conflict.  
This conceptualization might constitute an interesting twist in the classical construct 
of integrativeness. It highlights the benefit of identification with the L1 group while learning 
an L2. Some preliminary evidence might give support to this view. In the African context, 
Coetzee-Van Rooy (2006) reports that learners who identified more strongly with their in-
group are the ones who achieved higher in English. In this case, the target group is the in-
group. Research in other contexts has similarly shown that using the L1 as the language of 
instruction in school, which can be seen as enhancing in-group identification, has a positive 
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effect on success in English (Genesee, Lindholm-Leary, Saunders, & Christian, 2006; 
Rolstad, Mahoney, & Glass, 2005; Slavin & Cheung, 2005; Willig, 1985). This might imply 
that possessing an integrative motivation, but toward the in-group rather than only toward an 
out-group, has a positive effect on both the affective and the academic levels. A similar 
picture is found is the context of learning languages other than English. It has been observed 
that one motive for learning a language other than English is the attempt to connect with 
one’s own group, whether real or imagined (Duff & Li, 2009). For example, as part of degree 
requirements, many students select a certain language to study because it is their own 
ancestral language, such as Chinese and Korean (e.g., Comanaru & Noels, 2009). Again, the 
target group to identify with here is the in-group. This might be an interesting dimension to 
integrative motivation. However, as mentioned above, these findings are at best preliminary 
and suggestive, as most of these studies were not designed to test the question of L1 
identification specifically. Instead, this idea emerged from the data. More direct testing of this 
hypothesis and its mechanisms and moderators would therefore be an interesting future 
direction.  
As reviewed in Chapter 6, the Saudi context presents a unique situation. The political 
and religious dynamics have cultivated both Islamic supremacism and animosity toward the 
West. It has even led to terrorist activities at a global scale. This cultural baggage may take a 
toll on learning English. The results of this thesis show that religious attitudes are associated 
with fear of assimilation and ethnocentrism, both being the antithesis of openness to the L2 
group. Further supporting this view is the fact that religious attitudes had a negative 
correlation with achievement in the language. These results are in line with the notion that 
religious supremacy leads to higher attachment to the L1 community and lower openness to 
the L2 group, thus negatively affecting success in learning the language of that group.  
The discussion in this section thus far might seem rather unconventional. It has dealt 
with themes such as religiosity, supremacism, and terrorism, none of which are conventional 
topics in the language motivation literature. However, looking at such broad cultural 
dynamics can help provide a deeper perspective into classroom micro-dynamics. As an 
illustration, Nespor (1997) reports on his two-year school ethnography to demonstrate that 
the classroom—far from being an empty ‘container’ to be filled by teacher–student 
interactions—embodies the intersections of local politics, regional economics, school–
community conflicts, corporate influences, body discourses, neighborhood histories, and 
popular media. In other words, “the key to understanding education isn’t to be found in what 
happens in classrooms or schools but in the relations that bind them to networks of practice 
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extending beyond” (Nespor, 1997, p. xiii, original emphasis). Or as Larsen-Freeman and 
Cameron (2008) put it, “there is no chance that... [our decisions] can be disconnected from 
the social-political-historical-moral-cultural influences of our time” (p. 76). The language 
motivation field has recently been moving toward a socio-dynamic approach (Dörnyei & 
Ryan, 2015). This approach is not incompatible with the broader perspective discussed in this 
section.  
This broader perspective also calls attention to the critical role of the language 
teacher. From this perspective, it becomes inevitable that the teacher’s role bears “value-
oriented, moral, and ethical dimensions” (Kubanyiova & Crookes, 2016, p. 119). According 
to Kumaravadivelu’s (2003) analysis, conceptualizations of the role of the teacher have 
passed through three phases. The first phase viewed the teacher as a passive technician, who 
is just a transmitter of content knowledge through breaking it down to discrete and 
manageable parts. The second phase promoted the teacher to a reflective practitioner, who is 
a problem-solver following a holistic approach that involves creativity and context-
sensitivity. Finally, the third phase considers the teacher as a transformative intellectual, who 
educates students “to take risks, to struggle for institutional change, and to fight both against 
oppression and for democracy outside of schools in other oppositional public spheres and the 
wider social arena” (Giroux, 1988, p. xxxiii, original emphases). Indeed, conceptualizing the 
role of the teacher as a transformative intellectual “stretches their role beyond the borders of 
the classroom” (Kumaravadivelu, 2003, p. 14), and has been described as possibly “the most 
significant development in language teacher identity research” (Morgan & Clarke, 2011, p. 
825).  
Fortunately, the language class has two unique characteristics that makes this role a 
bit less formidable of a task. First, thanks to the dominance of communicative language 
teaching today, the language teacher is typically the only teacher who can simply walk into 
the classroom and start ‘chatting’ with the students about a topic of choice until the end of the 
lesson and still be considered ‘teaching’. Although not all teachers have this luxury, many do 
at least during speaking activities such as group discussions, presentations, and written 
essays. This puts the language teacher in a unique position to promote critical thinking and to 
develop ethical standards—beyond learning the mechanics of the language—through 
carefully selected topics and well-structured dialogues.  
A second unique feature of the language class is that teaching the language involves 
introducing learners to aspects of another culture (Gardner, 1985). In fact, the language class 
typically constitutes the learner’s first systematic exposure to the L2 culture, and so the 
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teacher has the ability to mold the learner’s attitudes (positively or negatively) toward that 
group. In recognition of this potential, Lamb and Budiyanto (2013) advocate exploiting 
aspects of the L2 culture in order to uncover learners’ stereotypes and to critique them. Lamb 
and Budiyanto (2013) also argue that this approach, rather than being a purely egalitarian 
exercise, may foster cultural identification and then inspire both short- and long-term 
motivation to learn the language.  
Thus, language teachers in the Saudi context have the potential to influence their 
students’ explicit and implicit attitudes, a responsibility dictated by ethical and moral 
imperatives. This reinforces the view of the teacher as a moral agent (Kubanyiova & 
Crookes, 2016). The language classroom becomes an ideal opportunity for promoting 
tolerance, cross-cultural respect, and peaceful coexistence—or as Brophy (2009) describes it, 
the “proactive implantation of new motivational systems” (p. 152). This analysis might 
constitute an initial seed toward a philosophy of language learning motivation.  
A century ago, renowned educator John Dewey maintained that, “The criterion of the 
value of school education is the extent in which it creates a desire for continued growth and 
supplies means for making the desire effective in fact” (Dewey, 1916, p. 62). Our field has 
the potential to live up to this dream.  
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7.3 Limitations and future directions  
This thesis has hopefully shed some light on some aspects that have not received due 
attention in the field. The results might inspire investigations into ‘the other side’ of our 
constructs. This might lead to interesting discoveries, such as implicit sources of student (and 
even teacher) demotivation. This thesis has used two implicit tests, but there are many more 
tests to explore. Nosek et al. (2011), for example, review 20 different implicit measures. In 
addition, the religious attitudes scale was developed for the purpose of the present research 
and was not grounded on prior theoretical or psychometric research. Furthermore, the ought-
to L2 self scale draws mostly from promotion-related items rather than prevention-related 
ones (see Taguchi et al., 2009). It would be interesting to examine in future research whether 
this point makes a difference.  
The following discussion addresses two aspects that have not been addressed in detail 
in the present thesis, one related to causality and the other malleability.  
7.3.1 Causality  
A limitation of the design of the two studies of this thesis is that they are both observational, 
and so the direction of causality cannot be determined unequivocally. The use of ‘effect’ and 
‘predict’ throughout this thesis has been intended in the statistical sense only. This is standard 
practice in statistical terminology. For example, when researchers calculate ‘effect sizes’ of 
their results, this size of the ‘effect’ is concerned with the magnitude of the variance 
explained and does not have any causal implications of one variable having an effect on 
another. Statistical procedures used in this thesis, such as t-test and ANOVA, are 
fundamentally simplified regression equations (Cohen, 1968). Because of the observational 
nature of this research, hardly any pedagogical implications have been suggested in this 
thesis. Although it has become common in recent years to expect pedagogical implications 
even from observational studies, extreme caution must be exercised here. Making 
pedagogical implications usually assumes causality (for more discussion, see Gardner & 
Tremblay, 1994).  
One way to address this issue is to adopt an experimental research design. The various 
experimental research designs available involve intentional manipulation of variables and 
then observing the effect. Other approaches involve longitudinal designs, in which the 
researchers investigate whether change of one variable over time is followed by change in 
another variable. An example of this design is cross-lagged panel design (e.g., Finkel, 1995). 
Still, because such designs are observational and do not involve manipulation, their results 
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suggest that the causal relationship plausible, not conclusive. Other designs that could also 
shed light on causality include regression discontinuity designs, instrumental variable 
designs, matching and propensity score designs, and comparative interrupted time series 
designs (see Y. Kim & Steiner, 2016).  
7.3.2 Malleability  
The above discussion about studying causality through experimentation implies that implicit 
attitudes are malleable. Otherwise, the possibility of manipulation would be ruled out. Indeed, 
there is some research showing that implicit attitudes are malleable. For example, Dasgupta 
and Greenwald (2001) conducted two experiments and found that exposure to positive and 
negative models from a target community can improve and decrease implicit attitudes, 
respectively. In another study, Gregg, Seibt, and Banaji (2006) also found that it is possible to 
induce positive and negative implicit attitudes about an imagined community. That is, simply 
asking participants to imagine a hypothetical social group can lead to the development of 
implicit attitudes toward that group. Once formed, implicit attitudes become more resistant to 
change. However, Blair, Ma, and Lenton (2001) conducted five experiments and 
demonstrated that engaging in mental imagery can counteract the effect of negative implicit 
attitudes (see also Blair, 2002). Considering the recent interest in mental imagery in our field 
(e.g., Hadfield & Dörnyei, 2013; Kubanyiova, 2014), there seem to be interesting possibilities 
for future research.  
In an interesting study, Lai and colleagues (2014) conducted a large scale set of 
experiments (N = 17,021) testing the effectiveness of 17 different interventions aiming at 
altering implicit attitudes. Their results pointed to several effective interventions, but the most 
effective intervention was using a vivid counterstereotypic scenario. According to this 
intervention, the participants read an evocative story and imagine themselves in this story. In 
testing this intervention, the researchers asked the participants to read a narrative story 
involving this statement: “With sadistic pleasure, he bashes you with his bat again and again” 
(p. 1771). After reading this story, the participants’ implicit attitudes were successfully 
influenced. This demonstrates the power of mental imagery stimulated by narrative stories.  
Perhaps more interestingly, the researchers then increased the vividness of the 
narrative:  
 
With sadistic pleasure, he beats you again and again. First to the body, then to the 
head. You fight to keep your eyes open and your hands up. The last things you 
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remember are the faint smells of alcohol and chewing tobacco and his wicked grin. 
(Lai et al., 2014, p. 1771) 
 
After reading this (highly) vivid narrative, the intervention became more than doubly 
effective. This is another clear illustration of the power of vivid imagery in altering implicit 
attitudes.  
In a subsequent study, Lai and colleagues Lai et al. (2016) wanted to assess the 
durability of attitude change resulting from these interventions. Their results showed that the 
effect is short-term, and that the participants’ implicit attitudes revert to their original level 
within a couple of days at most. Lai and colleagues suggest that longer-term durability might 
be achieved through repeated and prolonged intervention. In support of this view, Devine, 
Forscher, Austin, and Cox (2012) successfully induced durable change in implicit attitudes 
through a 12-month multifaceted intervention program. The effect still existed eight weeks 
after the end of the intervention. Repeated practice leads to increased automaticity of 
activation (Logan, 1988; Nosek, 2005).  
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7.4 Concluding remarks  
This thesis has argued that the implicit side of attitudes and motivation may constitute a more 
important component in the overall understanding of language learning motivation than is 
currently acknowledged in mainstream theories. Focusing entirely on explicit attitudes and 
motivation in empirical studies could mask the potential impact of any conflicting implicit 
attitudes. The findings of this thesis offer evidence that this impact can in some subgroups 
change the results substantially, which in turn suggests that adding an implicit dimension to 
our overall understanding of motivation may be a fruitful future direction.  
This thesis has shown that L2 learners who had stronger implicit preference for L2 
speakers (i.e., explicit–implicit congruence) also expressed stronger affiliation with the L2 
group as well as less fear of assimilation and ethnocentric concerns than did explicit–implicit 
incongruent learners. Implicit attitudes are thus related to other attitudinal/motivational 
factors, and this might be a step toward solving Ushioda’s (2013) puzzle about the divergence 
between the importance of English and the motivation to learn it, as quoted at the beginning 
of the introduction to this thesis.  
While the ‘self’ has served as a useful metaphor in L2 motivation for around a decade 
and has advanced the field beyond integrativeness, “the multitude of overlapping concepts in 
the literature on the self is more confusing than integrativeness ever could be” (MacIntyre et 
al., 2009, p. 54). This may not be undesirable. The complexity of the self may open up 
countless possibilities for future research on a multitude of aspects, conscious and 
unconscious.  
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Implicit test stimuli  
 
Study 1 
 
Pleasant 
جهبم 
Unpleasant 
جعزم 
Arabic 
يبرع 
English 
يزيلجنإ 
Kind 
بيط 
Mean 
ميئل 
Mohammad  
دمحم 
George 
جروج 
Beautiful 
ليمج 
Ugly 
حيبق 
Fatimah  
ةمطاف  
Elizabeth 
ثيبازيلإ 
Honest 
نيمأ 
Dishonest 
نئاخ 
Mecca  
ةكم  
London 
ندنل 
Optimistic 
لئافتم 
Pessimistic 
مئاشتم 
Jordan  
ندرلأا  
Britain 
ايناطيرب 
Fair 
لداع 
Unfair 
ملاظ 
Ibn Khaldun 
نودلخ نبا  
Newton 
نتوين 
Knowledgeable 
مِلاع 
Ignorant 
لهاج 
Hatim al-Tai  
يئاطلا متاح  
Robin Hood 
دوه نبور 
Hardworking 
دهتجم 
Lazy 
لوسك 
Al-Mutanabbi 
يبنتملا  
Shakespeare 
ريبسكش 
Polite 
بدؤم 
Impolite 
حِقو 
Cairo University  
ةرهاقلا ةعماج  
Oxford University 
دروفسكأ ةعماج 
Cheerful 
حِرم 
Cheerless 
بيئك 
Kuwaiti Dinar 
يتيوك رانيد  
Pound Sterling 
ينيلرتسإ هينج 
Clean 
فيظن 
Dirty 
رِذق 
Aljazeera  
ةريزجلا ةانق  
BBC 
يس يب يبلا 
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Study 2 
 
L2 Speakers ST-IAT  L2 Course ST-IAT 
Pleasant 
جهبم 
Unpleasant 
جعزم 
Native 
Speakers 
 نيثدحتملا
يزيلجنلإاب 
 
Pleasant 
جهبم 
Unpleasant 
جعزم 
English 
Course 
يزيلجنلإا ةدام 
Kind 
بيط 
Mean 
ميئل 
George 
جروج 
 
Interesting 
عتمم 
Boring 
لمم 
Grammar 
دعاوق 
Beautiful 
ليمج 
Ugly 
حيبق 
Elizabeth 
ثيبازيلإ 
 
Clear 
حضاو 
Complicated 
ّدقعم 
Vocabulary 
تادرفم 
Honest 
نيمأ 
Dishonest 
نئاخ 
New York 
كرويوين 
 
Valuable 
ديفم 
Time-
Wasting 
تقولل ةعيضم 
Listening 
عامتسا 
Optimistic 
لئافتم 
Pessimistic 
مئاشتم 
Britain 
ايناطيرب 
 
Important 
مهم 
Trivial 
هفات 
Reading 
ةءارق 
Fair 
لداع 
Unfair 
ملاظ 
Newton 
نتوين 
 
Varied 
عونتم 
Monotonous 
ينيتور 
Speaking 
ثّدحت 
Knowledgeable 
مِلاع 
Ignorant 
لهاج 
Robin Hood 
دوه نبور 
 
Satisfying 
ىضرلاب رِعشم 
Dissatisfying 
ءايتسلااب رِعشم 
Writing 
ةباتك 
Hardworking 
دهتجم 
Lazy 
لوسك 
Shakespeare 
ريبسكش 
 
Good 
ديج 
Bad 
ئيس 
Learning 
مّلعت 
Polite 
بدؤم 
Impolite 
حِقو 
Oxford 
University 
دروفسكأ ةعماج 
 
Appealing 
بّاذج 
Repellent 
ّرفنم 
Studying 
ةركاذم 
Cheerful 
حِرم 
Cheerless 
بيئك 
Dollar 
رلاود 
 
Encouraging 
عّجشم 
Discouraging 
ّطبحم 
Lecture 
ةرضاحم 
Clean 
فيظن 
Dirty 
رِذق 
BBC 
يس يب يبلا 
 
Clean 
فيظن 
Dirty 
رِذق 
Teacher 
سّردم 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire items 
 
Study 1 
 
Attitudes toward English-Speaking People 
 
I wish I could have many more English friends. 
.نييزيلجنلإا ءاقدصلأا نم ربكأ ددع يدل ناك ول ىنمتأ 
 
I think my fellow students should make more English friends.  
يئلامز حصنأ .نييزيلجنلإا عم تاقادصلا نم ديزملا نيوكتب بلاطلا 
 
I’d like to know more English people. 
.نييزيلجنلإا صاخشلأا نم ديزملا ىلع فرعتلا دوأ 
 
Attitudes toward Learning English 
 
Learning English is very interesting. 
.ادج قوشم ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعت 
 
I enjoy learning English. 
.ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعتب عتمتسأ انأ 
 
I feel that time passes fast while studying English. 
.ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعت ءانثأ ةعرسب رمي تقولا نأ رعشأ انأ 
 
If it were my choice, I would spend more time learning English.  
 فوس ينإف ,يديب كلذ ناك ول.ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعت يف لوطأ اتقو يضقأ 
 
Ideal L2 Self 
 
I can imagine myself mastering English one day.  
.ام اموي ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا تنقتأ دقو يسفن ليختأ نأ يننكمي 
 
I can imagine that I will be able to communicate with English speakers as easily as I do it in 
Arabic.  
.ةيبرعلاب ثدحتأ ينأكو ةلوهسب ةيزيلجنلإاب نيثدحتملا عم لصاوتلا عيطتسأ فوس ينأ ليختأ نأ يننكمي 
 
I can imagine myself one day reaching the stage when I can write English letters and 
documents without any problem.  
 دقو ام اموي يسفن ليختأ نأ يننكمي.لكاشم يأ نودب ةيزيلجنلإا تادنتسملاو لئاسرلا ةباتك نم يننكمت ةلحرمل تلصو 
 
I can imagine that I will be able to watch English movies without any problems of 
understanding them.  
اهمهف يف لكاشم يأ نودب ةيزيلجنلإا ملافلأا ةدهاشم عيطتسأ فوس ينأ ليختأ نأ يننكمي. 
 
 
 
Ought-to Self 
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I must study English because it will earn me respect [recognition] in the society.  
.عمتجملا يف مارتحلاا ينبسكت فوس اهنلأ ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعتأ نأ يلع بجي 
 
I must study English because people close to me believe it is important.   
 بجي.يرورض رمأ كلذ نأ نودقتعي ينم نيبرقملا سانلا نلأ ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعتأ نأ يلع 
 
Studying English is important to me because this will make me an educated person.  
.افقثم اصخش ينلعجيس كلذ نلأ يل ةبسنلاب مهم ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعت 
 
Fear of Assimilation 
 
I think that the interest in the West has a negative influence on the Arab culture.  
.ةيبرعلا ةفاقثلا ىلع يبلس ريثأت هل برغلاب مامتهلاا نأ نظأ انأ 
 
Arabic has become contaminated because of the influence of the English language.  
حبصأ ةيبرعلا ةغللا نأ دقتعأ انأ.اهيلع ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ريثأت ببسب ةثولم ت 
 
I think the morals of Arabs have become worse because of the negative influence of the West.  
.يبلسلا ةيزيلجنلإا لودلا ريثأت ببسب أوسأ تحبصأ برعلا تايقلاخأ نأ دقتعأ انأ 
 
I think the cultural values of the West spread at the expense of the values of Arabs.  
ةيزيلجنلإا لودلا مِيق نأ دقتعأ انأ .ةيبرعلا ميِقلا باسح ىلع رشتنت 
 
Openness to the West constitutes a threat of losing the Arab identity.  
 تافاقثلا ىلع حاتفنلاا نإ.ةيبرعلا ةيوهلا دقفب اديدهت لكشي ىرخلأا 
 
Ethnocentrism 
 
I find it difficult to work together with people who have different customs.  
.ديلاقتلاو تاداعلا يف يننوفلاخي صاخشأ عم لمعلا يف ةبوعص دجأ انأ 
 
It is hard for me to accept the behavior of people from other cultures.  
.ىرخأ تافاقثل نومتني يذلا صاخشلأا كولس ّلبقت ّيلع بعصي 
 
I think the world would be better if everybody lived the way Arabs live.  
عي امك اوشاع سانلا لك نأ ول لضفأ نوكي فوس ملاعلا نأ نظأ انأ.برعلا شي 
 
I often think that Christians are enemies to Muslims. 
.نيملسملل ءادعأ نييحيسملا نأ يلاب ىلع رطخي ام ابلاغ 
 
Westerners are ignorant because they have not accepted Islam.  
.ملاسلإا اوقنتعي مل مهنلأ ةلهج نييبرغلا نإ 
 
Religious Attitudes 
 
The idea of sharing my Islamic faith with my non-Muslim friends is always present in my mind.  
.يلاب ىلع ةرضاح امئاد ملاسلإل نيملسملا ريغ يباحصأ ةوعد ةركف 
 
I feel upset when I see things that violate Sharia law among the English.  
 ام ىرأ امدنع قياضتأ انأ.نييزيلجنلإا دنع ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا فلاخي 
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I try to avoid looking like non-Muslims, such as in dress and haircut.  
.رعشلا تاصقو سابللاك لكشلا يف نيملسملا ريغب هبشتلا نع داعتبلاا لواحأ انأ 
 
I pity the English because they are non-Muslims.  
فشلاب روعش يندواري.نيملسم ريغ مهنلأ نييزيلجنلإا ىلع ةق 
 
Attitudes toward Arabs – Semantic Differential 
 
Unfair / Fair   
ملاظ / لداع 
 
Polite / Impolite (R) 
بدؤم / حِقو 
 
Cheerless / Cheerful  
بيئك / حِرم 
 
Mean / Kind   
ميئل / بيط 
 
Pleasant / Unpleasant (R) 
جهبم / جعزم 
 
Lazy / Hardworking  
دهتجم / لوسك 
 
Beautiful / Ugly (R) 
ليمج / حيبق 
 
Ignorant / Knowledgeable  
لهاج / مِلاع 
 
Dishonest / Honest  
نئاخ / نيمأ 
 
Pessimistic / Optimistic  
مئاشتم / لئافتم 
 
Attitudes toward the English – Semantic Differential 
 
Unfair / Fair   
ظ / لداعملا  
 
Polite / Impolite (R) 
بدؤم / حِقو 
 
Cheerless / Cheerful  
بيئك / حِرم 
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Mean / Kind   
ميئل / بيط 
 
Pleasant / Unpleasant (R) 
جهبم / جعزم 
 
Lazy / Hardworking  
دهتجم / لوسك 
 
Beautiful / Ugly (R) 
ليمج / حيبق 
 
Ignorant / Knowledgeable   
لهاج / مِلاع 
 
Dishonest / Honest  
نئاخ / نيمأ 
 
Pessimistic / Optimistic  
مئاشتم / لئافتم 
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Study 2 
 
Ideal L2 Self 
 
I can imagine myself mastering English one day.  
.ام اموي ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا تنقتأ دقو يسفن ليختأ نأ يننكمي 
 
I can imagine that I will be able to communicate with English speakers as easily as I do it in 
Arabic.  
.ةيبرعلاب ثدحتأ ينأكو ةلوهسب ةيزيلجنلإاب نيثدحتملا عم لصاوتلا عيطتسأ فوس ينأ ليختأ نأ يننكمي 
 
I can imagine myself one day reaching the stage when I can write English reports without any 
problem.  
.لكاشم يأ نودب ةيزيلجنلإا ريراقتلا ةباتك نم يننكمت ةلحرمل تلصو دقو ام اموي يسفن ليختأ نأ يننكمي 
 
I can imagine that I will be able to watch English programs without any problems of 
understanding them.  
نأ يننكمي .اهمهف يف لكاشم يأ نودب ةيزيلجنلإا جماربلا ةدهاشم عيطتسأ فوس ينأ ليختأ 
 
Ought-to Self 
 
I must study English because it will earn me respect in the society.  
.عمتجملا يف مارتحلاا ينبسكت فوس اهنلأ ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعتأ نأ ّيلع بجي 
 
Studying English is important to me because this will make me an educated person.  
.افقثم اصخش ينلعجيس كلذ نلأ يل ةبسنلاب مهم ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعت 
 
Studying English is important to me because it will help me get a good job someday. 
 كلذ نلأ يل ةبسنلاب مهم ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعت.ام اموي ةديج ةفيظو ىلع لوصحلا ىلع يندعاسيس  
 
Studying English is important to me because it is an important factor for promotions in my future 
career. 
.ةيلبقتسملا يتفيظو يف تايقرت ىلع لوصحلل مهم لماع كلذ نلأ يل ةبسنلاب مهم ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعت 
 
Intended Effort 
 
I am prepared to expend a lot of effort in learning English. 
 .ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعت يف دهجلا نم ريثكلا لذبل دادعتسلاا ّيدل 
 
I would like to spend lots of time studying English. 
.ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعت يف لوطأ تقو ءاضق يف بغرأ انأ 
 
If I was offered to study English in the future, I would study it. 
.اهسردأ فوسف ،لبقتسملا يف ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ةسارد ّيلع ضرُع ول 
 
I want to master English in order to keep informed of the latest news of the world. 
 تادجتسم رخأ ىلع اعلطم نوكأ ىتح ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ناقتإ ديرأ.ملاعلا لوح رابخلأا  
 
One of the reasons that motivate me to learn English is I want to be able to communicate with 
more people.  
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.سانلا نم ربكأ ددع عم لصاوتلا ىلع ارداق حبصأ نأ ديرأ ينأ وه ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ملعتل ينعفدت يتلا بابسلأا دحأ 
 
Family Support 
 
My parents encourage me to study English. 
.ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ةسارد ىلع يادلاو ينعجشي 
 
My family pressure me to do my best in my studies. 
.يتسارد يف يدهج لذبلأ ّيلع طغضلاب يلهأ موقي 
 
My parents follow up with my progress in the College.  
 يف يمدقت يادلاو عباتي.ةيلكلا  
 
My parents feel happy when I get high marks.  
.ةيلاع تاجارد ىلع لصحأ امدنع ةداعسلاب يادلاو رعشي 
 
Fear of Assimilation 
 
I think that the interest in the West has a negative influence on the Arab culture.  
 يبلس ريثأت هل برغلاب مامتهلاا نأ نظأ انأ.ةيبرعلا ةفاقثلا ىلع 
 
Arabic has become contaminated because of the influence of the English language.  
.اهيلع ةيزيلجنلإا ةغللا ريثأت ببسب ةثولم تحبصأ ةيبرعلا ةغللا نأ دقتعأ انأ 
 
I think the morals of Arabs have become worse because of the negative influence of the West.  
.ةيبرغلا لودلل يبلسلا ريثأتلا ببسب أوسأ تحبصأ برعلا تايقلاخأ نأ دقتعأ انأ 
 
I think the cultural values (like their customs) of the West spread at the expense of the values of 
Arabs.  
ةيبرغلا لودلا مِيق نأ دقتعأ انأ تنت )مهديلاقتو مهتاداعك(.ةيبرعلا ميِقلا باسح ىلع رش 
 
Openness to the West constitutes a threat of losing the Arab identity.  
.ةيبرعلا ةيوهلا دقفب اديدهت لكشي ىرخلأا تافاقثلا ىلع حاتفنلاا نإ 
 
Ethnocentrism 
 
I find it difficult to work together with people who have different customs.  
.ديلاقتلاو تاداعلا يف يننوفلاخي صاخشأ عم لمعلا يف ةبوعص دجأ انأ 
 
It is hard for me to accept the behavior of people from other cultures.  
نومتني يذلا صاخشلأا كولس ّلبقت ّيلع بعصي .ىرخأ تافاقثل 
 
Religious Attitudes 
 
When I see a non-Muslim, the idea of sharing my Islamic faith with them comes to my mind 
immediately.  
ملسم ريغ اصخش ىرأ امدنع، .ةرشابم يلاب يف رضحت ملاسلإل هتوعد ةركف نإف 
 
I feel upset when I see things that violate Sharia law among Westerners.  
.نييبرغلا دنع ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا فلاخي ام ىرأ امدنع قياضتأ انأ 
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I try to avoid emulating infidels in appearance, such as in clothing and haircut.  
رافكلاب هبشتلا نع داعتبلاا لواحأ انأ .رعشلا تاصقو سابللاك لكشلا يف 
 
I pity the English because they are non-Muslims.  
.نيملسم ريغ مهنلأ نييزيلجنلإا ىلع ةقفشلاب روعش يندواري 
 
I sometimes think that Christians are enemies to Muslims. 
.نيملسملل ءادعأ نييحيسملا نأ يلاب ىلع رطخي ام ابلاغ 
 
Westerners are living in darkness because they have not accepted Islam.  
.ملاسلإا اوقنتعي مل مهنأ ملاظ يف نوشيعي نييبرغلا نإ 
 
Social Desirability 
 
I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble. 
 ةدعاسم لجلأ يلمع كرت يف ادبأ ددرتأ لا انأ.ةدعاسملل جاتحي صخش  
 
It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. (R) 
.دحأ نم اعيجشت دجأ مل اذإ يلمع ةعباتم يف ةبوعص دجأ انأ ،نايحلأا ضعب يف 
 
I have never intensely disliked anyone. 
.ادبأ يتايح يف ةدشب ادحأ ُتهرك ينأ ثدحي مل 
 
On occasion, I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. (R)  
.حاجنلا ىلع يتردق يف كشلا اهيف يندوار يتلا تاقولأا ضعب ّيلع ترم 
 
I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. (R) 
.ديرأ ام بسحب روملأا يرجت لا امدنع بضغلاب رعشأ انايحأ 
 
My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.  
.معطملا يف يلكأ ةقيرط نع فلتخت لا تيبلا يف يلكأ ةقيرط 
 
On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability. (R) 
شل ُتعمتسا ،تارملا نم ةرم يف.كلذب تعتمتساو رخآ اصخش باتغي صخ  
 
No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.  
.هعم ثدحتأ يذلا صخشلا وه نّمع رظنلا ضغب نيرخلآل ديج عمتسم امئاد انأ 
 
I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something. (R) 
نم موي يف ضرملاب ُترهاظت نأ ثدح دقل .ام لمع نم صلختأ يكل مايلأا  
 
There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. (R) 
.تارملا نم ةرم يف ام صخش للاغتساب ُتمق دقل 
 
I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.  
.هب فارتعلال دعتسم امئاد انأف أطخ بكترأ امدنع 
 
I always try to practice what I preach.  
.هب نيرخلآا حصنأ ام ّقبطأ امئاد انأ 
222 
 
 
I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. (R) 
.فلس اّمع وفعأ نأ نم لادب يقحب ذخآ نأ لضفأ انايحأ انأ 
 
When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it.  
 نوكأ امدنع.كلذب فرتعأ نأ نم عنام يدل نوكي نل هنإف ،ام رمأب لاهاج  
 
I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.  
.مدلا ليقث وه نم عم ىتح ،بذهم امئاد انأ 
 
At times, I have really insisted on having things my own way. (R) 
هيف تيّرصأ يتلا نايحلأا ضعب كانه.يتقيرط بسح روملأا يرست نأ ىلع ا  
 
There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. (R) 
.بضغلا ببسب ءايشلأا ميطحت يف ةبغرلاب اهيف ُترعش يتلا نايحلأا ضعب كانه تناك 
 
I never resent being asked to return a favor.  
ر ينم بلُطي امدنع ادبأ ءاتسأ لا انأ.ليمجلا د  
 
I have never been annoyed when people expressed ideas very different from my own.  
.ييأر نع فلتخت ءارآ سانلا يدبي امدنع ادبأ قياضتأ لا انأ 
 
There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. (R) 
ا تاقولأا ضعب كانه تناك.نيرخلآا ظح نم ةريغلاب اهيف ترعش يتل  
 
I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.  
.ام اصخش خّبوأ يف ةبغرلاب ةرم رعشأ مل انأ 
 
I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. (R) 
 .ةمدخ ينم دحأ بلطَي امدنع قياضتأ انايحأ انأ 
 
I have never felt that I was punished without cause.  
.ببس نودب تبقوع ينأب ادبأ رعشأ مل انأ 
 
I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved. (R) 
 ام لان هنأب لوقأو يسفن نيبو ينيب هب ُتمشأ انايحأ ينإف ،ةبيصمب صخش باصي امدنع.قحتسي  
 
I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.  
.ادبأ نيرخلآا روعش حرجي ائيش لوقأ نأ دمعتأ مل انأ 
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Attitudes toward L2 Speakers – Semantic Differential 
 
Lazy / Hardworking (R) 
دهتجم / لوسك 
 
Mean / Kind   
ميئل / بيط  
 
Pessimistic / Optimistic  
مئاشتم / لئافتم  
 
Polite / Impolite (R) 
بدؤم / حِقو 
 
Unfair / Fair   
ملاظ / لداع 
 
Cheerless / Cheerful  
بيئك / حِرم 
 
Beautiful / Ugly (R) 
ليمج / حيبق 
 
Pleasant / Unpleasant (R) 
جهبم / جعزم 
 
Ignorant / Knowledgeable   
لهاج / مِلاع 
 
Dishonest / Honest  
نئاخ / نيمأ 
 
L2 Learning Experience – Semantic Differential 
 
Boring / Interesting   
ةلمم / ةعتمم 
 
Complicated / Clear 
ةّدقعم / ةحضاو 
 
Pleasant / Unpleasant (R) 
ةجهبم / ةجعزم 
 
Time-Wasting / Valuable   
تقولل ةعيضم / ةديفم 
 
Trivial / Important 
ةهفات / ةمهم 
 
Bad / Good   
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ةئيس / ةديج 
 
Appealing / Repellent (R) 
ةبّاذج / ةّرفنم 
 
Discouraging / Encouraging   
ةّطبحم / ةعّجشم  
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Appendix C: Correlation tables  
Table C.1: Zero-order correlations for the male (above the diagonal, n = 257) and female (below the diagonal, n = 108) subsamples.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Attitudes to English- 
    Speaking People 
—   .45***   .18**   .31*** –.17** –.13* –.08   .03   .30***   .18**   .08 
2. Attitudes to  
    Language Learning 
  .34*** —   .21***   .34*** –.08   .09   .09   .06   .21***   .13*   .03 
3. Ideal L2 Self   .18†   .10 —   .17** –.07   .06   .08   .15*   .00 –.09 –.05 
4. Ought-to L2 Self   .27**   .27**   .09 —   .18**   .19**   .02   .03   .24***   .13* –.09 
5. Fear of Assimilation –.02 –.02 –.08   .04 —   .55***   .35***   .18** –.24*** –.31*** –.27*** 
6. Ethnocentrism  –.04   .22* –.18†   .21*   .49*** —   .52***   .32*** –.17** –.38*** –.19** 
7. Religious Attitudes    .13   .16†   .00 –.02   .30**   .38*** —   .32*** –.12* –.31*** –.21*** 
8. Attitudes to Arabs— 
    SDS 
  .11 –.01   .02   .02 –.04   .18†   .24** —   .07 –.70*** –.12* 
9. Attitudes to the 
    English—SDS 
  .52***   .18† –.09   .08 –.09   .06 –.04   .23* —   .59***   .10 
10. Explicit D Measure   .28**   .16 –.05   .02   .00 –.12 –.19* –.70***   .49*** —   .14* 
11. Implicit D Measure –.11 –.09 –.02   .08 –.16† –.06 –.10 –.10 –.16† –.05 — 
Note. SDS = semantic differential scale.  
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05, † p < .10   
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Table C.2: Zero-order correlations for the male participants who had L1 (below the diagonal, n = 128) and L2 (above the diagonal, n = 129) 
implicit preference.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Attitudes to English- 
    Speaking People 
—   .50***   .32***   .39*** –.27** –.16† –.20* –.10   .36***   .33***   .09 
2. Attitudes to  
    Language Learning 
  .40*** —   .23**   .34*** –.23**   .11   .05 –.02   .32***   .29***   .03 
3. Ideal L2 Self   .04   .19* —   .20* –.10 –.02 –.02   .14 –.04 –.10 –.01 
4. Ought-to L2 Self   .25**   .35***   .14 —   .12   .15† –.01 –.01   .26**   .20* –.07 
5. Fear of Assimilation –.06   .08 –.06   .22** —   .51***   .39***   .17* –.22** –.30*** –.34*** 
6. Ethnocentrism  –.08   .09   .13   .20*   .57*** —   .55***   .32*** –.11 –.31*** –.22** 
7. Religious Attitudes    .08   .16†   .18*   .05   .28***   .47*** —   .35*** –.13 –.33*** –.29*** 
8. Attitudes to Arabs— 
    SDS 
  .18*   .14   .14   .05   .16†   .31***   .27** —   .00 –.68*** –.19* 
9. Attitudes to the 
    English—SDS 
  .23**   .09   .05   .23** –.25** –.22** –.11   .16† —   .66***   .15† 
10. Explicit D Measure   .03 –.04 –.07   .08 –.29*** –.42*** –.26** –.71***   .52*** —   .21* 
11. Implicit D Measure –.03 –.07   .01 –.03 –.11 –.01 –.05   .05 –.01 –.08 — 
Note. SDS = semantic differential scale.  
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05, † p < .10  
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Table C.3: Zero-order correlations for the female participants who had L1 (below the diagonal, n = 54) and L2 (above the diagonal, n = 54) 
implicit preference.   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Attitudes to English- 
    Speaking People 
—   .61***   .14   .37**   .00 –.06   .16   .06   .61***   .36** –.01 
2. Attitudes to  
    Language Learning 
  .05 —   .07   .21   .05   .22   .21   .00   .22   .16   .11 
3. Ideal L2 Self   .20   .12 —   .17 –.09 –.20 –.17 –.05 –.04   .08   .29* 
4. Ought-to L2 Self   .14   .32*   .00 —   .12   .20 –.03 –.02   .12   .08   .15 
5. Fear of Assimilation –.10 –.13 –.13 –.08 —   .54***   .24†   .05 –.15 –.09 –.08 
6. Ethnocentrism  –.02   .22 –.17   .22   .34*** —   .39**   .22 –.18 –.29*   .09 
7. Religious Attitudes    .08   .12   .14 –.02   .37**   .36** —   .37**   .02 –.25†   .02 
8. Attitudes to Arabs— 
    SDS 
  .18 –.02   .09   .07 –.22   .12   .09 —   .16 –.76*** –.07 
9. Attitudes to the 
    English—SDS 
  .41**   .14 –.16   .04 –.03   .27* –.11   .30* —   .47*** –.19 
10. Explicit D Measure   .16   .16 –.21 –.06   .15   .08 –.13 –.63***   .53*** — –.04 
11. Implicit D Measure –.10 –.32* –.08   .23† –.07   .06 –.08 –.03 –.15 –.18 — 
Note. SDS = semantic differential scale.  
*** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05, † p < .10 
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Appendix D: R code used to compute Bayes factors  
#This script is self-contained  
#and does not require an associated data file.  
#The computations are calculated based on the data below.  
 
################## 
 
#Code for the Bayes factors reported in Tables 6.17 and 6.18: 
 
#Study 1 data:  
  #n1 = 78, n2 = 84 
  #ATESP t = 1.99,  
  #foa t = 3.35 
  #ethno t = 2.49 
  #relig = 3.11 
  #att tw arabs t = 2.48 
 
#Study 2 data (t-values are the square roots of MANCOVA F-values)   
  #n1 = 112, n2 = 125 
  #foa t = 2.3 
  #ethno t = 1.87 
  #relg t = 1.79 
  #grades = 2.34  
 
foa.t <- c(3.35, 2.3) 
ethno.t <- c(2.49, 1.87) 
relig.t <- c(3.11, 1.79) 
n1 <- c(78, 112) 
n2 <- c(84, 125) 
 
#install the package if not already installed 
#install.packages("BayesFactor") 
library(BayesFactor) 
foa.30 <- meta.ttestBF(foa.t, n1, n2, rscale = .3) 
foa.10 <- meta.ttestBF(foa.t, n1, n2, rscale = .1) 
foa.50 <- meta.ttestBF(foa.t, n1, n2, rscale = .5) 
c("foa.10" = foa.10, "foa.30" = foa.30, "foa.50" = foa.50) 
 
ethno.30 <- meta.ttestBF(ethno.t, n1, n2, rscale = .3) 
ethno.10 <- meta.ttestBF(ethno.t, n1, n2, rscale = .1) 
ethno.50 <- meta.ttestBF(ethno.t, n1, n2, rscale = .5) 
c("ethno.10" = ethno.10, "ethno.30" = ethno.30, "ethno.50" = ethno.50) 
 
relig.30 <- meta.ttestBF(relig.t, n1, n2, rscale = .3) 
relig.10 <- meta.ttestBF(relig.t, n1, n2, rscale = .1) 
relig.50 <- meta.ttestBF(relig.t, n1, n2, rscale = .5) 
c(relig.10, relig.30, relig.50) 
 
#Grades 
grades.30 <- ttest.tstat(2.34, 112, 125, simple = T, rscale = .3) 
grades.10 <- ttest.tstat(2.34, 112, 125, simple = T, rscale = .1) 
grades.50 <- ttest.tstat(2.34, 112, 125, simple = T, rscale = .5) 
c("grades.10" = grades.10, "grades.30" = grades.30, "grades.5" = 
grades.50) 
 
################## 
 
#Code for the Bayes factors of the cluster analysis: 
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#cluster analysis for the MALE samples: 
 
#Study 1: 
  #cluster n1 = 129, cluster n2 = 128 ##notice the order is switched## 
  #cluster t = 3.27 
 
#Study 2: 
  #cluster n1 = 138, cluster n2 = 134 
  #cluster t = 2.34 
 
cluster.n1 <- c(129, 138) 
cluster.n2 <- c(128, 134) 
cluster.t <- c(3.27, 2.34) 
 
cluster.30 <- meta.ttestBF(cluster.t, cluster.n1, cluster.n2, rscale = .3) 
cluster.10 <- meta.ttestBF(cluster.t, cluster.n1, cluster.n2, rscale = .1) 
cluster.50 <- meta.ttestBF(cluster.t, cluster.n1, cluster.n2, rscale = .5) 
c(cluster.10, cluster.30, cluster.50) 
 
################## 
 
#Code for the Bayes factors reported in Tables 6.19 and 6.20: 
 
#Study 1 data:  
  #n1 = 178, n2 = 152 
  #ideal t = 0.02  
  #ought t = -0.70 
  #foa t = -5.92 
  #ethno t = -9.97 
  #ATESP t = 0.09 
  #L2experience t = -1.90 
  #IATspeakers t = 3.05 
 
#Study 2 data:  
  #n1 = 153 n2 = 129 
  #ideal t = -2.88 
  #ought t = -2.13 
  #foa t = -7.14 
  #ethno = -3.77 
  #ATESP t = -2.01 
  #L2experience t = -0.45 
  #IATspeakers t = 0.05 
 
ideal.t <- c(.02, -2.88) 
ought.t <- c(-0.70, -2.13) 
foa.t <- c(-5.92, -7.14) 
ethno.t <- c(-9.97, -3.77) 
ATESP.t <- c(0.09, -2.01) 
L2experience.t <- c(-1.90, -0.45) 
IATspeakers.t <- c(3.05, 0.05) 
 
n1 <- c(178, 152) 
n2 <- c(153, 129) 
 
library(BayesFactor) 
ideal.10 <- meta.ttestBF(ideal.t, n1, n2, rscale = .1) 
ideal.30 <- meta.ttestBF(ideal.t, n1, n2, rscale = .3) 
ideal.50 <- meta.ttestBF(ideal.t, n1, n2, rscale = .5) 
c(ideal.10, ideal.30, ideal.50) 
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ought.10 <- meta.ttestBF(ought.t, n1, n2, rscale = .1) 
ought.30 <- meta.ttestBF(ought.t, n1, n2, rscale = .3) 
ought.50 <- meta.ttestBF(ought.t, n1, n2, rscale = .5) 
c(ought.10, ought.30, ought.50) 
 
foa.10 <- meta.ttestBF(foa.t, n1, n2, rscale = .1) 
foa.30 <- meta.ttestBF(foa.t, n1, n2, rscale = .3) 
foa.50 <- meta.ttestBF(foa.t, n1, n2, rscale = .5) 
c(foa.10, foa.30, foa.50) 
 
ethno.10 <- meta.ttestBF(ethno.t, n1, n2, rscale = .1) 
ethno.30 <- meta.ttestBF(ethno.t, n1, n2, rscale = .3) 
ethno.50 <- meta.ttestBF(ethno.t, n1, n2, rscale = .5) 
c(ethno.10, ethno.30, ethno.50) 
 
ATESP.10 <- meta.ttestBF(ATESP.t, n1, n2, rscale = .1) 
ATESP.30 <- meta.ttestBF(ATESP.t, n1, n2, rscale = .3) 
ATESP.50 <- meta.ttestBF(ATESP.t, n1, n2, rscale = .5) 
c(ATESP.10, ATESP.30, ATESP.50) 
 
L2experience.10 <- meta.ttestBF(L2experience.t, n1, n2, rscale = .1) 
L2experience.30 <- meta.ttestBF(L2experience.t, n1, n2, rscale = .3) 
L2experience.50 <- meta.ttestBF(L2experience.t, n1, n2, rscale = .5) 
c(L2experience.10, L2experience.30, L2experience.50) 
 
IATspeakers.10 <- meta.ttestBF(IATspeakers.t, n1, n2, rscale = .1) 
IATspeakers.30 <- meta.ttestBF(IATspeakers.t, n1, n2, rscale = .3) 
IATspeakers.50 <- meta.ttestBF(IATspeakers.t, n1, n2, rscale = .5) 
c(IATspeakers.10, IATspeakers.30, IATspeakers.50) 
 
###################### 
 
#Bayes factors reported in Tables 6.19 and 6.20  
#for variables that were not included in Study 1: 
  #IATcourse t = 0.06 
  #family t = -4.25 
  #intended t = -1.69 
  #desirability t = -1.13 
  #grades t = 3.05 
  #n1 = 153 n2 = 129 
 
IATcourse.10 <- ttest.tstat(0.06, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .1) 
IATcourse.30 <- ttest.tstat(0.06, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .3) 
IATcourse.50 <- ttest.tstat(0.06, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .5) 
c("IATcourse.10" = IATcourse.10, "IATcourse.30" = IATcourse.30, "grades.5" 
= IATcourse.50) 
 
family.10 <- ttest.tstat(-4.25, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .1) 
family.30 <- ttest.tstat(-4.25, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .3) 
family.50 <- ttest.tstat(-4.25, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .5) 
c("family.10" = family.10, "family.30" = family.30, "family.5" = 
family.50) 
 
intended.10 <- ttest.tstat(-1.69, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .1) 
intended.30 <- ttest.tstat(-1.69, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .3) 
intended.50 <- ttest.tstat(-1.69, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .5) 
c("intended.10" = intended.10, "intended.30" = intended.30, "intended.5" = 
intended.50) 
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desirability.10 <- ttest.tstat(-1.13, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .1) 
desirability.30 <- ttest.tstat(-1.13, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .3) 
desirability.50 <- ttest.tstat(-1.13, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .5) 
c("desirability.10" = desirability.10, "desirability.30" = 
desirability.30, "desirability.5" = desirability.50) 
 
grades.10 <- ttest.tstat(3.05, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .1) 
grades.30 <- ttest.tstat(3.05, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .3) 
grades.50 <- ttest.tstat(3.05, 153, 129, simple = T, rscale = .5) 
c("grades.10" = grades.10, "grades.30" = grades.30, "grades.5" = 
grades.50) 
 
citation("BayesFactor") 
 
